FOURTH EDITION
edited by
FOURTH EDITION
Department of Philosophy
i
ii
History and Philosophy of Science
Princewill Alozie
Department of
Philosophy
Copyright © 2006 Princewill Alozie
All right reserved. No portion of this book may be
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FOURTH
EDITION
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PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
In this revised and enlarged fourth edition, the history of science has taken on a new form. We now have histories of some disciplines like Physics, Zoology, Botany, Nursing Science. With the exception of History of Physics which we deliberately gave more space, the other disciplines introduced in this edition are given introductory and sketchy approaches. Our basic aim in this volume is to remind students and specialists alike, of non-static nature of academic disciplines. Readers are encouraged to explore in more detailed forms the history of their respective disciplines. It is my hope that the relationship of various disciplines would gradually be unfolding as we embark upon this study which is still at its infancy in this part of the world. Attempt have also been made to present some geo-political perspectives of the history of science. We thus have, history of science in India, Arab world, and History of Mathematics in Africa.
The Philosophy of science section has added chapters dealing with Feyrabend’s philosophy; Realism in science; reflections on Thomas Kuhn’s science; Marxist methodology of science in a changing world; logic, law of evidence and philosophy of science.
History and Philosophy of science will enable readers appreciate the fact that science at the present stage of development will make the science of a thousand years ago look like a child’s play. We have not arrived at the ultimate scientific truths about reality which some scientists aim at unravelling. What is important, however, is to regard science not as package of absolute truths, but as processes that could lead us unto unraveling most mysteries of life and of the universe.
Staff and students in different institutions are likely to be thrilled by some of the chapters in this edition. Science students, will equally benefits from this work.
Princewill
Alozie
v
vi
History of Physics (from antiquity to the 21st century) .....1
History of Zoology............................................................86
History of Botany............................................................100
History and Philosophy of Nursing Science...................114
Reflections on the History of Physics.............................137
History of Mathematics in Africa...................................150
History of Science in the Arab World.............................162
History of Science in India.............................................171
TABLE OF CONTENTS
History of science Part One
Philosophy of Science: A Panoramic View: Positivism;
Critical Rationalism and Some Alternatives..................193
Determinism in Biology.....................................................222
Philosophical Foundation of the Science and Politics...231
Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Science and its implications
for African Development...............................................265
Science as an Ideology...................................................284
Logic, Law of Evidence and Philosophy of Science.....298
Realism in Science.........................................................314
Reflections on Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science..327
The Concept of Relativism in Modern Science:
its Philosophical Underpinnings.....................................349
Marxist’s Methodology of Science in a
Changing World..............................................................376
List of Contributors........................................................398
Philosophy of science Part Two
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Part
I
vii
HISTORY
OF PHYSICS
(FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE 21ST CENTURY)
BY
JOSEPH A. OBU
DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS
CALABAR
June, 2005
1.0 Introduction
Since antiquity, people have tried to understand the behavior of matter with questions such as; why unsupported objects drop to the ground and why different, materials have different properties amongst others, being asked. In addition, the character of the universe, such as the form of the earth and the behavior of celestial objects such as the sun and the moon were a mystery. Several theories were proposed to answer some of these questions, but most of them were wrong and were largely couched in philosophical terms and rarely verified by systematic experimental testing. Invariably, the behavior and nature of the world were explained by invoking the actions of the gods.
Physics comes from the Greek word physikos meaning natural, itself rooted from the word “physis”, meaning Nature. It is the study of energy and its interaction with matter. Because of the primacy of energy in terms of the history of the universe, because all matter must interact with energy and because energy is the key player when matter is decomposed into its most basic parts, physics is often considered as the fundamental science.
The major categories of physics are - theoretical physics, experimental physics, fundamental research and applied physics. Theoretical physicists seek to deduce laws of the universe using observations of experimental physicists. A common goal of theoretical physics is to reduce the description of the physical world to a minimal set of laws governing a finite set of fundamental constituent elements in the universe. Experimental physicists perform experiments designed to be able to decide which theory is true. They often find completely new phenomena with no existing theory: electromagnetism and radioactivity were discovered in this
way. Fundamental research quests for the basic structure of nature, while applied physicists apply existing knowledge to analyze complex systems in order to use them in practical life. Both fundamental research and applied research have theoretical and experimental aspects. …
2.3 Indian
Contributions to Physics
Indian civilization was religious in character, and so, the development of science there was less pronounced than in other areas of the world. However, her science in antiquity excelled in mathematics and astronomy. For instance, modern physics can hardly be imagined without a system of arithmetic in which simple calculations is easy enough to make large calculations even possible.
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History of Physics (From Antiquity to the 21st Century)
The positional number system and the concept of zero were first developed in India at about 876 A.D., and were later adopted by the Islamic empire (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988; Temple, 1991), however according to Lumpkin (1986), the Mayans of Central America used a zero hundreds of years before the Indians.
In astronomy, there are some references of chronological significance in the Hindus Vedas (Holy Scriptures). For instance, some Vedic notes marked the beginning of the year and that of the vernal equinox in Orion; this was in 4500 B.C. In addition, Fire altars with astronomical basis; have been found in the third millennium cities of India. The texts that describe their designs are conservatively dated to the first millennium B.C., but their contents appear to be much older.
From the Vedic literature, it seems that the function of attracting heavenly bodies was attributed to the sun. The term Guru-tva-akarshan can be interpreted to mean “to be attracted by the master”. The Sun was recognized by all ancient people to be the source of light and warmth and by extension the “Master” of the universe. Thus, the heliocentric idea could have existed in a rudimentary form in the days of the Rig-Veda (Holy Scriptures). Nevertheless, is has to be conceded that the heliocentric theory of gravitation was also developed in ancient times by the Greeks. What supports the contention that it could have existed in India before the Greek astronomers developed it, is that in Vedic literature the Sun is referred to as the “centre of spheres”.
Atomic and molecular theories were also utilized by Indians albeit speculatively to explain chemical changes caused by heat. For example, Prasastapada proposed that the “taijasa” (heat) factor affected molecular groupings (vyuhaa) thus causing chemical changes.
The earliest of the Indian rationalists also attempted to provide theories on the nature of light and sound. Like the ancient Greeks, the early Indian philosophers assumed the eyes as a source of light. This error was not corrected until the first century A. D when “Susruta” posited that it was light arriving from an external source at the retina that illuminates the world around us, (Aryabhata reiterated this in the 5th century; A. D). In other respects, the earliest philosophers were more on the mark, with “Cakrapani” suggesting that both sound and light travel in waves but light traveled at a much
higher speed. They also understood sound to have its own reflection- “pratidhvani” (echo).
Al Haytham (born in Basra, and worked in Cairo in the 10th century A.D) who may have been familiar with the writings of Aryabhatta, expounded a more advanced theory of optics using light rays, diagrammatically explaining the concepts of reflection and refraction. He is particularly known for elucidating the laws of refraction and articulating that light rays travelling at different speeds in different materials caused refraction.
Just as the study of mathematics in India received an impetus from the study of astronomy, so did the study of physics. Aryabhatta (born c.476 A.D.) made pioneering discoveries in the realm of planetary motion. Specifically, he propounded the theory that the Earth is a sphere and that it rotates in 5th century A.D. (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). This led to advances in the definition of space and time measuring units and, better comprehension of concepts such as gravitation, motion and velocity. Parasastapada took the study of motion much further in the 7th century A.D. because, in addition to linear motion, he also described curvilinear motion (gamana), rotatary motion (bhramana) and vibratory motion. Bhaskaracharya (1114-1180) in his “Siddhanta Siromani” and Ganitadhaya”, took a crucial first step in quantification, and measured average velocity. Here, he described a wheel, which he claimed would run indefinitely (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). This assertion was one of the first descriptions of a supposed perpetual motion machine.
Wootz, a steel making technique, was discovered in India around 300 AD (although some say as early as 500 B.C. (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). This goes to show how the ancient Indians had the mastery of material science and metallurgy.
Indian scientists up to the 16th century A.D continued to record useful scientific observations, but without serious attempts at quantification, or deeper investigation into the physical causes of what they observed. For example, magnetism is referred to by Bhoja (10th-11th century) as well as by “Sankara Msra” later. Udayana (10th-11th century) recognized solar heat as the heat source for all chemical changes, and also that air had weight, in a discussion of balloons in his “Kironawadi”.
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History and
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History of Physics (From Antiquity to the 21st Century)
2.4 Chinese
Contribution to Physics
Chinese society of old is known throughout history for its stability of its traditions and its bureaucracy, and until the 15th century, China was more successful in applying scientific knowledge than Western Europe.
The Chinese are credited with being the first to do documentation of phenomena in the universe. For instance, around 2296 B.C. Chinese observers recorded for the first time in history, the sighting of a comet (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). In addition, at about 352 B.C., Chinese astronomers observed and recorded a supernova explosion, the first known record of such sighting. However, according to Adams (1986), citing George Michanosky’s “The Once and Future Star”, the ancient Sumerians have a record of one that occurred in the constellation Vela about 6000 years ago. Furthermore, from the ancient era right up to the Middle Ages, the Chinese made several other observations of astronomical manifestations, some of which are today identified as supernova and hypernovae. Of particular note is the first recorded sighting of Halley’s Comet in 240 B.C. and the observation of the crab Nebula (or Messier’s M1). The Chinese noted the appearance of this “guest” star on July 4, 1054 A.D (Adams, 1986; Ruderman, 1986; Wilson and Buffa, 2000).
Between 300 and 291 B.C., the astronomers Shih Shen, Gan De, and Wu Xien independently compiled star maps that will be used for the next several years (Adams, 1986; Hoskin, 1997). Around this period too, the Chinese incorporated their concepts of “yin and yang” (paired opposites) into a model of how the universe is organized (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988).
The Chinese also developed theories on matter and living beings. For instance, Chinese philosophers stated Newton’s first law of motion, that a body will not stop moving unless stopped by an opposing force, almost 2000 years before Newton (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). In addition, according to Lumpkin (1986), the ancient Chinese almost 2000 years ago, solved systems of equations with a method similar to the modern elementary transformations of matrices.
Other contributions from China include the invention of the magnetic compass (Gans, 2004; Aczel, 2004), which were initially used in mysticism, and only applied by them for naval navigation,
around the 11th century. The modern method of papermaking was created by the Chinese court official, Ts’ ai Lun in AD 105, when he developed a method to make paper out of cotton rags (Hellemanns and Bunch,1988); (a writing material called papyrus, which were woven from reeds, was produced as early as 3000 BC in Egypt). Gunpowder was discovered in China in the 9th century A.D. This discovery, attributed to Chen Yin appears to be by accident while he was seeking the elixir of immortality. The first reference to gunpowder appeared as warnings in alchemy texts not to mix certain materials together (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). Using the gunpowder they developed rockets, which were initially used for entertainment-the precursors of modern fireworks-and were later adapted for warfare in the 11th century.
The Chinese attitude toward nature was quite different from that of Western Europe then. For instance, they never separated the material from the sacred world, and did not have the conviction that man could dominate nature. They were not interested in the scientific method, thus their theories remained divorced from observation and experimentation.
2.5 Mayan
(Mesoamerican) Contributions to Physics
This civilization did not have metals or wheels, but they possessed a system of writing and an amazing fluency with flint-knapping including portraiture in flint. They developed a calendar utilizing a base 20 number system with zero and calculated the solar year to somewhat greater accuracy than the Gregorian calendar. (Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988). They made detailed tables for calculating phases of the Moon and the movement of Venus for centuries in the past or future. Native Americans are also credited with the observation of the Crab Nebula on 4 July 1054 A.D. (Ruderman, 1986).
2.6 African
Contribution to Physics
The contributions of Africans to the development of science in antiquity have gone largely unnoticed before now because most of the people of Africa then, apparently left no written records. The key to their history lies in archeological excavations, works of arts, oral tradition, language analysis and reports of early European explorers. In addition to the above limitations, the science of Africans was
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History and
Philosophy of Science
History of Physics (From Antiquity to the 21st Century)
paradigmatically different from what we know today as science. Therefore, it is difficult to appreciate appropriately, the enormous contributions Africans made to the body of knowledge called science. Worthy of mention also, is the fact that although universities had been founded in Timbuktu and Jenne in the Empire of Mali as far back as the 13th century A.D., less is documented on what was taught there in the realm of physics.
The above notwithstanding, it is important to note that there was more than a thousand years of recorded history in Egypt (one of this earliest forms of writing were the hieroglyphs invented in Egypt) preceding Thales, who is often cited as the first scientist in most books. In this wise it is puerile to assume that science began in Greece, because according to Papperdemos (1986), the so-called Greek “miracle” was prepared by millennia of work in Egypt, Mesopotamia and possibly other regions. Even the Greeks acknowledge that the Egyptians are the inventors of geometry and that the birthplace of astronomy is Egypt. Papperdemos (1986) opined that Thales, Democritus and Euxodus (408-355 B.C.) traveled to Egypt to study planetary motion. Greek science can thus be viewed as more of a revival than an invention. Furthermore, notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, evidences abound to show that ancient Africa made some fundamental contributions to physics in particular and science in general. For instance, the Dogon people of Mali-West Africa, were knowledgeable in astronomy as they knew about the Sirius star-system about 700-800 years ago (Adams, 1986). They incorporated this knowledge into their various calendars. They also had knowledge of Saturn, Venus, Jupiter, and even the Milky Way galaxy. Evidence for this assertion is an archeological wooden mask, which dates back to the 13th century A.D., called “kanaga” that was used by the Dogon to celebrate their Sirius-related “Sigui” ceremonies.
A recent archeological find by some Russians in Egypt of a crystal lens, perfectly spherical and of great precision used in ancient Egypt (Hunter 1986), points to the fact that the Egyptians must have made use of these as a form of telescope even before Galileo. Still in Egypt, the great pyramids of Gizeh and those in the Sudan, which dates back to the 30th century B.C. tells us the level of science and technology in ancient Africa.
An evidence of some ideas about aeronautics in ancient
Africa is a model of an ancient Egyptian airplane made of sycamore wood found in Sakkara in 1898. According to Messiha et al, (1986), this discovery indicates that the Egyptians were experimenting with flying machines as early as the 4th or 3rd century B.C.
The Egyptian pharaoh, Imhotep is reputed to have been a master of physical principles such as the lever and inclined planes, 2000 years before Archimedes-who is usually seen as the inventor of the lever (Fraser, 1948). This enabled him to build the Great Pyramids at Sakkara.
The scientific measurement of time started with the Egyptians. Based on their stellar observations, the calendar developed by them dates back to as far back as 424 B.C. (Papperdemos, 1986), and it is the one still being used today with only minor modifications. Papperdemos further went on to assert that, there is also evidence that the Egyptians were smelting iron and steel and even welding as early as 1500-1200 B.C. and were highly skilled in shipbuilding, which indicates their knowledge of hydrostatics dating back to about 1500. He also averred that most ancient sundial known is Egyptian, dating back to the time Thutmosis III (15th century B.C.). The water clock was invented in Egypt about 2000 B.C. and is reputed to have been used by Galileo in one of his experiments on accelerated motion. In addition, obelisks dating back to about 3500 B.C. have been found all over Egypt and Ethiopia. The shadows cast by them in the sun, gives information relevant to time keeping. Finally, Brecher et al (1978) opined that an Egyptian physician, Ibn Butlan also recorded the supernova explosion of 1054.
From the mathematical point of view, the most interesting find is the carved bone discovered at the fishing site of Ishango on Lake Edward in Zaire. It is a bone tool handle having notches arranged in definite patterns and a bit of quartz fixed in a narrow cavity in its head. It dates back to the period between 9000 B.C. and 6500 B.C. The artifact, which was probably used as a record of months and lunar phases is reputed to be the oldest scientific document, found so far (Zaslvsky, 1986; Pappademos, 1986; Hellemanns and Bunch, 1988).
Another archeological find of importance is the “Namoratunga”, a megalithic site in Northern Kenya. It consists of an alignment of 19 pillars that are non-randomly oriented…
5.0 Development of Physics in the 20th
Century
At the end of the 19th century, some physicists believed that the basic principles underlying their subject were completely known, and that physics in the future would only consist of filling in the details. They could hardly have been more wrong. The beginning of the 20th century brought the start of a revolution in physics. The long-held theories of Newton were shown not to be correct in all circumstances. In addition, the century saw the rise of quantum mechanics (which shows that the laws of motion did not hold on small scales) and relativity (with general relativity showing more disturbingly that fixed background of spacetime on which Newtonian mechanics depend do not exist). The 20th century also saw far-reaching developments in the field of cosmology, particle physics, solid-state physics, optical and laser physics, etc. These subjects have fundamentally changed our understanding of space, time and matter. They have also transformed daily life, inspiring technological revolution that includes the development of radio, television, lasers, nuclear power, computers, airplanes, etc.
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Mills/%28physicist%29>.
HISTORY OF ZOOLOGY
By
Dr. Mrs. Ene E. Oku
Department of Zoology (University of
Calabar)
Zoology is the branch of biology that deals with the study of animal life. This great branch of biology is arbitrarily divided into various disciplines and these include Protozoology (study of protozoa), Entomology (study of insects and other arthropods), Parasitology (study of animals and human parasites), Physiology (study of organ functions), Embryology (study of early development of animals), Anatomy (study of animal structural frame), Histology (Study of tissues), Cytology (cell structure and functions), Ecology, Animal behaviour (Ethology), Zoogeography, Paleontology, Fisheries and Hydrobiology, Taxonomy, among others.
Throughout history, humans have been fascinated by the life of other animals. The primitive man was a kind of naturalist with a keen interest and insight into his environment. As a necessity, they were interested in animals that provided them with food, clothing, shade and other essential needs, as well as the wild beasts and pests that menaced them. Insects and mites for example, are believed to have been in association with man early in evolution from a hunter-gathering stage to an urban society (Robson, 1996, p13). The first associations were perhaps with the flies, beetles, and other carrion feeding insects that were attracted to feed on camp garbage dumps, while cockroaches were common pests of the early man that lived in caves. Moreover, entomophagy (the use of insects as food), as is still practiced in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, is believed to be an ancient life stile. The primitive man needed to have some knowledge of the numerous insects around him in order to choose the edible ones.
As it is today, the earliest times humans were faced with numerous problems that affected their existence; they had to deal with death, disease, hunger, cold, threat from biting flies and wild beasts, and other forms of discomfort. Through their study of the ways and habits of other animals, they were able to develop weapons for catching of prey, and to keep and domesticate animals. … We are in a time when animal species all over the world are increasingly subject to extinction and diminishing population size. For this reason, much effort has been consolidated since the last century, towards conservation. There are voluntary organizations that concern themselves with conservation issues internationally. The fauna and flora preservation society for example, funds much specific species conservation research and protection. The Worldwide fund for Nature (formerly, the world wildlife fund, WWF) raises large sums of money for both research into and purchases of endangered environments. Furthermore, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), is a wide network and forum for those concerned with conservation, allowing them to coordinate action and monitor the survival of endangered species all over the world. All endangered species of both plants and animals are documented in the “Red Data Book” produced by the IUCN. Another important group is the National Conservation Foundation (NCF) which funds research on conservation related issues. NCF currently has a wild life centre in the department of zoology, University of Calabar. In the field of disease management, research and control programmes are well sponsored by a number both national and international agencies. Good examples are the Onchocerciasis control programme in Nigeria currently funded by World Health Organization (WHO), the Global 2000 project of Jimmy Carter and the Nigeria Guinea worm Eradication Programme (NIGEP) both geared towards that Guinea worm control in Nigeria, and Roll back malaria being a Federal government project for malaria control in Nigeria.
It should be noted that all the major problems facing humans in the past and present are biological, the population explosion, food and energy shortages, pollution and disease. These cannot be solved without an adequate knowledge of zoological principles that govern animal life upon planet earth.
HISTORY OF BOTANY
By
Professor Ani Nkang
Department of Botany
Plants
Problems affecting plants are among the oldest issues of interest to the human race. Plants are the primary producers of food for humans and all other animals. The carbohydrates, proteins, fats and oils as well as important accessory nutrients such as certain vitamins and minerals are all made available to animals through green plants. In any community of living things (biological community), photosynthetic plants provide the basic food or energy supply and form the broad base in the “food or energy pyramid.”
Uses of plants
Plants have been very amenable to exploitation by humans and have contributed greatly to the attainment of our present (modern?) mode of life. Plants have played a predominant role in food supply but play other important roles in the human economy. Important staple foods include cassava, yams, beans, sugar, cereal grains (particularly rice, wheat and maize). Valuable edible oils are obtained from oil palm, peanuts, cottonseed and soybeans. Important fruits that play roles in human diet include banana, pineapple, mango, apples, rock melon and avocado. Some plants serve as beverages, amongst which are tea, coffee and cocoa. Since plants are primary producers they play important roles in food chains.
Some plant materials have important industrial purposes. Wood is sawn into timber and used in furniture and construction companies. Plants are utilized in the pulp and paper industry (e.g. gmelina). Non-timber forest products include resins and gums, fibers for the manufacture of fabrics and cordage.
In all
cultures plants have historically been exploited for the treatment of human
ailments. Thousands of plant species serve as important medicinal agents.
Important pharmaceutical agents of plant origin include quinine (from the bark
of the Cinchona tree). Modern production techniques have produced a large
number of synthetic drugs that have replaced many of the old plant
preparations. Important alkaloids such as caffeine, cocaine, atropine, morphine
and quinine are plant extracts. Tea and coffee owe their stimulatory properties
to their content of caffeine. Some of these are classified as narcotics drugs,
which if abused create health and sociological problems. There is presently
increased interest in screening plants, particularly of tropical Africa, for
new plant drugs that could be effective against such ailments as diabetes and
HIV-AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus-acquired immunodeficiency syndrome).
Extracts of some plant species possess insecticidal value. Two of the most potent insecticides of plant origin are rotenone and pyrethrins. Unlike synthetic insecticides like DDT, rotenone and pyrethrins are relatively non-toxic to humans and higher animals and are therefore safer for general use as dust or spray applications. The common insecticide ’Piff puff’ and ’Rambo insect powder” are pyrethrin based….
Ethnobotany/Traditional knowledge
Ethnobotany deals with the relationship between plants and man. Traditional knowledge can take many forms including verbal communication, local names, folk names or old ethnobotanical records (Laghetti et al., 1990). As more of the older generation die, the less the knowledge that will be available. This is of great concern especially in the face of massive erosion of genetic diversity. It has
been suggested that steps should be taken to rescue the traditional knowledge through “memory bank” projects that will be conducted in conjunction with the user’s perspective. Memory banks parallel the gene banks but rather than preserve germplasm per se, they preserve the traditional knowledge that could be useful in future germplasm collection (Hammer and Mbewe, 1994). The use of traditional knowledge can lead to the detection of new cultivated plant species from the numerous underdeveloped and perspective crops that abound in tropical Africa. Local farmers have specific objectives (e.g. increased yield and marketability) and selection criteria (e.g. organoleptic qualities, yield) in choosing planting stock for the next planting season. What is their taxonomic system? The value of folk taxonomy has long been recognized by academics (Berlin, 1992) and often, has been adopted into Linnaean taxonomic classification. An example is the African medicinal plant Mondia whitei, after the Zulu specific name omondi (Cunningham, 1994). In some instances the approach in folk taxonomy is very different to that of Linnaean taxonomy. For example, five cultivated races of sorghum (durra, caffra, bicolor, caudatum and guinea) occur in the Zambezi valley in Zimbabwe. Linnaean taxonomists distinguish these on the basis of their distinctive spikelets while local farmers do not recognize such characters but recognize varieties on the basis of a combination of morphology, ecological requirements and usage (van Oosterhout, 1990). Similarly, traditional medical practitioners utilize bulb, root, bark or sap characters as well as taste and smell, more frequently than the conventional tools (flower, fruit or leaf characteristics) (Cunningham, 1994). This can result in different local names for a single species as some of these characters may be lacking or undeveloped in juvenile individuals. Folk taxonomy characters have been largely underutilized but could be evaluated and used in plant classification. This will be useful in traditional medical practice and in the identification of African medicinal plants. …
The beginning of Western or Scientific
knowledge:
The pre-Christ era (B.C.)
The
invention of science is generally credited to the Greek natural philosophers
that lived during the sixth century B.C. This thinking is thought to reflect
the cultural bias of western civilizations as great civilizations existed along
the valleys of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and Indus rivers as much as 5000
years earlier (Magner 1979). Nearly 7000 years ago, Africans had begun to
cultivate crops along the shores of Lake Chad and on the banks of the Upper
Niger in West Africa (Hull 1972). The development of scientific heritage in
other traditions have been largely overlooked due to an emphasis on traditional
western heritage from Greek culture. In
both African traditional and Greek scientific heritage the interest was in the
natural world. Such questions as “what is life?” and “are plants living things?”
were asked.
The science of botany is considered to have been established in early classical times by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and his disciples. Aristotle, who is widely known in the realm of philosophy, made careful observations on life and ascribed to the living the ability to think and to feel, to move and to grow. He noted that plants, in contrast to animals, seemed to bear both male and female sexes. Aristotle also noted that a natural system of classification was possible. Theophrastus (ca. 373-ca. 285 B.C.), one of Aristotle’s many disciples, is perhaps the most important and influential botanist of antiquity. Theophrastus was Aristotle’s assistant and is remembered most as the father of scientific botany, with broader interests in biology, medicine and metaphysics. About 10 % of Theophrastus’ works are known to have survived (Magner, 1979) and include the following:
1. De historia plantarum (A history of plants)
2. De cuasis plantarum (About the reasons of vegetable growth).
These
works were in wide circulation in the 15th century, having been
highly promoted by the order of Pope Nicholas V to have the works translated
into Latin. The campaigns of Alexander the Great (ca 356-323 B.C.) had exposed
the Greeks to the knowledge of the existence of other cultures in Libya, Egypt,
India, Syria and Persia (Iran/Iraq). Theophrastus encouraged his students from
these and other regions to observe the plants in their regions, thus expanding
his botanical inventory and research. He described up to 500 species of wild
and cultivated plants in the two major works, which are summarized as shown (www.XXXX): ...
Development of
Botany In Nigeria
Botany as a modern scientific study started during the
colonial era. Europeans were posted to the Colonial Forestry Service. Some
colonial forestry officers continued to serve as Chief Conservators
of Forests even after independence in 1960. With their
retirement, however, Nigerians took over. With the establishment of a
University College in Ibadan (by the University of London), the study of botany
as a scientific discipline started. Some of the first graduates of Botany were
recruited into the Forestry Service. A few others studied outside the shores of
Nigeria. One of such persons was Eni Njoku (1917-1974). He was trained in the
arts and the sciences and obtained a doctor of philosophy degree in plant
physiology from the United Kingdom. He pioneered photoperiodic research in the
tropics. He was appointed a lecturer in botany in 1948 and rose to become the
first professor and Head of Department of Botany, University College Ibadan in
1959. He was the pioneer Vice Chancellor of the University Of Lagos (1962-
1965) and first Nigerian Vice- Chancellor of the University of Nigeria (1965-
1969). Botany presently is taught in the Faculties of Science of Nigerian
universities, with a large number of students to cater for the increasing needs
of society.
References:
Berlin, B. (1992). Ethnobiological classification:
principles of categorization of plants and animals in traditional societies.
Princeton University Press.
Cunningham, A.B. (1994). The role of ethnobotany and
customary knowledge in the conservation and use of plants. In: Putter A. (Ed.)
Safeguarding the genetic basis of Africa’s traditional crops, pp 141- 146
Technical Center for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation/ International Plant
Genetic.
Resources Institute, Italy.
Hull, R. W. (1972). Munyakare: African civilization before
the Batuuree. John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Hammer, K. and Mbewe, D. N. (1994). The role of traditional
knowledge in germplasm collecting. In: Putter A. (Ed.) Safeguarding the genetic
basis of Africa’s traditional crops, pp 147- 155. Technical Center for Agricultural
and Rural
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and Philosophy of Science
History of Botany
Cooperation/ International Plant Genetic.
Resources Institute, Italy.
Laghetti, G., S. Paludosi, K. Hammer, S. Cifrarelli and P.
Perrino (1990). Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata)
germplasm collection in Southern Italy and preliminary evaluation. In: Ng, N.Q.
and L.M. Monti (Eds.) Cowpea genetic Resources, International Institute for
Tropical Agriculture, Ibadan, Nigeria.
Magner, L.N. (1979). A history of the life sciences.
Marcell Dekker, Inc. New York.
Mbiti, J. (1969). African religions and philosophy.
Heinemann, London.
Van Oosterhout, S.A.M. (1990). A question of cultural
context: formal taxonomy versus peasant classifications of Sorghum bicolor in Zimbabwe. Mitteilungen aus dem Institut fur Allegemeine
Botanik, Hamburg. 23b: 953- 959.
Warren, D.M. (1990). Using indigenous
knowledge in agricultural development. World Bank Discussion Paper 127.
HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF NURSING SCIENCE
BY
MILDRED E. JOHN,
R.N., PH.D., FWACN.
DEPARTMENT OF
NURSING SCIENCES,
UNIVERSITY OF
CALABAR, CALABAR. NIGERIA.
INTRODUCTION
Nursing means
“caring for or tending another person”. By this definition, the art of nursing
is as old as humanity because wherever there have been sick people and those
who cannot care for themselves, there has always been the need to care for or
tend them. At that time, treatment was untested and the primary task of nurses
was to support the sick until they healed or comfort them until they died.
However with technological and scientific advancement, the Science of Nursing
evolved globally in the early twentieth century when nurses began to
conceptualize about the nature of nursing. However, Nursing at the time was
referred to as an eclectic science
because it borrowed its tenets from other sciences like the natural sciences,
biological sciences, medical sciences and behavioural sciences. But today
nursing is seen globally as a science with many branches, due mainly to the
development of nursing theories and a unique body of knowledge that is
basically nursing. The traditions of nursing are rooted in the past and although
the essential function of nursing has not changed, the practice of nursing has
changed over the centuries having been influenced by advances in science and
technology. Because of these ancient roots and the more recent scientific
development, nursing has been called “the oldest of arts and the youngest of
professions” (Donahue 1985). Many nurse theorists have conceptualized nursing
variously: as an art (Nightingale, Orem, and Taylor), a vocation (Henderson,
Abdellah, and Hall) a science (King, Roy, Johnson, and Levine) and as both an
art and a science (Gowan, Riehl and Roy). Unlike medicine which focuses on
disease and injury, nursing focuses on human responses to health problems. As a
result nursing provides a wide range of health services ranging from the most
basic to the most complex. To deliver these services a wide spectrum of care
givers has evolved, from the least to the most highly skilled and educated.
With the improved educational programme for nurses over the years, the contemporary
view is that nursing is a science that deals with the promotion/maintenance of
health, alleviation of suffering and care during illness. The importance of
nursing in the health care system cannot be overemphasized because nurses
constitute the largest number of care providers in the health sector and spend
the longest time at the patients’ bedside. …
The impact of social and scientific changes on nursing and
nursing’s impact on society are ongoing processes that need to be studied.
Nursing has its own history, credentials, organizations, ethical codes and
educational system. The development of nursing has been influenced throughout
history by several factors such as the prevailing culture and religion,
politics and war and the technology and medicine of the time. The religion and
culture of each country has influenced healing techniques and patient care. The
various world wars and the politics of the world powers have also influenced
the development of nursing as nursing service and care are usually required for
the injuries and deaths of war. An understanding of the past will bring
additional clarity about the science of nursing and help to shape the future of
the profession. Nursing today was formed by its historical antecedents. Its
development since ancient times explains many things: its power or lack of it,
its educational pattern, and the make-up and attitude of its practitioners etc.
Nursing was the first profession in the health sector to form an international
organization the International Council of
Nurses (ICN) in 1899 and in 1916, the Royal College of Nursing was established.
This text presents the history of nursing which will be
discussed under two major areas: its development globally and development in
Nigeria with particular reference to Old Calabar (the first capital of the
southern protectorate).
THE HISTORY OF
NURSING
Nursing is
said to be older than any other profession in the health sector. In ancient
times, nursing care was primarily given to the sick in their homes but later
nursing care became tied to religion,
and monasteries set up hospitals where monks and religious
priests served as doctors while nuns and other religious women served as
nurses. Skilled nursing care for the sick and wounded was common only among the
more cultured races the Egyptians,
Greeks, Romans, Babylonians, Hebrews, and Chinese etc. The history of nursing
globally can be discussed under four eras
Prehistoric, Pre-Christian, Christian and the Post world war eras.
1. PREHISTORIC
CIVILIZATIONS
Although there are no written records of the earliest
civilizations, Neolithic evidence and artifacts discovered in recent times
reveal that women with special skills in caring for the sick were called upon
to help the sick and wounded. Treatment methods were imbued with a magical aura
and involved use of charms, incantations, hypnosis, massage and herbal mixtures
while shamans (medicine men) sometimes did trephine to release evil spirits.
2. PRE-CHRISTIAN
ERA
Papyrus writings discovered in 1500 BC described a well
developed health sector in Ancient Egypt (4000 BC) and showed that the
culture and religion of Egypt at the time influenced the development of
nursing. Egyptian records described over 250 diseases, several surgical, dental
and nursing procedures and over 700 substances used in treatment and also tell
of skilled nursing especially in wound care, given by women. They used special
baths for wound cleansing and for healing purposes and were skilled in
embalming and intricate bandaging which can still be seen on mummies. Older
women, especially widows, were trained as midwives to take deliveries and treat
“women diseases” while other women cared for the dying in the “houses of death”
where they were isolated and when they died embalmed them. The first organized
medical and nursing books were written by the Egyptians and records also tell
of Medical and Midwifery schools in ancient Egypt. In early civilization in Mesopotamia, the Babylonians (2000 BC) had lay nurses who cared for patients.
These were mainly women of low status who were subservient to the
physician-priest. Babylonian records describe medical practice, child care,
midwifery and nursing care of patients with fevers, tuberculosis, plague,
jaundice, abscesses and tumours by lay nurses using massage, diet
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modification, purging and magical formulae made from
vile-tasting plants and minerals. Patient care was regulated by laws and edicts,
especially the Code of Hammurabi (sixth king of Babylon) which was very strict
and prescribed penalties for malpractice and misconduct by physicians and
nurses. In ancient Israel, some old
Hebrew women served as midwives who helped women deliver their babies while
others served as nurses who dressed wounds and cared for the sick and also
taught them to care for themselves using high level of hygiene. “Sick houses”
where people suspected of having communicable diseases were isolated, were
built in the outskirts of the towns and women were employed to take care of
them. The ancient Greeks (1400 BC)
had good knowledge and skill in caring for the sick and used herbs and oils in
patient care for massage, wound care and aromatique therapy. Askelepios, son of
Apollo (the Greek mythical god of health and medicine) and a human mother, was
said to be the chief healer according to Greek mythology. Askelepios was always
portrayed by a wand of mercury a
seafarer’s staff entwined by sacred serpents of wisdom. The modern symbol of
medicine (the Caduceus) originated from this ancient portrayal. Temples were
built to serve as shrines to Askelepios and these were managed by priests and
female nursing attendants who cared for the sick and injured. These priests and
their nursing attendants handed down their skills to relatives. Some of these
shrines later became health resorts either for acute care or chronic care while
others served as shelter for strangers. By 500 BC the Greeks had established
small hospitals where organized nursing was given and the art of medicine and
nursing was taught. However since women were not admitted to the “mysteries” of
any art, only men gave nursing care outside the home. Hippocrates, the “Father
of Medicine” later wrote books on nursing techniques which included directions
for wound cleansing, hygienic care, poultice application and smoothing of bed
linen.
Ancient writings in India
in 1000 BC show that nursing care was very organized, and those involved in
providing care were well selected and given basic instructions on what was
expected of them. A code of conduct regulated medical and nursing practice,
prescribed sanctions for malpractice and greatly influenced the development of
nursing by prescribing that nurses must be skillful, trustworthy and maintain
standards. Indian records in 600 BC
also
show that medicine, surgery and hygiene were highly
developed and those who served as nurses were expected to provide safe care and
perform minor surgical procedures like blood letting and incision of abscesses.
However when Buddhism became dominant in India, women were not allowed to work
outside the home. Nursing was therefore done in public hospitals by young men
while women nursed patients in their homes and older women served as midwives
and pharmacists. Based on the code of practice, the ancient physician, Charaka,
set out the following details of the standard of care for nurses: “those who attend upon the sick must be of
good behaviour distinguished of purity, possessed of cleverness and skill,
endued with kindness, skilled in every service a patient may
require; competent to cook food, skilled in bathing and
washing the patient, rubbing and massaging the limbs, lifting and assisting him
to enable him to walk about; well skilled in making and cleaning of beds, ready
and patient and skilful in waiting upon one that is ailing and never unwilling
to do anything that may be ordered.” (Ancient Writings on heath care system
found in Chandra).
From the
above statement, the ancient nurse not only needed to function in the
cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains by not only knowing what to do and
how to do it, but also needed to appreciate the nature of the patient to help
him recover from illness. Similar references were found in early Babylonian
writing, Egyptian papyri and the Greek writings of Hippocrates in 460 BC.
Today, however the duties of the nurse have expanded and extended beyond these
basic knowledge and skills. In ancient
China (400 to 500BC), health care was profoundly influenced by the Tao
concept of balance between health and illness. Ancient Chinese treatment and
health care involved curing the spirit and nourishing the body through the use
of acupuncture, Moxibustion and medicinal herbs. Acupuncture involves insertion
and twisting of needles in areas along twelve meridians of the body.
Moxibustion uses the same twelve meridians but also involves placing mounds of
powdered plants on the skin and burning them until a blister forms. Nursing was part of traditional Chinese
medicine which was well developed at the time and nursing care was given by
young women who were trained by the Chinese “medicine men” in the art of
acupuncture and other Chinese medical practices. “Halls of healing” (praying
areas) were built near temples for caring for the sick but public hospitals
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were not built till much later. During the height of power
of the Roman Empire, its culture and
religion greatly influenced the care of the sick and injured. The Romans
believed in gods who were responsible for every physiological function or
disease; and borrowed the culture and religion of the people they conquered
which affected their health care and treatment of diseases immensely. Many
Romans made notable surgical discoveries, for example, Caesarian section,
tracheotomy etc and Celsius described the four cardinal symptoms of infection.
Women were less restricted and so worked as nurses in public hospitals.
In ancient America, Aztec, Mayan and Incan
civilizations flourished and influenced health care and later nursing care
especially in the native Indian societies. Shamans and priests maintained
health and healed diseases by chanting prayers, preparing protective charms,
performing purifying and healing rituals using sweat and mineral baths and
human sacrifice. Medicine, surgery and nursing were well developed in Aztec
societies. Hospices were built for the sick where women trained in the art of caring
took care of the sick and elderly using herbs, minerals, massage, trephine,
bloodletting, amputation and sand painting. Sand painting was a unique form of
therapy where the shaman created intricate designs of coloured sand to effect
specific cure. Older women (“nurses”) were trained in the art and also taught
others to provide this mode of treatment to the sick. (Hamilton1992). In ancient African societies, pre-historic civilizations practiced crude nursing
whereby “medicine men”, “root doctors”, herbalists and “witch doctors” cared
for the sick in their own homes and taught their sons and daughters and certain
members of the tribe to do so. Their care involved the use of roots, herbs,
charms and mystical rituals. Later when medical lore became more and more
associated with good and evil spirits, the sick were cared for in temples of
the gods and in houses of religious worship. Ongoing care for the sick was
given by female relatives who were instructed on what to do by the root doctor
or medicine man.
3. THE CHRISTIAN
ERA
The
ministry of the lord Jesus Christ included healing and caring for the sick and
so the early Christians became involved in the healing/caring ministry. In the
early Christian era, the sick were
cared for in the church and in the patients homes by
certain women who were later called the “deaconesses”. These women had no real
training by today’s standard but experience taught them valuable skills
especially in the use of herbs, oils and mixtures and some gained fame as much
as the physicians of that time. By 313 AD, the Romans had built very fine, well
organized hospitals. Later some of these hospitals were converted into
monasteries where nursing care was given by religious orders (monks, nuns).
Between the 4th and the 18th century, many hospitals were
built and maintained by public contribution. At this time also, the Islamic
Arabs made great strides in medicine by introducing inhalation anaesthesia and
skilled dentistry and nurses were trained to assist in these areas. They built
hospitals and medical schools. Women were not allowed outside the home so only
men nursed patients in the hospitals. During the crusades and jihads, military
nursing orders evolved to care for the sick and wounded. The Knights of Hospitaliers of Saint John was one of such and
became famous for first aid and disaster management. Their symbol, the Maltese
Cross, later became the symbol of the Nightingale school of nursing.
The years between the fall of Rome in 476AD and the fall of
Constantinople in 1453 divide ancient and modern times. The first 500 years
after the fall of Rome were called the dark ages because of the chaotic world
conditions which affected health and health care immensely. These conditions
include several wars, famine, poverty, ignorance, lawlessness and sicknesses
like leprosy, tuberculosis, diphtheria, small pox and the Bubonic plague of
1348 which swept across the world, ravaged societies and reduced the human
population by one-third to half. Monastic orders were established to care for
the sick using some untested treatment regimes. After the fall of the Roman
Empire, hospital care declined both in Rome and Greece and so from the 9th
to the 14th century, skilled nursing care was lacking and hospitals
became very filthy.
During the Renaissance of the 14th century and
the Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries, there was
separation of health care from religion. In protestant nations most hospitals
operated by Catholic monastic orders were closed down or taken over by the
government and the monks and nuns were expelled with no-one prepared to take
their place. Women of the lowest social
strata in society were recruited to fill nursing positions and this
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scenario persisted for many centuries. Only in the few
hospitals within the monasteries was effective nursing practice carried out.
Social reforms were therefore desperately needed. Thus the period between 1550
and 1860 (310 years) is called the Dark Ages of nursing because of the poor
prevailing conditions in the health sector. In the attempt to improve the care
of the sick, several groups of men and women were formed in the 17th
Century, for example, the Order of the
Sisters of Charity (formed by St. Vincent de Paul) in France and the
Brothers of St. John of God. These groups established health care institutions
independent of the monasteries and some of these groups used abandoned
hospitals and took care of the sick. Some military orders like the “Knights of
the hospital of St. John of Jerusalem” (later called the Knights of Malta) also
took care of the sick and wounded within abandoned hospitals, during the time
of the Crusades. During the Renaissance and Reformation also, European nations
sought power and wealth in the new world and established colonies in Africa and
America. They built hospitals in these colonies and many religious orders went
there to care for the sick. In colonial America, one of the first hospitals,
Bellevue Hospital on Manhattan Island New York was established in 1658 by the
Dutch East Indian Company to cater for sick sailors and African slaves arriving
on the slave ships. The hospital had a high mortality rate because of the
filthy conditions and the poor knowledge of patient care by the “nurses”.
However with the arrival of Alice Fisher, a Nightingale nurse from England the
quality of nursing care improved and the death rate reduced. The first hospital
solely dedicated to the care of the sick in the American colony was
Pennsylvania Hospital founded in 1751. Many religious nursing orders, for
example, the Dominicans, Irish Sisters of Mercy, Lutheran deaconesses from
Kaiserwerth, the sisters of Charity etc. soon came over from Europe to work in
America. In 1791 the New York Hospital opened and became famous because its
attendants received lectures on anatomy, physiology, maternity nursing and
child care. More hospitals were established and due to the activities of the
various nursing and religious orders, the era of the reformation saw a
spectacular improvement in the scientific and skillful treatment and nursing
care of the sick and injured. At this time also the standard of nursing
practice generally in the world was significantly raised. St Vincent de Paul
also encouraged lay people to train informally as nurses even though formal
nurse training did not take place until two centuries later. Those who were so
trained banded together to form secular orders which adopted a uniform and
received a formal salary for their services. By the end of the 18th
century therefore, organized nursing had started and a crop of nurses had
emerged. Organized selection for recruitment into the profession became
necessary and certain characteristics were set out for prospective nurses to possess
before selection to train. According to Bullough & Bullough (1978)
to train informally as nurses even though formal nurse
training did not take place until two centuries later. Those who were so
trained banded together to form secular orders which adopted a uniform and
received a formal salary for their services. By the end of the 18th
century therefore, organized nursing had started and a crop of nurses had
emerged. Organized selection for recruitment into the profession became
necessary and certain characteristics were set out for prospective nurses to
possess before selection to train. According to Bullough & Bullough (1978)
“Since not all persons are adapted to nursing, careful
selection must be made to recruit people who are
patient, mild and compassionate to console the sick,
foresee their needs and relieve their tedium” p.57.
However there was no
formal hospital training school until a clergyman, Pastor Theodore Fliedner,
inspired by the prison reforms in England, set up a special hospital called the
Institute of Protestant Deaconesses at
Kaiserwerth Düsseldorf, Germany in (1836). Originally a refuge for released
prisoners, it later expanded to become a hospital and training school for
deaconesses. In 1846, organized nurse training started in the hospital with the
primary aim of providing skilled nursing services and meeting the nursing needs
of the Kaiserwerth hospital. Many women came from all over the world to benefit
from the three year programme of training. There Florence Nightingale received
the training that enabled her to practice nursing and establish the first
school of nursing designed primarily to train nurses rather than to provide
nursing service for a particular hospital. The training Nightingale received at
the Kaiserwerth also enabled her to reform nursing practice and nursing
education in Britain in particular and the world in general.
It is
difficult to explore the history of nursing without focusing on great and
famous women who became nurses and served humanity faithfully through their
practice. These women include Florence
Nightingale, Elizabeth Fry, Louisa Twinning, Adelaide Nutting, Isabelle Hampton
and others. However, it was Florence Nightingale’s work that altered the
perception and image of nursing at a time when secular nursing was mainly done
by “uneducated”, uncouth women of low social status and therefore had no
acceptance or prestige. She created the new nurse and the new nursing image….
THE HISTORY OF
NURSING IN
The history of nursing in Nigeria can be traced to the work
of the early missionaries who came to the colony with their doctors and nurses
in the middle 19th century. From time immemorial, it had been the
Christian tradition to disseminate the gospel message side by side with curing
the sick. The medical efforts of missionaries and the development of nursing in
Nigeria falls into three periods - pre-colonial, colonial and post
independence.
Pre-colonial: The early missionaries entered Nigeria in 1846 through
three main routes the Cross River, Niger River and Ogun River. Along the banks
of these Rivers they built mission houses and established dispensaries and
infirmaries to help the sick and those wounded in inter-tribal wars; and also
care for missionaries and their families who were often sick from malaria,
Black water fever and other endemic diseases of the tropical rain forest. The
earliest
missionaries were of the Church Missionary Society (CMS)
who entered through the Ogun River and Niger River, and the Church of Scotland
Mission who entered through the Cross River. Missionaries of other missions
soon followed suit, for example, the Baptist, Roman Catholic, Wesley etc and
built hospitals and dispensaries and informally trained nurse-aides. The early
dispensaries and hospitals were built in Lagos, Abeokuta, Itu, Wusasa (Zaria),
Etinan, Iyi Enu etc and these later formed the nucleus of mission training
schools for nurses and midwives.
Colonial period: When the colony and protectorate of Nigeria came into existence
with the coming of the colonial administrators, there was need to augment the
health care activities of the missionaries. More hospitals, dispensaries and
nursing homes were built in major towns in Nigeria to care for the sick. The
first government hospital was St. Margaret’s hospital Calabar, established in
1897 with Miss Margaret Graham as the first nursing sister. She was later
joined by Miss Jane MacCotter who later moved to establish the Infant welfare
centre at Ake Abeokuta (now Oba Ademola maternity). The development of nursing
in Nigeria during the pre-colonial and colonial eras cannot be complete without
specific consideration of the development of healthcare in general and nursing
in particular in old Calabar.
In Old Calabar
before the advent of scientific (orthodox) health care, treatment of diseases
and care of the sick rested on the traditional herbalist or “medicine man” that
was later labeled the “witch doctor” by the colonialists and missionaries,
because his practice involved sorcery and he served as a priest to the local
deity. Then there came the missionaries of the Church of Scotland Mission
(Presbyterian) in the mid nineteenth century. Some of these were medically
trained missionaries who had combined the study of divinity with basic
medical/nursing training. They first carried out medical duties in their
mission house and also went about to treat patients in their homes. They later
established dispensaries and infirmaries but many natives did not take kindly
to the scientific treatment of the “foreign doctor”. In 1890, there was an
outbreak of disease that had an alarming death toll among both the Europeans
and the natives. This, coupled with the fact that Calabar had a lot of colonial
activity taking place, made the need for a real hospital both imperative and
urgent. Since building a big hospital required time
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and a lot of resources, interim measures were put in place to
try and meet the increasing need for treatment and care. First of all, small
mission hospitals and dispensaries were built in Creek Town, Itu and Duke Town.
Miss Mary Slessor is said to have assisted in giving nursing care to patients
in the hospitals at Itu and Creek Town during the outbreak of epidemics. Later,
another dispensary was established in Calabar to care for patients with
infectious diseases (e.g. smallpox, black water fever, yellow fever &
measles) and this became known as the Infectious Diseases Hospital (I.D.H) in
1905. Secondly, three trained nurses were sent from Scotland to the colony in
1895 to assist the missionary doctors and also man the government hospital when
built. These nurses were Miss Margaret Graham, Miss Scott and Miss Miller.
Since the government hospital was not yet ready, the three nurses were seconded
by government to assist the missionaries in the mission house clinic and
dispensaries and in the school clinic of Hope Waddell Training Institute,
Calabar.
In 1897, the government hospital was established and called
St. Margaret’s Hospital. According to Erim & Ndoma-Egba (1998), this was a
“modern medical outfit, first of its kind in Nigeria”. The hospital was
originally intended to cater for the health needs of the early colonial
masters, traders and missionaries as well as the few indigenous elite residents
of Efikland. It started out as a national institution and remained so for two
decades, then assumed provincial status but later its scope became restricted
in the 1940’s when similar hospitals were established in Lagos, Enugu and Aba.
Nurse Miller died in 1897, two years after arriving Nigeria and a few months
after the hospital was opened, so nurses Graham and Scott formed the initial
staff of the nursing department while Doctor Mackinson served as the first
medical doctor. It was speculated that the hospital was named after Margaret
Graham (one of the three early nurses) but another school of thought said
Margaret Graham was no saint. Rather it was said that the hospital was named
after Margaret the Queen of Scotland (wife of Malcolm III) who lived between
1045 and 1093 AD and who was famous for her charity and piety and was canonized
in 1250 AD. The hospital was affiliated to the London and Liverpool Schools of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. Because of the shortage of nursing staff and the
high cost of importing some, sisters Graham and Scott trained their African
dressers, cooks, stewards etc (both male and female) to assist in
giving nursing care, fetching water for the hospital and
washing bed linen and bandages. These Africans served as nurse-aides and
attendants and one of such was Mr. Willie Archibong (Ette Willie) who on
retirement in 1932 had reached the position of chief nurse. Formal training of
nurses in St. Margaret’s Hospital, Calabar started in 1918 during the tenure of
Dr. Maples as chief medical officer. He set the pre-requisite qualification
needed for training as a nurse at standard six, standardized the mode of
training and conditions of service of the trained nurse and gave a sense of
belonging to the nursing department. Two other hospitals were established in
Calabar the Psychiatric Hospital (1904)
and the Infectious Diseases Hospital on the premises of the former dispensary
for infectious diseases (1905).
Post independence
period: When Nigeria gained independence
in 1960, nursing practice and education continued to grow and improve in
standard in line with the Nightingale reforms in Britain. In recognition of the
fact that the type of nurse training in
any country determines the type and quality of practice, the Nursing Council of
Nigeria in 1964 set up a high-powered committee to look into the adequacy of
the syllabus for nurse training and generally revise the system of nursing
education in Nigeria. This committee reviewed and upgraded the training
syllabus, set standards for training of both nurses and midwives, and also set
the standard of nursing practice in Nigeria. This new syllabus was broad based
and structured to contain topics in the natural, biological and behavioral
sciences along with several laws, principles and theories. It was implemented
in 1965 in all training schools leading to a standard recognized in the United
Kingdom and Australia. Nursing in Nigeria at this time began to be defined as a
science thus paving the way for professionalism and autonomy in nursing. Today
the scientific design of nursing can effectively be demonstrated through the
use of many nursing theories to guide practice. The concept called the Nursing
Process is one such concept and is used extensively in Nigeria in patient care.
HISTORY OF
NURSING EDUCATION
What has brought about and sustained the image of nursing
as a science has been its educational programme which has over many decades
enabled nurses to develop nursing theories which
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have made nursing achieve professional status globally.
Nursing as a science and a profession came into existence and consolidated its position
by developing its own language, rituals, ethics, attitudes, culture and values
from scientific laws and principles. Unfortunately, the idea of an educated
nurse with professional status was a long way in coming. The Florence
Nightingale School of Nursing was the first formal nurse training school in the
world. Students were put through nine hours of work and bedside teaching per
day and two hours of semi-mandatory exercises (extra curricular). Bedside
teaching in patient care was given by the nurse- teachers and Miss Nightingale
while elementary instruction in chemistry, physiology, medical and surgical
topics were given by professors of the medical school at St. Thomas’ Hospital.
The text used for teaching the nursing topics was Florence Nightingale’s “Notes
on nursing, what it is and what it’s not” (Nightingale, 1859). Students worked
split shifts in hospital units and those who completed the prescribed course of
study were awarded a diploma. Thus hospital-based nursing education became
known as diploma programme and was apprenticeship in nature. The idea of formal
education soon caught on and hospitals established nursing schools. At this
time nurse training was apprenticeship in nature and made up only 2% of theory
(mainly Anatomy, physiology, materia
medica, bacteriology, hygiene and symptoms and care of some diseases). The
first European nursing schools began in hospitals of religious and secular
orders and when students completed their study they took vows and became full
members of the order. In the United States of America, the New England Hospital
for Women & Children established the first nursing school in 1872
(Hamilton, 1992) and in 1873 three
schools based on the Nightingale model (except that they were not autonomous)
were established in New York, New Haven (Connecticut) and Boston and many young
women were trained. In 1881, Isabelle Hampton established a school of nursing
at John Hopkins hospital and Miss Adelaide Nutting graduated from the 1st
Hopkins class and along with Hampton, set out to enhance nurse training in
America. The first nursing school in Canada was established in 1874 and
designed after the “Nightingale” school.
According to Barritt
(1973), reforms in nursing education and practice globally, is attributable to
Florence Nightingale, who
Palmer (1977) called “the reformer, reactionary and
researcher”. In 1884, the first school of nursing was established in China. In
the early 20th century, there was upgrading of nursing education in
United States of America from “apprenticeship” to “collegiate” system and so in
1934 nursing education went into tertiary institutions (community colleges) and
became college-based. This type of education was all-embracing and grew rapidly
because of the awareness by nurses that this was foundational and fundamental
to professionalism. The first of such education for nurses took place in the
Teachers college of New York. In 1952, the baccalaureate (generic) nursing
programme (a 5-year degree programme) started in the Teachers College, Columbia
University in United States on the suggestion of Mildred Montag. Other
universities and colleges soon followed and today there are over 100
universities in USA offering basic and higher degrees in nursing. Canada,
Australia, Germany, Sweden and Britain soon joined the league. Nigeria started
university education for nurses in 1965 followed closely by South Africa and
Ghana. Unlike most professions nursing has a variety of programmes for entry
into the profession i.e. pre-service, basic (diploma) and Generic (baccalaureate
degree).
Nursing Education
in Nigeria can be traced to the early
missionaries who came in the 19th century. They hand picked indigenous young
women and men and trained them on-the-job to provide basic nursing services.
These young natives were unqualified and selected from among the missionaries’
personal servants on the basis of being loyal, obedient, humble and
hardworking. Using the “apprenticeship” method they were taught simple
procedures like bathing of patients, dressing of wounds/ulcers, serving of
meals, bandaging etc Courses were not planned and there was no formal syllabus
and no textbooks for students to use. The standard of nurse training at this
time was therefore lower than the apprenticeship type and beneficiaries were
only nurse aides. With the establishment of hospitals, especially
government-owned ones, formal nurse training began in Nigeria. This was made
possible by the graduates of the Florence Nightingale School of Nursing who
were sent by the colonial home office to the colonies and protectorates. In
1930, formal midwifery training started in many mission hospitals with the
promulgation of the Midwives’ Ordinance Number 24 (operational in 1931) and the
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establishment of the Midwives Board to regulate midwifery education and practice and register
trained midwives. The impetus for the ordinance was the fact that the
missionaries who had established the earlier Midwifery schools had doctors who
controlled training and practice by teaching the midwives only what they wanted
them to know. With the establishment of the Midwives board, requirements for
midwifery training schools were streamlined in terms of pre-entry
qualification, size of hospital, number of beds etc. In 1940, formal nursing
training started with the approval of five schools of nursing (both mission and
government-owned) by the colonial government. In 1946 the Registration of
Nurses Ordinance Number 16 (which came into operation in 1947), was promulgated
thus being the first law to stipulate the requirements for nursing education,
practice and registration in Nigeria. This ordinance became the spring board
for the establishment of the Nursing Council of Nigeria the same year to control
nurse training, approve schools and hospitals, maintain discipline and standard
and keep a register of trained nurses. Nursing at this time was mainly done by
women, but immediately after the Second World War there was an increase in the
number of male nurses in Nigeria because many soldiers were discharged from the
West African army medical corps. These were absorbed into hospital service and
paid like civilian nurses. In 1952, an experimental training school for nurses,
with a standard high enough to be recognized in the United Kingdom was
established by the University College Hospital (UCH) Ibadan. Miss Bell, a
graduate of the Nightingale school of Nursing St Thomas’ hospital, London was
its first principal and only girls were admitted for training. Soon the Lagos
University Teaching Hospital established a school with the same standard
followed shortly after by two Catholic mission hospitals -St Luke’s Hospital,
Anua, Uyo and Holy Rosary Hospital, Emekuku. All these schools trained only
females and soon nursing became once again a predominantly female profession.
It can therefore be said that the rapid changes brought about by Nightingale
into nursing practice and education had great impact on the development of
nursing education and practice in Nigeria. In 1965 the Bachelors degree
programme was established in the College of Medicine, University of Ibadan in
collaboration with the World Health Organization, to produce nurse educators
and administrators for the African sub region. In 1973, the Generic system of
nursing education started in Nigeria with the establishment of the
baccalaureate programme in the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo
university). Graduates of this programme are awarded the Bachelor of Nursing
Science and practice as professional clinicians. Today, many universities in
Nigeria are offering basic and higher degrees in nursing including the
University of Ibadan, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, University of
Nigeria Nsukka (Enugu campus), University of Calabar, Calabar, Ahmadu Bello
University Zaria, Babcock University Ilisan-Remo, Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa and Madonna University Okija, etc.
administrators for the African sub region. In 1973, the
Generic system of nursing education started in Nigeria with the establishment
of the baccalaureate programme in the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo
university). Graduates of this programme are awarded the Bachelor of Nursing
Science and practice as professional clinicians. Today, many universities in
Nigeria are offering basic and higher degrees in nursing including the
University of Ibadan, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, University of
Nigeria Nsukka (Enugu campus), University of Calabar, Calabar, Ahmadu Bello
University Zaria, Babcock University Ilisan-Remo, Niger Delta University
Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa and Madonna University Okija, etc.
In 1970, the Federal Executive Council enacted the Nurses’
Decree Number 2 which laid down regulations for entry into nurse training,
recognition of training schools, training and examination for nurses,
discipline etc. Each succeeding decree or ordinance added to the advancement of
nursing education and practice. The 1970 decree led to outstanding reforms in
nursing education and practice in the country. In 1979 the Nursing Council of
Nigeria and the Midwives Board were merged, by Decree number 89 of 1979, to
become the Nursing & Midwifery Council of Nigeria. This is the only
professional body for all cadres of nurses and midwives in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
NURSING SCIENCE
Philosophy,
the science that comprises logic, ethics and aesthetics, is critical to the
practice of nursing. The philosophy of nursing science is the belief system of
the profession and a strong determinant of the cognitive and affective outcomes
of nursing practice. Philosophy serves to remind the profession of its beliefs
and values and guides in the pursuit of ethical goals in nursing practice,
education and research. It also governs the development of the theoretical
basis of professional practice. The philosophy of nursing encompasses three
areas - the concern with knowledge,
values and being (existence). The concern with knowledge is important
because nursing is a science and its practice is based on logic and the
scientific process. Nurse practitioners should therefore have the necessary
scientific knowledge and skills to enable them fulfill the extended and
expanded roles of the nurse. The preparation of the professional nurse should consist
of liberal education that incorporates laws and principles from the arts,
social sciences, sciences, the humanities and medical sciences. The concern
with values is also important in the philosophy of nursing because nursing is
governed by a code of ethics and nurses are continually called upon to make
attitudinal, preferential and value choices as they commit themselves to the
care of clients. The focus on being (existence) is significant because
existence is the manifestation of life, and nursing deals with life.
The philosophy of nursing in Nigeria is based on the
following beliefs;
· Belief on the sanctity of human life
· The profession should be responsive to the health needs of
the society
· The essential purpose of nursing is to preserve life and
achieve better health for the individual and community
· Man is a composite of physical, psychological, social,
spiritual indivisible elements. Nursing care should therefore focus on all
these areas.
· The client is capable of reasoning and independent thought
and possesses ideas, beliefs and values that guide his action. He should
therefore be an active partner in his care process.
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· Health is an integral part of the overall development of
man and to preserve life and achieve health for man and his family, nursing
should be concerned with modifying environmental factors that affect health.
· The nurse is a human being who shares the same nature and
humanness as the client/patient.
· A sound professional training consisting of liberal
education is necessary for the nurse to ensure the acquisition of broad-based
professional knowledge and skills.
· Continuing education is an integral part of nursing
education to enhance professional growth, competency and efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Nursing is the art and science of caring for those who
cannot care for themselves. As the foremost caring profession, it has developed
and passed through the process of reformation from the traditional role of
caring for the sick to the contemporary status of giving scientific and
professional care to clients, sick and well. It has been and continues to be
influenced by religion and culture, politics and war and technology and
medicine. These influences have left their mark in the traditions that remain
reminding us that nursing though the oldest of arts has become the youngest of
the caring professions. Nursing has consolidated its position through the ages
by developing its own language, rituals, traditions, values and procedures from
principles drawn from the sciences, humanities, and social sciences. The
history of nursing education and practice in Africa is closely interwoven with
the history of nursing globally. Nursing, like all other professions, has
witnessed several changes as the needs of the society have changed. Many
happenings in the world, for instance the world wars have had tremendous impact
on the growth and development of the nursing profession. With improved
education for nurses globally, nursing is regarded as a science with many
branches and has achieved the full professional status.
REFERENCES
Barritt, E. R. (1973). Florence Nightingale’s values and modern
nursing education.
Nursing forum 26;
84 89.
Bullough, B. & Bullough, V. (1978). The care of the
sick: emergence of modern
nursing. New
York: Prodist.
Delmothe, T. (1988). Nursing grievance: voting with their
feet. British Medical
Journal 296:
25 28.
Donahue, H. P. (1985). Nursing: the oldest art, an
illustrated history. Philadelphia:
Mosby.
Erim, E. O. & Ndoma-Egba, R. (1998). Saint Margaret’s
Hospital: 100 years of
dedicated service
to humanity 1897 1997. Enugu: New Generation
Ventures
Ltd.
Hamilton, P. M. (1992). Realities of contemporary nursing.
New York: Addison
-Wesley Nursing.
Kelly, L. Y. (1981). Dimensions of professional nursing.
New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co.
Ltd.
Levine, M. E. (1963). Florence Nightingale: the legend that
lives. Nursing Forum
2(4); 24 35.
Nightingale, F. N. (1859). Notes on nursing: what it is and
what it is not. Adelaide
Nutting
historical nursing collection, Teachers College of New York library.
Nightingale, F. N. (1882). Nurses, training of and nursing
the sick. In Robert
Quain (ed.) A
dictionary of Medicine. London: Farber & Farber Ltd.
Palmer, I. (1977). Florence Nightingale: reformer,
reactionary and researcher.
Nursing Research
26, 84 89.
Perry, A. (1993). A sociologist’s view: the hand maiden’s
theory. In M. Jolley &
G. Brykczynska
(eds.). Nursing: its hidden agendas. London:
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and Philosophy of Science
Edward Arnold.
REFLECTIONS ON THE
HISTORY OF PHYSICS
By
VICTOR OBIANWU
In this
section, we shall discuss in precis, how concepts in physics have evolved over
the years. The idea is to rediscover the
past in order to appreciate the present trends and reposition the mind for the
possibilities of the future. Only few
pertinent phenomena or concepts in physics would be considered in this
discourse. The idea is not to
flabbergast, but to expose the reader to certain strategic information about
the history of physics, which are believed to be capable of invigorating the
mind for positive thinking.
THE CHANGING
FACES OF PHYSICS
Physics
like other physical sciences, except perhaps mathematics, has been undergoing a
lot of changes. The changes involve not
only what constitutes physics, but also the concepts that are used in
explaining physical phenomena.
Initially,
physics and other physical sciences were studied together as natural
philosophy. Those were the days of
Aristotle (384BC -322BC) when emphasis was not placed on experimental proofs
and empirical findings, things were in a
confused state (Dampier, 1968 ). At that time, the boundaries between
disciplines were quite hazy. Even the
explanation of physical concepts were generally subjective. For instance, according to Aristotle, bodies
fall to the ground, because it was their natural tendencies to do so, a rule
that strikes us today as a little above tautology (Dampier, 1968) . This Aristotelian thought which is based on
the so called “tendencies” and “potentials” did not stand the test of time, due
to the shift in emphasis, to experimentation and mathematical proofs. In fact, mathematical advances led the way
towards advances in physics. Of course,
one should note that theoretical physics is saturated with mathematics. It is
believed that because mathematics is regarded as the archetype of intellectual
clarity and precision, certain very abstract concepts in physics require full
doses of mathematics for consolidation and order. That is why physicists are
regarded as mathematics sifters. They extract relevant
formulae and operations from mathematics, adjust it to suit their plans of
today and dump the rest for their successors to scavenge tomorrow. Apart from mathematics which brings about
clarity and precision to the theories of physics, application of new ideas to
physics, from time to time, over the centuries, has contributed in no small
way, to the changing faces of physics.
It is
observed, that late in the 18th century, it was thought that almost all the
principles of the broad-based field of physics referred to as classical physics
were understood. However, the emergence
of quantum mechanics and relativity which introduced the concept of
discontinuous change and curved space, upturned certain old notions and
provoked new ways of understanding physics. Furthermore, in the twentieth
century, mathematical principles such as probability, correlation, convolution,
deconvolution, Fourier series, fast Fourier transform, matrix algebra and
symmetries, just to mention but a few, drastically improved our understanding
of certain abstract concepts in physics.
For instance, Fourier series which was introduced by
Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier (1968-1830), a French physicist and mathematician,
who lived and taught in Paris, accompanied Napoleon to Egypt and was later made
the prefect of Greenoble (Kreyszig, 1985), is an operation that decomposes
complex periodic functions to simple periodic functions. Although Fourier
series is limited in importance, the corresponding Fourier integral (for time
domain operations) or Fourier transform (for frequency domain operations) is
very useful in understanding and dealing with problems involving non periodic
functions. The Fourier integral is
applied in communications and control problems that tend to dominate our
technological age. A notable application
of Fourier transform is in the designing of a simulator for humans to use while
training for airplane or space travel.
The simulator is built so that it “feels right” to the human who is
being trained. This to a first
approximation means that the Fourier transform of the simulator should be close
to that of the real airplane or space ship (Hamming, 1973).
REFERENCES
Alozie, P. I., Dosumu, M. I. and Ezeanyim, V. I., 2001,
History and
Philosophy
of Science. Second Ed., Clear Lines
Publications,
Calabar, 210 p.
Dampier, W., 1968, A History of Science and its
Relationship to Philosophy
and Religion. Fourth
Ed., Cambridge University Press, London,
544 p.
Gamow, G. and Cleveland, J. M., 1964, Physics: Foundations
and Frontiers.
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and Philosophy of Science
Reflections on the History of Phiscis
Prentice-Hall of India (Private) Ltd., New Delhi, 525 p.
Glover, J., 2004, God Almighty’s Grand Unified Theorem
(GAGUT).
www.geocities.com/igala1, New York, 9 p.
Hamming, R. W., 1973, Numerical Methods for Scientist and
Engineers.
Second ed., McGraw-Hill Inc., New York, 721 p.
Jenkins, F. A. and White, H. E., 1981, Fundamentals of
Optics. Fourth Ed.,
McGraw-Hill International Book Co., Tokyo, 746 p.
Kreysig, E., 1985, Advanced Engineering Mathematics. Fifth Ed., Wiley
Eastern Ltd., New Delhi, 988 p.
Sears, F. W., Zemansky, M. W. and Young, H. D., 1981,
University Physics.
Fifth Ed., Addison-Wesley Pub.
HISTORY OF
MATHEMATICS IN AFRICA
BY
PRINCEWILL ALOZIE
Summary/Abstract
The
history of mathematics in Africa is interwoven with the history of the African
people. Majority of the popular books in Euro-America on history of Mathematics
reproduce the erroneous view that Africans have made no contribution to the
development of mathematics. This article
argues that ancient Africa led the world in mathematics. The slave trade, colonialism and
neo-colonialism had been stumbling blocks in further significant contribution
to the development of mathematics.
Despite these stumbling blocks, there are many outstanding
mathematicians in contemporary period of African origin who are not highlighted
or projected by those bent on the continued distortion of Africa’s history.
Introduction
The famous
theoretical physicist, George, Gamow, in one of his popular expositions on
facts and speculations of science, did reproduce the falsehood that “many
Hottentot tribes do not have in their vocabulary the names for numbers larger
than three.” According to him; “Ask a
native down there how many enemies he has slain and if the number is more than
three he will answer “many”. Thus in the Hottentot’s country in the art of
counting, fierce warriors would be beaten by an American child of kindergarten
who could boast the ability to count up to ten. (Gamow, 1947:15). We shall be
examining the various ramifications of the above remarks in the write-up that
follows. This article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the Egyptian origin
of western mathematics and makes the point that Africans are not only competent
in counting, but were leaders in various aspects of mathematics prevalent in
antiquity. The second part discusses the
other centers of mathematical activities in Africa at large. The point is also made that the Arab period
in the history of mathematics is also an African
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period. Quite a number
of the Arab scholars were Africans with dark skin. The same could be said of the so-called
Alexandrian period of Greek mathematics. The bearer of the Greek name “Euclid”,
could in fact be an African, given the
fact that Egypt (African town) was the centre of the world at the time.
1. Egyptian Origin of Western Mathematics
Claudia,
Zeslavsky, in her classical, edifying, multi-disciplinary book Africa Counts, has used numeration
systems, geometric patterns in architecture, art forms, mathematical games,
historical records and artifacts, oral tradition and literary work in African
to show that the Africans have very complex and highly developed mathematical
knowledge. Although her work concentrated on rules of reasoning about
calculations measurement and shape”, it can be shown, and would be shown that
some other aspect of mathematics underlie the rules of reliable “reasoning
about calculation, measurement and shape.
Egypt is
the acclaimed cradle of western civilization. Writing, architecture,
agriculture calendar, mathematics, science and many more aspects of human
endeavour in the western world make reference to Egypt and then Greece.
Recently, when it has become very
evident that the ancient Egypt in question was populated and ruled
mostly by dark-skinned Africans, the emphasis on Egypt is shifting away to a probable European or
Asian origin. For Africa, Egypt in antiquity was only an outpost, representing
the culture of most of African people. This is one reason why the Ishango bone
artifact is of great interest.
In the
Democratic Republic of Congo (not long ago known as Zaire) a carved bone, an
artifact, was discovered at Ishango, situated by the lake known as lake Edward.
Dr. Jean de Heinzelin discovered this bone artifact dated at 9000-6500 before
the present era. On the bone, there are markings showing groups of notches
arranged in three distinct columns. A series of number sequences emerge when
counted. In one of the columns, Heinzelin says they are arranged in four groups
composed of 11,13,17,and 19 individual notches.
In the
next they are arranged in eight groups containing 3,6,4,8,10,5,5 and 7 notches.
In the third they are arranged in four groups of 11,21,19,9. Heinzelin noticed that the groupings in each
column are quite different from one another, and that each
column contains internal relationships unlike those found in either of the
others. For instance, 11,13,17 and 19 are all prime numbers (divisible only by
themselves and by one) in ascending order, and they are the only prime numbers
between 10 and 20. The group 11,21,19 and 9 represent the digits 10 plus one,
20 plus one and 10minus one. In the third column, the groups of 3 and 6 notches
are fairly close together. Then there is a space, after which the 4 and 8
appear close together. After a space, there comes 10 followed by two 5s in
close succession. He postulates that the arrangement strongly suggests
appreciation of the concept of duplication or multiplication by two. He
speculates that the patterns may represent an arithmetical game of some sort
devised by a people who had a number system based on 10 as well as knowledge of
duplication and of prime numbers (Fauvel, J& Gray, J. 1990: 6).
The
statement that the people were probably playing arithmetical games and that the
people had a number system based on 10 of prime numbers and of multiplication
was quite irritating to Alexander Mar-shack who could not fathom how such
knowledge could be credited to a backward people. The Isango bones were
discovered around the 1950’s when Congo was still a Belgian Colony that could
not boast of up to twenty university graduates. He could tolerate such an
assertion if they were made of Egyptians, Babylonians and the Greeks. Well, professor
Claudia Zaslavsky had been able to show that arithmetical games exist in
various regions of Africa despite chronic under-development and wretchedness of
the people. Among the Igbo, for instance, there are varieties of arithmetical
games known as Okwe. There are also arithmetical games with commercial and
military flavour. Alexander Marshack decided to interprete the Ishango artifacts in terms of time count or lunar
count. Marshack’s reasons for rejecting the line of thought proposed by
Heinzelin, and the rationale for pursuing a lunar count approach clearly
exposes the dominant prejudice and mind-set.
It is important to note that the number patterns detected
by Jean de Heinzelin is akin to several other such patterns among African
people today. In response to the historians of mathematics, including the
theoretical physicist George Gamow who asserts that Africans can only count
one, two, three, and “many”, we will demonstrate that numeration system in some
African communities could produce
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numbers ranging into several millions or billions. But
before we do that it will be interesting to read the testimony of a Dutch
trader who visited Dahomey for trading in the 18th century.
The
arithmetical skill which the Dutch trader, William Bosman, noted at the
beginning of the 18th century about the Dahomean (now Republic of
Benin) had been developed several centuries before that period. According to
this Dutch trader.
“They are so
quick in their merchandise accounts, that
they easily reckon as justly and as quickly in their
heads alone, as we with the assistance of pen and
ink, though the sum in amounts to several thousands which makes it easy to
trade with them” (Zaslavsky, 1973:
289).
This kind
of arithmetical skill was possible because many African peoples had developed
their own numeration system.
For
instance, it has been pointed out that the numeration system of the Edo and
Yoruba are similar, with the exception that in the Edo of Nigeria, the words
for number having FIVE in the unit’s place are formed by addition, rather than
by subtraction. The words for 45 and 46 were used as illustration
45 = (60-10)- 5 in Yoruba
45 = 40 + 5 in Edo
46 = (60-10)-4 in both Yoruba and Edo
Higher numbers of the Edo were computed as follows:
1000 aria isen (5x200)
2000 aria isen eva (2x1000)
10,000 aria isen igbe (10x 1000)
1,000,000 aria isen aria isen
(1000x1000)
1,000,000,000 aria isen aria isen aria (1000x1000x1000)
(Zaslavsky, 211).
It is interesting to
note the similarity between the
Amongst
the Igbos of Nigeria, higher numerals are computed as follows:
100 = Nnari
1000 = Puku
2,000 = puku
abuo
10,000 = Puku
iri
90,000 = puku
iri iteghete
100,000 = Puku
nari
1,000,000 = Nde
1,00,000,000 = Nde
nari
1,000,000,000 = ijeri
100,000,000,000 = ijeri
nari
1,000,000,000,000 = ijeri
Puku
The numeral system of
the Igbo as presented above is a modification of the ancient one that makes use
of twenties and tens, culminating in 400 and multiples of 400. Twenty is “ohu” and four hundred is “nnu”. The Igbo monetary transactions had been
described by Jeffrey in the cowries shell. According to that system we have:
16Cowries = isiego (isii =6, = ego-money)
12Cowries = ego nabo (2 units of money)
18Cowries = ego nato (3 units of money)
60Cowries = ughu (a new unit).
The next
units were 1200 (20 x 60) and 24,000 (20 x 1200), Jeffrey list number words up
to 96,000,000 (10x60x20), (Zaslavsky, 72).
The Efik
of Cross River State of Nigeria have a similar numeration system. Olderroge and
Ward think that this system developed only in the 19th century. They
may have come to such a conclusion because of the use of the word “tosn’ for
1000: which they feel is an adoption of the English word “thousand.”
Considering the numeration system of the Efik, it is possible other words were
used other than tosn for 1000 (Olderroge 1984: 10-11). For instance: 1 = kiet, 10 = duop, 15 efit, 20 = edip, 90
ananyeduop (80+10), 100 = ikie, 300= ikita; 800=ikitiaita, etc. (Olderroge, 10
-11).
The
Asante, Bambara, Mandingo and many communities in ancient Africa had requisite
numeration system appropriate for their needs.
Mathematics
is not just the numeration system. Records of mathematical theories are not
many in Africa. For the part of Africa generally referred to as “Egyptian
civilization” in order to camouflage the connectedness of that Egypt with black
Africa, two documents survive on Egyptian mathematics: the Moscow papyrus
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and the Rhind papyrus in the British museum. Both papyri
date back to about 1700B.C. The papyrus discovered by the British, Henry Rhind,
contains 85 mathematical problems and solutions, while the papyrus in Moscow
contains 25 mathematical problems and their solutions.
Geometrical,
arithmetical and algebraic problems are found in those papyri. According to
Morris Kline “The most striking rule of Egyptian geometry is the one for the
volume of a truncated pyramid of square base, which in modern notation is: V=h/3(a2+ah+b2)
where V is the height and a and b are sides of top and bottom. The formula is
surprising because it is correct and because it is symmetrically expressed (but
of course not in our notation) Kline, 1972: 20).
Morris Kline, the author referred to above, proceeded to
doubt whether the Egyptians recognized the Pythagorean theorem (square on the
hypotenuse). This kind of doubt raises problems for the truth- content of the
History of mathematics being taught in schools. Given the facts that the Egyptian
civilization is sometimes put at 7000B.C; that a calendar which these Egyptians
prepared at about 4142B.C was adopted by Julius Caesar in 45 BC with a slight
modification; and that the Egyptians combined their knowledge of astronomy and
geometry in erecting their accurate and complex pyramids; it will be dishonest
to claim that these same Egyptians were ignorant of the concept of “square on
the hypotenuse”.
The
Pythagorean theorem can be expressed thus: In right-angled triangles the square
on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the sum of the squares on
the sides containing the right angle.
Kline,
however, indicated that Pythagoras travelled to other places, including Egypt
and Babylon where he may have picked up some mathematics and mystical
doctrines. (Kline, 28).
George G.
M. James, who had done a substantial research on this and similar areas had to
conclude that the dishonesty in the movement of the publication of a Greek
philosophy, becomes very glaring, when we refer to the fact, purposely, that by
calling the theorem of the square of the Hypotenuse, the Pythagorean theorem,
it has to be known that Egyptians taught Pythagoras and the Greeks what
mathematics they knew (James, 1988: 5-6).
Anders
Wedberg is probably aware of claiming a Greek origin of the theory falsely
attributed to Pythagoras when he stated
that “special cases of this theorem were already familiar
to the Babylonian mathematicians several thousand years B.C (Wedberg, 1982:50).
Wedberg preferred to credit the Babylonians
with the knowledge of this theorem instead of the Egyptians. Bertrand Russell was bolder when he stated
that “it is said, and is not improbable., that Pythagoras visited Egypt, and
learnt much of his wisdom there (Russell, 1971: 49-50; 1969:62-63).
What has
come to light now is that most of the so-called founders of Greek Mathematics
and science, reproduced what they learnt or plagiarized from ancient Egypt,
then regarded as the educational centre of the ancient world.
Thus,
Thales of Mellitus, Pythagoras, Democratus, Plato visited and studied in the
Egyptian mystery school and received instructions from Egyptian priests. As regards Socrates and Aristotle, there
exist a lot of contradictions and unfilled gaps in their biographies. It is not explicit that they visited
Egypt. The method, content and behvaiour
of Socrates, and the content, association with Alexander the Great, the
so-called intellectual and scientific work of Aristotle show the marks or
imprints of the mystery school and the Alexandrian library in Egypt (James,
42-46; 163-175).
It is easy
to notice that the so-called Alexandrian period of Greek civilization was the
more fruitful. The intellectual
background existed in Alexandria better than in ancient Greece, which was
almost perpetually at war with herself.
If we dwelt longer on the history of Egyptian mathematics it is because
the disinformation and falsehood spread about ancient Egypt and the black
Africans are enormous in that region.
Egypt is the only area in Africa historians agree has made some
contributions to world progress. It is
precisely because of this position that we feel compelled to show that the
Egypt in question was owned and controlled by dark-skinned, woolly-haired,
flat-nosed Africans. Professor Cheikh
Anta Diop has written extensively on this and we do not intend to duplicate him
here. We shall remind ourselves some of Diop’s points on the matter.
Cheikh Anta Diop assembled evidence from diverse
perspectives, which include evidence
from anthropological value of human images of the protohistoric period;
Linguistic affinity; cultural data; divine epithets of ancient Egyptians;
Biblical passages; and classical authors of antiquity. Of all the pieces of evidence assembled by
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Diop, we shall dwell only on a sample of the evidence from
classical authors. This will definitely
be easier to cross-check from libraries than the rest of other technical
examples and pieces of evidence presented by Diop.
The classical authors quoted by Diop include: Herodotus,
Aristotle, Diodorus of Sicily, and Count Champollion-Figeac Volney. Herodotus who is considered by the West, to
be the “father of History”, was emphatic on the point that the Egyptians of his
days were black-skinned people.
Aristotle, is also quoted as saying: “ Those who are too black are
cowards, like for instance, the Egyptians and Ethiopians. But those who are who
are excessively white are also cowards as we can see from the example of women,
the complexion of courage is between the two”.
Although the correlation between complexion and psychology is childish,
Aristotle confirms the assertion of
Herodotus on the physical nature of the Egyptians of his days. Diodorus of Sicily who was a contemporary of Caesar Augustus
brings in the dimension of the Ethiopians providing Egypt with their laws and
civilization. This is the point made
earlier that Egypt was just an outpost of Black-skinned Africans towards the
South of Egypt (Diop, 1981:36-43).
Diop cited the evidence from a French citizen, Count C-F.
Volney who travelled to Egypt between 1783 and 1785 and made some honest
observations based on the physical anthropology of people in Egypt and on the
records about ancient Egypt. According
to Volney, “the ancient Egyptians were true Negroes of the same stock as all
the autochthonous peoples of Africa and from that datum one sees how their
race, after some centuries of mixing with the blood of Romans and Greeks, must
have lost the full blackness of its original colour…” Volney adds, “that this
race of blacks who nowadays are slaves and the objects of our scorn is the very
one to which we owe our arts, our sciences and even the use of spoken word,….
(Diop, 1981: 40).
2. Other Centres of Mathematical Activities in
Ancient Africa
Besides
ancient Egypt, and Meroe (within present day Sudan), there were other centres
of concentrated and intense intellectual activities in ancient Africa. Mathematics, literature, history, geography,
astronomy, were some of the seven liberal arts
studied in these centers found in Sankore in Timbuktu;
Jenne, Goa; Katsina; etc. (Buttner, 1981, Okoye, 1964)
Advance in
the so-called pure mathematics were as high as in ancient Egypt. We need only
compare the curriculum of the West African Universities with the curriculum of
the mystery school of ancient Egypt to come to such conclusion. Both
institutions taught the seven liberal arts; secret systems of language and
mathematical symbolism; and magic. (James, 1988: 132; Zaslavsky, 1973). That
mathematical knowledge was quite advanced in ancient West Africa was confirmed
by Dr. Bivar, of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London, who was reported to have made references to Muslim medieval West
African scholars and their pursuit of Lima al-assrar, “The science of secrets”.
This science of secrets is a combination of mathematics, astronomy and magic.
Muhammad was one of such Astronomers
Mathematicians from Katsina. H. L. Gwarzo has described Muhammad B.
Muhammad as an eighteenth century scholar, but had correlated Muhammed’s work
with Egyptian, West African, Greek, Hebrew and Coptic forms of numerical
symbolism. The implication of Gwarzo’s work on Muhammad is that the work has
ancient origin pre-dating Muhammed. (Zaslavsky, 131 151). Zaslavsky is not sure whether Muhammad
made any original contributions to number theory or any other branch of
mathematics. Whether or not Muhammed made original contributions, we should
note that the historian Ahmmed Baba, a Professor in history as well as Mahmud
Kati had listed more than one hundred prolific and eminent Mathematicians,
poets, lawyers in Sankore University of Timbuktu and other such centers in West
Africa (Buttner, 51, 56)
Ahmad
Baba, has been described in the Sudan Chronicles as a versatile scientist,
owned a library of 1,600 books. If we take into consideration that “All the scholars, lecturers, professors,
jurists and theologians were driven in chains to Morocco together with their
books,” and that the level of mathematics developed along lines of ancient
Egypt including the so-called Alexandrian Greek period, it will be clear that
pure mathematics as well as other branches of science were so advanced that the
Berbers of Morocco had to convert, treasure and steal what they could (Okoye,
77; Sudanskie Kronikle, 1984).
The
connection between Western Europe with Morocco,
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Carthage, West Africa and Arab influence can be noticed In
the so-called European Renaissance.
West African mathematicians and scholars were usually
referred to as Muslim scholars just as Afro-American scholars are referred to
as American scholars. The Soviet scholar, Prof. D. A. Olderroge, who
investigated this aspect concerning Arabic names of institutions and
personalities in the Songhai Empire is emphatic in stating that the people and
institutions were all black Africans and that development in the area was
autochthonous. (Buttner, 54;) Prof. Chancellor Williams of America also
discussing ancient African intellectuals came to the same conclusions that
these West African scholars “all wrote in Arabic just as black Americans all write in
English.” (Williams, 1971: 127).
Besides
the looting of intellectual property by invaders, some of the intellectual
property were destroyed. Despite the looting and destruction of intellectual
property, the human origin of science and mathematics ensured that traces of such
knowledge lingered in the founding society. This explains why Uthman Dan Fodio,
the scholar, religious leader and Muslim general had to teach his younger
brother Arithmetic, among other subjects. It also explains why the son of
Uthman Dan Fodio, Sultan Muhammad Bello valued a gift of Euclid’s ELEMENTS in Arabic from the English
traveller Hugh Clapperton, in 1826. Sultan Muhammad Bello said his earlier copy
of the book was burnt by fire (Zaslavsky, 276). Pre-occupation with mathematics
in ancient Africa has to be seen in the light of necessary ingredient for
scientific and technological advancement (Alozie, 2001).
Conclusion
From
the discussion so far, it is evident that Africans can count up to several
billions if there is need for that. The
mathematical activities of the Africans included geometry and algebra of the
so-called Arab period in the development of mathematics. The ancient Egyptians who taught the
Europeans and then the Americans, the mathematics they are now developing, were
black-skinned Africans. The
contemporaries of these ancient Egyptians like Herodotus, Aristotle, and
Diodorus confirm that these ancient Egyptians were black like other inhabitants
of Africa,
South of the Sahara.
The point was made, that besides Egypt, there were other flourishing
centers for mathematical activities.
Slaves
trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism do not bring out the best in human
beings. It is indeed a testimony of
the resilience of the Africans, that
they still produced outstanding mathematicians despite these unfavourable
conditions. Nigeria was able to produce
great mathematicians like Professors Chike Obi, Bestman, James Ezeilo, Charles Chidume, O. D. George,
Prof. Awujuobi (mechanical engineering, mathematician and lawyer), Dr. Edwin
Madnnagu. In the United States of
America, the computer wizard and mathematician, Philip Emeagwali represents a
very sizeable number of Nigerian-American mathematicians/engineers abroad. Ivan
Van Sertima has a fairly representative names of Black Africans in Science from
ancient to modern times (Sertima, 1986).
In Sertima’s work there are quite an impressive number of mathematicians
and Scientists occupying very sensitive positions in the science and technology
enterprise.
What this
implies is that great advances in mathematics would only be possible only when
there is an enabling environment for such development. This could explain why some of the Nigerian
mathematicians abandoned classroom mathematics for socio-political
mathematics. Unfortunately, these Nigerian
mathematicians will have to learn that a different brand of mathematics is
needed for politics. Africans should
boldly assert the position of black Africans in intellectual history.
Bibliography
Alozie, P. (2001),
“History and Philosophy of Science in Ancient Africa” In: History and Philosophy of Science, Alozie,
P. (Ed) (2001), Clear Lines Publication, Calabar.
Buttner, T. (1981), Istoria
Afriki s Drevnishigh Vremin Moskva (In Russian translated from German
Text).
Diop, C. A. (1981), “Origin of the ancient Egyptians” In: Unesco General History of Africa 2. (Ancient
Civilizations of Africa), Ed. Moukhtar, G., California, Heinemann Unesco.
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Emananjo, N. (1978), Element
of Modern Igbo Grammar. Ibadan, Oxford University Press.
Fauvel, J. and Gray, J. (Ed.) (1990), The History of Mathematics: A Reader: London, Macmillan Press and
The Open University.
Gamow, G. (1947), One
Two Three…..Infinity: New York, Macmillan and Co and Mentor Books.
James, G. M. (1988), Stolen
Legacy, San Francisco, Julian Richardson Associates.
Kline, M. (1972), Mathematical
Thought from Ancient to Modern Times. New York, Oxford University Press.
Olderroge, D. A. (1984) “Systems of Numeration in the
languages of Peoples f Tropical and Southern Africa” In: Etnograficheski
Sbornik, Leningrad.
Okoye, N. (1964) African
Responses Ilfracombe, Devon, Stockwell Ltd.
Russell, B. (1971) History
of Western Philosophy: London, George Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B. (1969) The
ABC of Relativity. London, George Allen and Unwin.
Sertima I. V. (1986) Blacks
in Science. Ancient and Modern. New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
Sudanskie Kronikle (1984) Moskva (In Russian).
HISTORY OF
SCIENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD
BY
ASIRA, E. ASIRA
Ph.D
INTRODUCTION
History of Science in general is one of the most difficult
things to do. The reasons are:
(1) Most of the achievements
attributed to some persons and localities are got through archeological
findings that do not always tell us about who invented what.
(2) The original
inhabitants of some of the localities either left their abodes or were extinct
due to invasions or migration in search of food and other amenities or
necessities of life.
(3) The zoning
system may have counted out/in a group from/to the location it never
belonged. This difficulty has given rise
to the fact that the history of philosophy of science in what is referred to as
the Arab world is a fussed one. This
accounts for the difficulty in stating clearly which of the scientific
inventions actually belong to which specific area or country. In the words of Anthony U. Uzoma,
It is true that many if not the best “Arab” scientists were neither Arabs nor Moslems; they were
Syrians, Persians and Jews who
had Arabic names and wrote in the
Arabic language (68).
This implies that science is mobile and can be attributed to
any country in error where a particular scientist or science migrates to. In what seems to be in line with what I am
trying to establish, Uduigwomen, writing on science in the Eastern world,
lumped Egyptian, Babylonian, Chinese, Indian, Asian, etc. civilizations
together. About the scientific movement
which influenced the other parts of the Eastern world, he quoted the World
Encyclopedia as saying that:
a scientific movement whose writing consisted of numerous treatises, commentaries,
manuals and
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technical
dictionary, originated in India and spread
widely. When these writings were translated, they gave rise to new
movements in other parts of
the Eastern world (32).
This does not mean that this was the beginning of
science. However, science has been with
man and has been handed on from generation to generation and from place to
place. There has been none, nor is there
any group of people in existence without a technique or technical know-how on
how to solve its problems, however crude or traditional such techniques may be.
Two things can be deduced from the foregoing and, that is,
that science can spread, and that there is no group without a science or
technique of its own. This is in line
with Stephen Mason’s view that:
Before the appearance of the first urban civilizations
mankind had already brought into being
a considerable array of techniques, instruments,
and skills (15).
The existence of mankind invariably implies the presence of
a problem-solving technique. Therefore,
every other thing that is today is a mere innovation of the old technique. If this is true, then the people of the Arab
world wherever they were and by whatever name they were known, had developed
problem-solving techniques, fashioned weapons for war, for the catching of
animals preys, etc.
With this background, the likely arguments concerning
science in the Arab world seem to be reduced.
Hence, it should not be surprising if a Persian, a Syrian, a Jew who had
Arabic name and wrote in Arabic language happens to be mentioned here as an
Arab. Nor should it be surprising if a
place that is not now or is now reflected on the world map, as or not as an
Arab community is here mentioned or not as part of Arab world.
Again, what some people call Arab world is being referred
to by other people as Muslim world and Islamic world as well. That is, these names are used
interchangeably. This is also adopted here.
This paper
is therefore about the scientific contribution of the Arab world.
SCIENTIFIC
CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARAB WORLD
As earlier stated, the Arab world like every other human
community in existence, was scientific.
According to Schwartz:
Early in the Essay of ’Dramatic Posesie’ Crites discusses the ’universal genius’
peculiar to each age, ’which inclines those that live in it to
some particular
studies…’” so true is it that nothing spreads
more fast (sic) than science, when rightly and generally cultivated (11).
This further implies that science is mobile and there are
bound to be mistakes in attribute.
According to Mason, men of science from Syria were gathered by the
Romans to Damacus, and founded an astronomical observatory there as early as
700 BC (95). In a case like this, who earns the credit? Is it the Syrians,
Syria or Romans or Rome? It cannot be
entirely Syrians nor the Romans. While the Syrians provided the intelligence,
the Romans provided the amenities or the conducive environment.
Mathematics originated in Asia, particularly in a place
called Orient. This was possible because
of the fact that the people were involved in farming which brought about
irrigation, which required a lot of engineering. To enhance the needed engineering in
irrigation, the people needed to be mathematically oriented.
According to
Uzoma,
The Arabs made important contributions to mathematics. Their outstanding work in this field was the ARITHMETIC of the Persian
Al- kwerizmi (68).
It is this author (Al-kwerizwi) who introduced the number
system which is today referred to as the ’Arabic numeral’. Uzoma explains that in this system, the value
of a digit depends upon its position in a series of digits. Thus, 2 by itself stands for 2; (21 = 20 +1),
etc. The zero sign has no value of its
own, it simply indicates the position, and the value and consequently the value
of the preceding digit or digits (68).
The Arab world, therefore, contributed in the area of
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arithmetic, especially in the introduction of the arabic
numeral. The afore-stated problem comes
up once more; this system of number, the
arabic numeral, is also referred to as Roman figures. This is as a result of the fact that at that time
(700 BC) the Roman power and military right overwhelmed.
The Arab world comprises the countries of the East namely:
Arabic, Asia, Syria, Bagdad, Iran, Iraq, etc.
In the Middle East, horse drawn
chariots and bronze weapons were in use.
Middle East had civilized by 1700BC.
Invasion began about 2000 BC when the Indo-European Hittites found their
way to Asia Minor. The Hittites mixed
the native peoples by putting together a large empire, which included Asia
minor and much of Syria. According to
Sigerist H. E., there was constant intercourse between the Greek Colonies of
Asia Minor (197).
Assyrians were also familiar with the prevailing inventions
and the use of iron weapons, had a disciplined army, efficient bureaucracy and
iron battering rams mounted on wheels (George Guest, 1719). The area or field where the Arabs really
excelled is medicine. Some of the famous figures, according to Uzoma, were
Phaxes (865-928) Alhaze (965-1038) Avicenna (980-1037), etc. (68).
Much of what the Arab world did initially was the
translation of other people’s work on science.
The chief translator between 80 and 77 was Hunayn Ibn Ishanq who
translated medical writings, Ptolemy’s astronomy, etc. Other works translated
even after the death of Ishanq were works of Ptolemy and Euclid, Hippocrates
and Dioscorides. The first ever known
original Muslim writer on medicine was Al-Razi who lived between 865 -925. He was a Persian. Although Rhazes and Sun
wrote extensively on medicine, they could not theoretically improve upon the
theories of Galen. But in practical terms, ’they knew of a much larger number
of drugs’ (Maison, 97). Alchemy, which was given birth to by the emergence of
Jabir Ibn Hayyan (The mystic), spread wide and members of the sect were called
’Brethren of Purity’. They wrote extensively. According to Maison, their
alchemical works were only part of “An encyclopedia which they wrote, seventeen
out of fifty two treatises in the
encyclopedia being devoted to scientific matters” (97).
The work, however, did not see the light of the day because
the group was suppressed and the work burnt by the authority
(orthodox sunni) of Baghdad. The ’Brethren of purity’ were
not in support of the deductive geometrical reasoning as was generally used by
the orthodox Muslim scholars. In their
attempt to explain that man is a microcosm of the whole world, the ’Brethren of
purity’ found analogies and correspondences between all aspects of the anatomy
and physiology of man and the structure and workings of the world (Maison 98).
The ’Brethren of Purity’ also contributed in the area of
chemistry by bifurcating natural substances into bodies and spirits. They opined that man is also made of these
substances body and spirit or soul. For them, spirits are volatile whereas bodies
are non-volatile substances. According
to them, all things (metals in particular) were formed by the interaction of
particles of mercury and sulphur. This
doctrine is traceable to alchemy of China and that of Alexandra.
The Muslim alchemists used the Greek doctrine of the four
elements and concluded that a metal could be transmuted by attering
quantitatively its elementary constitution (Maison, 98). On the basis of this,
Islamic alchemists studied chemical operations quantitatively. They also discovered chemicals like mineral
acids and saltpetre which they called “snow of China” (98).
The first paper mill in Islam was established in 751 and
the second in 793 at Samarkand and Bagdad, respectively. The Muslims got the
technique of paper-making from the Chinese during the battle of Samarkand in
704. Afterwards, paper making spread to Egypt and other parts of the
Western world.
Omar Khayyam developed the mathematics of Al-kwerizwi which
dealt only with quadratics but he (Omar) added cubic equations. In the field of
optics, Al-Hazen opposed the theory of Euclid, Ptolemy, etc. regarding the idea
that it is the eye that sends out light to the viewed object. For him, it is the object that illuminates
and that light spreads spherically from any source (Maison, 99). Al-Hazen’s
experimental study of magnifying glasses is close to the modern idea of convex
lenses and refraction in general. He
demonstrated that Ptolemy’s law that ’the angle of incidence is proportional to
the angle of refraction’, is only true at small angles.
In astronomy, one of the remarkable figures was Ibn
Yunis. He chronicled the records of
observations of the past from which he
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came out with the Hakemite (his patron’s) astronomical
tables. Al-Masudi wrote an encyclopedic
natural history which described for the first-time, Windmills. The mills were vertical axis of rotation and
were fitted with sails like those of a ship (Maison, 99). Ibn al-Nafis reacted
positively to Gelen, pointing out that, the dividing wall of the heart, the
septum, was solid and quite devoid of the pores permitting the passage of blood
just as posited by Gelen.
The blood, for Ibn al-Nafis, flows from right to left
ventricle through the lungs. On the
basis of this, he came out with the theory of lesser circulation of the
blood. This position was never regarded
as scientific until modern period.
Abuicasis wrote a medical handbook which dealt with
surgery, although it was never cherished by Muslim authors (Maison, 100).
The Spanish Muslims were opposed to the Ptolemaic system
because they preferred an empirical explanation of the world like that of
Aristotelian tradition. Others who
rejected the Ptolemaic system are Avempace and Abubacer. They rejected the Ptolemy’s device of the
epicycle because “the planets must revolve about a physically real central
body, not a geometrical point” (Maison, 100).
CONCLUSION
It is important to note here that Muslim science influenced
many places in the east and the west at one time or the other. Muslim Science was still influential even
after the capturing of some places by the Christians took place. Therefore, whether in China, Paris,
Summarkand, etc. Muslim scholars were at the helm of affairs in terms of
science. Many writings were made in
Arabic language and characters (Maison, 102).
The most accurate observation was that made by Tamerlane in
1420. He overturned Hipparchus’ study of
stars.
Asia is the craddle of planting and of breeding of
household animals. This was made
possible due to the topography of the land fit for farming coupled with the use
of irrigation (Wissmann in W. I. Thomas, 228
293); in the coastal areas, fishing was predominant. In effect, where farming was dominant,
farming instruments for tilling, clearing, etc. were invented. Where fishing was dominant, fishing instruments
were invented. Therefore, scientific
inventions by the Arab World was naturally and culturally influenced initially
until
they began to interact with other people of the world
either through trade or through annexation, conquest, migration, exploration,
etc.
A partial chronology of the history of science in the Arab
world is important here. This will
enable us to have an overview of the Arab role in scientific discovery. Below is the table of Arab contribution to
science:
Jabir Ibn Haiyan (Geber) Chemistry
(Father of Chemistry) Died 802
C. E.
Al-Asmai Zoology, Botany, Animal Husbandry. 740- 828
A-Khwarizmi
(Algorizm) Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography.
(Algorithm, Algebra, Calculus)770-840
’Amr Ibn Bahr Al-Jahiz Zoology, Arabic Grammar, Rhetoric,
Lexicography 776-868
Ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi Alkindus) Philosophy, Physics, Optics,
Medicine, Mathematics, Metallurgy800- 873
Thabit Ibn Qurrah (Thebit) Astronomy, Mechanics, Geometry,
Anatomy. 836- 901
’Abbas Ibn Firnas Mechanics
of Flight, Planetarium, Artificial Crystals.
Died 888
Ali Ibn Rabban Al-Tabari
Medicine, Mathematics, Calligraphy, Literature 838- 870
Al-Battani (Albategnius)
Astronomy, Mathematics, Trigonometry 858- 929
Al-Farghani (Al-Fraganus) Astronomy, Civil Engineering. C.
860
Al-Razi (Rhazes) Medicine, Ophthalmology, Smallpox,
Chemistry, Astronomy. 864-
930
Abul Hassan Ali Al-Masu’ di Geography, History Died 957
Al-Sufi (Azophi) Astronomy 903-986
Abu Al-Qasim Al-Zahravi
(Albucasis) Surgery, Medicine.
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(Father of Modern Surgery) 936 - 1013
Muhammad Al-Buzjani Mathematics, Astronomy, Geometry,
Trigonometry. 940-997
Ibn Al-Haitham (Alhazen) Physics, Optics, Mathematics. 965-
1040
Abu Raihan Al-Biruni Astronomy, Mathematics. (Determined
Earth’s Circumference) 973 - 1048
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) Medicine,
Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy. 981-1037
Al-Zarqali (Arzachel) Astronomy (invented Astrolabe)).
1028-087
Omar Al-Khayyam Mathematics,
Poetry. 1044 - 1123
Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Yahya (Ibn Bajjah) Philosophy,
Medicine, Mathematics, Astronomy, Poetry, Music. 1106 - 1138
Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoar) Surgery,
Medicine. 1091 - 1161
Al-Idrisi (Dreses) Geography
(World Map, First Globe). 1099 - 1166
Ibn TufayI, Abdubacer Philosophy, Medicine, Poetry.
1110 - 1185
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Philosophy, Law, Medicine, Astronomy, Theology. 1128-1198
Al-Bitruji (Alpetragius) Astronomy Died 1204
Ibn Al-Baitar Pharmacy, Botany Died 1248
Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi
Astronomy, Non-Euclidean Geometry. 1201 - 1274
Ibn Al-Nafis Damishqui Anatomy
1213 - 1288
Al-Fida (Abdulfeda) Astronomy, Geography, History. 1273 - 1331
Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (Ibn
Battuta) World Traveler.
75,000 mile voyage from
Ulugh Beg Astronomy 1393 -1449
Source: Dr. Zahoor,
Internet).
The scientific contribution of the Arab world cannot
therefore be overemphasized nor under-emphasized. The Arab world contributed scientifically in
mathematics, medicine, agriculture, chemistry, etc.
WORKS CITED
Guest, George. The March of Civilization.
Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1970.
Maison,
Stephen F., A History of the Sciences. New York: Collier, 1979.
Schwartz,
Richard B., Samuel Johnson and the New Science.
Madison: the
University of Wisconsin Press, 1971.
Sigerist, Henry E., A History of Mechine, Vol. II. Early
Greek,
Hindu and Persian Medicine. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961.
Uduigwomen,
A. F., A Textbook of History and Philosophy of Science. Aba: AAU Industries, 1996.
Uzoma,
Anthony U., Basic Facts in the History and Philosophy of Science. Owerri: Assumpta Press, 1997.
Thomas W. I.
Et al., Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the
Earth. Vol. I.
Chicago: Chacago University Press, 1984.
Wissmann, Von
Hermann, “On the Role of Nature and man in Changing the Face of the Dry Belt of
Asia” in Thomas, W. I. Man’s Role in changing the Face of the Earth Vol. I
Chacago: Chicago Press, 1984.
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HISTORY OF
SCIENCE IN INDIA
BY
J. O. INYANG
Introduction
One of the
major characteristics of science is the observation of facts in sense
experience. Modern science has reckoned with this feature and it is a truism
that this feature is indispensable to the notion of science in general. The
challenges that confront empirical observations including fallibility and
changeability among others not withstanding do not in any way reduce the
imperativeness and pertinence of observation in science. The attitude of
observing phenomena is as old as man himself who exhibits this attitude and
whether he is conscious of what he observes or not, it remains significant that
observation influences his life directly or indirectly.
Thus our
cultures and traditions may equally have started with the empirical
observations of the environment we find ourselves. If this is the case, then it
is arguable that science which is fundamentally anchored on observation is part
of our culture and tradition and has gone a long way to mould man disparately
relative to the ways he understands his immediate observed environment.
Apparently, science before the modern period was part of the traditions of both
philosophers and cultural people. This is found in both arts and crafts of the
early traditions as well as in practical agriculture. One may not sound absurd
in asserting that science is tied to tradition and arguably preceded
civilization. According to S. F. Mason:
No matter how far back in history we go, there were always some
techniques, facts and conceptions, known to craftsmen or scholars,
which were scientific in
character, though before modern
times such knowledge in general was subordinate
to the requirements of either the philosophical or the craft tradition
(ii)
Obviously, tradition is not universal in character, given
the
fact that the natural environments we find ourselves are
not in uniformity and these environments largely make up our tradition. Thus,
different people are identified significantly with different traditions and
cultures. What gives a tradition or culture its significance and peculiarities
include both its natural and man-made distinct features. It is on this idea of
distinctiveness or peculiarities subsumed under the concept of relativity that
makes it pertinent to critically investigate the history of science in India.
Of course, this does not rule out that certain scientific elements or features
run centrally in every traditional or cultural distinction. It is this central
or common feature(s) that gives Indian tradition or world-view the perceived objectivity
we find in science as a whole.
It can plausibly be argued that Western philosophical
thinking has glorified to a very large extent the important scientific
achievement of the ancient-Greeks not minding the parallel existence of this
same achievement by other traditions, nay, their influence on Greek thought
system. Examples are the Babylonian, Egyptian and Indian traditions. Suffice it
to say that the history of science in India is fundamentally rooted in two
sources. On the one hand is the technical tradition of the Hindus largely
dominated by practical experiences and skills handed down in a conservative
manner from one generation to another, and on the other hand is the spiritual
tradition with the dominance of human aspirations and ideas in it handed on and
augmented.
These traditions can
plausibly be argued, have “existed before civilization appeared, if we are to
judge by the continuity in the development of the tools used by the men of the
Stone Age....” (Mason ii). The growth in crafts and the corporations of
priestly scribes amongst the Hindus is an evidence of continuity in the
development of these traditions. Significantly, the convergence of the
technical and spiritual traditions during the middle ages and early modern
times resulted in a new tradition called science. Thus, in this chapter, we
shall examine the historical development of science in Indian tradition and
culture from ancient to contemporary age pointing out its significant
contribution to modern science. Areas such as astronomy, mathematics, medicine,
chemistry and related physical sciences shall dominate our concern, reason
being that the Hindu tradition excelled in them.
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Development of
Philosophical Thought and Scientific
Method in Ancient
India
Historically, the
Bronze Age culture of the Hindu people which flourished about 3000B.C, paved
way for the development of science and civilization in India. The period was
dominated by the use of a fast-spinning potter’s wheel and alloyed copper and
tin by the Hindu people in making bronze. Their civilization was remarkably
different from others by 2000B.C. The development of an alphabetic script was
quite an easy one because they had a pictographic script and a decimal numeral
system. All these were in place prior to the age of Christianity.
Fundamentally, the ancient systematic observations in India were predominantly
in the area of astronomy which we shall examine in details later. Besides the
Bronze Age and the observation of the celestial bodies (astronomy), it is
largely perceived that Indian civilization has been largely concerned with the
affairs of the spirit and after life. This position may be an erroneous one.
However, it is a common view for people to perceive the Hindus as people who
live with mysticism and spiritism given the fact that their tradition and or
culture are hardly discussed without a religious coloration and even magical
powers.
Contrary to this popular perception, historical records in
India suggest that some of the greatest Indian minds were much more concerned
with the development of philosophical paradigms grounded in reality.
Apparently, the parochial perception of other cultures by Western minds has
devastating effects on these cultures which often were presented derogatorily
in bad light. In this connection, we can infer that the premise that Indian
philosophy is founded solely on mysticism and renunciation emanates from a
colonial and western world view that seeks to obfuscate a rich tradition of scientific
thought and analysis in India. Most polemical texts that are not normally
thought of as scientific texts had much of the evidence of how India’s ancient
logicians and scientists developed their theories. Treatises on mathematics,
logic, grammar and medicine that survived and many philosophical texts
enunciating a rational and scientific world view can only be constructed from
extended references found in philosophical texts and commentaries by Buddhist
and Jain monks or Hindu scholars
usually called Brahmins.
Undoubtedly, these treatises are usually considered to be
part of the religious studies of India. It should be pointed out that many of
these treatises are in the form of extended polemics that are quite unlike the
Christian or Islamic holy books. The treatises have a remarkable difference
from religious texts, especially in attempt to debate the value of the real
world in contrast with the spiritual world. Equally, in the treatises is the
attempt to counter the theories of the atheists and other skeptics and describe
the competing rationalists and worldly philosophies anchored in a more
realistic and scientific perception of the world. The methods adopted were
those and that of flourishing proofs and counter-proofs. Remarkably, the
Buddhist world view and the ancient Jains were originally and essentially
atheistic and agnostic respectively. Equally within the broad stream of
Hinduism, there were several heterodox currents that asserted a predominantly
atheistic view. To buttress this position, Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism are
major religions that have today dominated the Indian world view. In other
words, these three thought systems were in ancient age not religions as we
think their of today since the modern understanding of religion presumes faith
or belief in a super-natural entity. Thus prior to the era of religious
conception, these philosophical schools felt the imperative to prove their
exta-worldly theories using rationalist tools of deductive and inductive logic.
Furthermore, it should be noted that amongst the
intellectuals of ancient India, atheism and skepticism must have been very
powerful currents requiring repeated and vigorous attempts at persuasion and
change. Over the centuries, the proponents of mystic idealism prevailed over
the skeptics, such that at the popular level, each of these philosophies
functioned as a traditional religion. No wonder the popular perception that
Indian civilization was largely concerned with the affairs of the ’spirit’ and
’after-life’. This could not have been in the absolute sense given the fact
that, at no point were the advocates of “pure faith” ever powerful enough to
completely and absolutely extinguish the rationalist current that had so imbued
Indian philosophy.
The Age of
Science and Rationalism in India.
The age spans from 1000 B.C. to the 4th
century A.D and is
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described as a rationalistic age from where many different treatises
of importance developed. It is plausible to state that from the earliest times
and without any restriction to race, culture, tradition or religion, people
have been curious about the world around them. According to The World
Book Encyclopedia,
“…people
learned to count and tried to explain the
rising and setting of the sun and the phases of the moon. They studied the habit of the animals they hunted, learned that some plants
could be used as drugs and acquired
other basic knowledge in
nature. This achievement marked the
beginning of science.”(142). Of course the Hindus
were not excluded from attaining this scientific
feat.
Like in ancient Greek tradition, history has shown that in ancient
India, the general structure and order of the cosmos was given a rational
explanation. An analysis of Indian tradition reveals that the Indians have in
many fields applied themselves to the effort of systematization which is not
reflected in a classification of the sciences (Wiet et al 631). In other words
less is known about science in India probably because not many scholars have
investigated it. The “Lokayata” was one of the most ancient of India’s
rationalist traditions. During its age “Lokayata” had an atheistic and
scientific world view. Unfortunately, it was maligned and was discredited by
the evangelicals of mystical Buddhism and vedantic Hinduism. As a remarkable
departure from religious influence, the “Lokayata” never believed in reincarnation
or an after- life and in the indestructibility of the human soul. They refused
to make artificial distinction between body and mind. They rather saw the human
mind as part of the human body and not as some separate entity that could have
an independent existence from the human body. In addition, they acknowledged
the material universe around it. The sacrificial gift and offerings for the
after- life as practiced by the followers of Brahmanical Hinduism in A.D 900
was totally rejected. Furthermore the ’Lokayatas’ dismissed both the Vedic
priests and their mantras as nothing but a means of livelihood for those
lacking in genuine physical or mental abilities.
Of interest, the “Lokayatas” were primarily concerned with
human sense perception and with the application of the
inferential process (rationalism) by which they were able to develop their
theories of how the world worked (http: India…2 of 4). Suffice it to say that
the Lokayatas were keen observers of nature; this may be why they are presumed
to be amongst the first to understand the nature of different plants and herbs
including their usefulness to the well-being of man. With this, one can
logically infer that Indian medicine gradually evolved from the early
scientific knowledge and understanding of the Lokayatas. It is likely that the
widely prevalent Indian custom of cremation originated from the Lokayatas since
they believed that consciousness begins with the living human body and ends
with death. Nothing like life after death.
With all these developments in ancient India and amongst
the Lokayatas in particular, we cannot certainly say that there was an
understanding of the world as elaborate as that of today’s science. Primitive
and inadequate will certainly be the description given to this ancient
tradition of the Lokayatas and their formulations should we judge them by the
standards of 20th century
science. However, there is no doubt that scientific elements and or traces were
found among the Lokayatas and knowledge of science undeniably has expanded
considerably since their age. Principally, the point of emphasis in this
development is that though there was a limited amount of scientific knowledge
available to humanity at that time, their world view was driven by a rational
and scientific approach.
Accordingly, the period of rationality gave birth to some
of the most fascinating series of debates concerning what constitutes the
“scientific method”. Also, was the problem of “when does an observation of
reality become accepted as facts and as scientific truth? How does one evaluate
a hypothesis for its scientific merit? What is a valid inference and what
constitutes a scientific proof?”, these and other related questions were
attacked with intellectual vigor. As keen observers of nature and human body,
India’s early scientists and philosophers studied human sensory organs,
analyzed dreams, memory and consciousness. They understand change both in
quantitative and quality terms. They even posited a prototype of the modern
atomic theory. It was this rational foundation that led to the flowering of the
Indian civilization.
The rational age in the history of science in India has
been described as a period of intellectual ferment and vitality leading to
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discovery in scientific and technological innovation. This
period also had its impact on the growth of other civilizations. Strongly
stated, colonial history has attempted to usurp the total heritage of the
colonized by making it exclusively euro-centric. This not withstanding, it is
pertinent to add that both fundamental and significant discovery in science and
innovations in technology have come from many different parts of the globe,
although at different periods and levels of civilization of the world. In this
regard, Indian tradition made its own contributions. However, we shall restrict
ourselves to scientific contributions as we examine different scientific
disciplines or endeavours in the history of India.
The Historical
Development of Scientific Disciplines and
Practices in
Indian Tradition.
Suffice it to say
that scientific practices have been found to be inherent in Indian tradition
and culture as far back as the ancient period. Generally speaking, the dynamic
and inventive quality associated with the scientific method has had some
influence upon human evolution. The method, described as essentially a means of
discovering new theories, so that the sciences constitute an ever-expanding
system of knowledge, has enabled old theories to be overthrown constantly by
new ones, so long as that method is practiced (Manson 602-603). To talk about
the historical development of science in Indian tradition could be viewed as
one of a number of historical movements that have formed an interconnected
complex in which science before now was a minor force. Accordingly, Manson
opines that “the science of a given age has belonged, not only to its own
tradition with its own methods, values, and accumulated knowledge, but also to
its own historical period in which other movements have made their own impact
upon it”(603).
It is on this basis that we shall examine, historically,
the scientific development in India with its attendant methods, values, and
accumulated knowledge as well as the impact upon it by other movements.
Specifically, the areas of concern we shall explore as earlier mentioned
include astronomy, mathematics, medicine, chemistry, and other physically
related sciences. We shall succinctly point out the influence of Indian
scientific practices on modern science.
(a) Astronomy
Unarguably, the recording of
scientific achievements in India started with astronomy. Astronomy as a field
of study is the scientific study of the sun, moon, stars, planets, and in
general celestial or heavenly bodies. It is pertinent to mention that by the 6th
century A.D., Indian astronomers had made significant discoveries about
planetary motions. This was made possible with the help of ancient Greek and
Babylonian influences coupled with Indian’s peculiar ingenuity. Accordingly,
the old nokshatra system was
preserved, while the characteristic feature of classical Indian astronomy was
the adoption of Greek and Babylonian zodiac astrology. Manson adds that;
The Hindus were acquainted with some of the science of the Greeks and perhaps
that of the Babylonians though, due to the absence of records, it cannot be
determined how and when the knowledge
of science came to India. This could be as
far back as between 150B.C. and A.D.140, given the fact that the Hindus
astronomers knew of the work of
Hipparchus but not that of Ptolemy, and
that the route was the sea trade between the Roman
Empire and Ujjain, the Indian trading center with the west (90).
In ancient India, attempts
were made to explain rationally the general structure and order of the cosmos.
Jean Filliozat in The Encyclopedia
Americana International, writes that ’the concept of a natural law of the
universe occurred to the ancient Indians
because of their observations of the regular coming of the monsoons and the
periodical return of the stars, the sun, and the moon to the same
positions.’(929). This buttresses the importance of observation as the first
step in science which we discussed at the very beginning of this work. Aryabhata was the first Indian astronomer to
describe the earth as a sphere that rotated on its own axis. In this
connection, he further postulated that it was the earth that rotated around the
sun and correctly described how solar and lunar eclipses occurred. Thus, it is
well known that astronomy was studied for calendrical purposes with a view to
setting time for both practical and religious tasks.
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Emphasis were primarily placed on solar and lunar motions,
with the fixed stars serving only as a background against which these
luminaries moved.
Almost every other
scientific study of Indian tradition was influenced by astronomy; particularly
as part of studying and understanding the world from the primitive stage of
noting important regularities in nature and essentially celestial bodies. The
city of Mysore in the South of India is historically revealed as the main
centre of Hindu science and the Indian scientist, Mahavira, is known to have
worked there, while at Patna, the Aryabhatas (A.D.475-550) worked there and in
the city of Ujjain, Bhaskara, Brahmagupta, and Varahamihira were well known for
their astronomical observations. It should be noted that Varahamihira presented
the first acknowledged account of the Hindu astronomical works titled the
’Siddhantas’ though five of such ’Siddhantas’ had been before his time and four
of the five were based on Greek astrology and the other one on ancient Vedic astrology(Manson
90).
In their astronomical survey, Varahamihira and other Hindu
astronomers speculated that the earth was spherical, with the sun, moon, and
planets, at distances from it which were proportional to their periods of
revolutions. Accordingly, this view was predicated on the assumption that ’all
the heavenly bodies moved in circles round the earth with the same uniform
speed.’(Manson 91). Most of the Hindu astronomers could be interpreted as
having the view that each body of the solar system possessed a proper motion of
its own, caused by a wind, and at the same time, there was a larger aerial
vortex which carried all of the celestial bodies round the earth once in
twenty-four hours. Equally, there was the assumption that all of the heavenly
bodies moved in circles round the earth with the same uniform speed. Manson
further explains how the complexity of the motions of the planets was accounted
for. According to him; ’the Hindus used the Greek mathematical device of the
epicycle, introducing void epicycles to obtain more exact agreement. In dealing
with the motions of the moon, however, the Hindu astronomers employed methods
which showed distinctive traces of Babylonian influence’ (91).
Indian astronomy in the early middle period recorded Aryabhata
as the first astronomer. As part of his achievements, Aryabhata wrote an
extremely concise resume on mathematics and
astronomy from which mathematical results were taken.
Gaston Wiet and Co. add that Aryabhata succeeded within a short time in “giving
an enumeration of the most important astronomical numbers, a section on the
determination of time and another on the terrestrial globe and the respective
position of the sun, the earth and the moon (theory of eclipses)”(636). Though
Ptolemy equally made his observations, Wiet notes that Aryabhata’s observations
were more accurate. Thus the invention of the epicycles was attributed to him
and the theory explains the retrogressive movements of the planets which
subsequently may have been interpolated in the Suryasiddhanta treatise. This not withstanding, Aryabhata’s claim
that the earth rotated suffered its non-acceptance during his age.
In another vein, it is pertinent to mention that
Varahamihira who died in 587 was not an astronomer in the absolute sense, given
the fact that he wrote several works of general interest and introduced little
innovations in the area of astronomy. Though, his focus was on correcting the Siddhandata, he however, was described
as the greatest of Indian astrology where he did some fundamental treatise on
horoscopes (Wiet 637). This is supportive of the fact that, at a time, Hindu
astronomy rapidly deteriorated into practical astrology. Besides Varahamihira,
other notable Indian scientists such as Brahmagupta and Bhaskara made little
contributions to the development of astronomy. For the former, he tried to
demonstrate that, the earth was fixed; this was in opposition to the teaching
of Aryabhata, his predecessor. While for the latter, he towed the general path
of the Suryasiddhanta, especially in
the discussion of the opinions of his predecessors. Accordingly, Bhaskara ’explained the apparent movements of the
planets by eccentrics and epicycles, and touched on the description of more
numerous instruments than those previously mentioned by the Suryasiddhanta (Wiet 637).
(B) Mathematics
Apparently, the notion of counting in all historical
cultures presupposes the existence of the mathematical system as far back as
the ancient period given the fact that counting, the various methods or
paradigms not withstanding, has been part of human existence and civilization.
In other words, the mathematical system was first expressed in the form of
counting including counting with the
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human fingers and other symbols. In this connection and as
practiced by many traditions, different symbols were used to represent
different definite numbers such as ten, twenty, fifty, hundred, etc. With the
progress in human civilizations, various numbers were assigned specific numeral
names and symbols or alphabetic letters such as in Roman culture.
Considering the history of science in India, it is
pertinent to mention that significant advances in mathematics were made as far
back as the ancient period with particular sophistication in geometrical and
algebraic techniques. Accordingly, these geometrical and algebraic traditions
were undoubtedly stimulated by the flexibility of the Indian system of
numeration that later was to come into the west as the Hindu-Arabic numerals.
It should be noted that in the history of science in India, the names of great
astronomers are associated with that of great mathematicians indicating the
influence of astronomy on mathematics. Thus it is plausible to assert that in
the early years of the 6th century, mathematics was perceived as a
product of astronomy in India. Though the former was for speculative purposes
where great progress had been recorded.
Aryabhata, one of the greatest astronomers in Indian
history, wrote his treatises on mathematics and tells us the significant role
mathematics played at the end of the Gupta era. Equally, his treatise on
astronomy had a chapter devoted to arithmetic, algebra and the most basic and
essential facts of trigonometry. Of much significance concerning the works of
Aryabhata in the area of mathematics is the fundamental discovery of the rule
for the extraction of square and cube roots. Weit and Co. quote the works of
Aryabhata thus stating the rule for extracting a cube root as set forth in a
stanza.
Aryabhata studied the summation of arithmetical series and
also attempted to solve both quadratic and linear in determinate
equations. He introduced the use of the
sines of angels instead of the chords used by the Greeks. With this introduction, it marked the
beginning of the study of trigonometry.
Some scholars have pointed out that because astronomy
required extremely complicated mathematical equations, ancient Indians made
significant advances in mathematics. In this respect of particular importance,
is the “differential equations” said to be the basis of modern calculus. These,
accordingly, were in all likelihood, an Indian invention. Furthermore, Indian
mathematicians were said
to be the first to invent the concept of abstract infinite
numbers, that is, numbers that can only be represented through abstract
mathematical functions such as infinite series in geometry or arithmetic.
Equally, due to the Indians’ advanced astronomy, they invented the modern
numeral system often referred to as the Arabic numeral system in Europe.
This development may have influenced great mathematicians
of western origin. Particularly, we are made to understand that Pythagoras,
the Greek mathematician and philosopher of the 6th Century B. C., was familiar with the Indian
Upanishads and learnt his basic geometry from one of the treatises, the
“SulvaSutras”. This goes a long way to
affirm the influence of Indian tradition on modern mathematics. To buttress this point, it is worthy to note
that the Indian notational system was quite elegant, and it was this notational
system of the Hindu people that spread to the western world through the Arabs
and has now been accepted as universal. Acknowledging this fact, the French
Mathematician, Laplace, is of the opinion that the ingenious method of
expressing every possible number using a set of ten symbols (each symbol having
a place value and an absolute value) emerged in India. This invention may not
be by accident given the fact that in India, almost everything was in place to
favor such a development.
Thus, there was already a long established history in the
use of decimal numbers, and philosophical as well as cosmological constructs
which encouraged a creative and expensive approach to number theory. It is pertinent to mention that, Aryabhata,
earlier discussed, used mathematical knowledge in his revolutionary
understanding of the solar system given the fact that is in order to understand
his calculations on Pi; he had to solve several mathematical problems that had
not been addressed before including problems in algebra and trigonometry. In an attempt to develop a precise mapping of
the lunar eclipse, Aryabhata, an astronomer and mathematician, was obliged to
introduce the concept of infinitesimals, otherwise called,
“tatkalikagati”. This designated the
infinitesimal or near instantaneous motion of the moon which was expressed in a
basic differential equation.
Gaston Wiet opines that in the history of mathematics in
India, the use of positional notation conditions all subsequent progress in
mathematics. This fundamental discovery
was given to
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the world by the Indians, but it is not known at what date,
Furthermore, the calculation of interest was of practical concern to the Indian
mathematicians. Accordingly, Wiet
presents Aryabhata as providing numerous examples.
Multiply the sum of the interest on the capital and the interest (on the interest) by the
time and by the capital; add
(to the result) the square of the half the capital;
extract the (square) root; deduct one half of the
capital and divide (the remainder) by the time.
This gives the interest on
the capital itself (632).
Besides the calculation of interest; Aryabhata was able to
solve equations of the second degree. He
also concerned himself with problems of indeterminate analysis.
In arithmetic, Jean Filliozat observed that the so-called
“Arabic decimal positional notation, with nine figures and zero was also
invented by the Indians. The rule given Aryabhate for the extraction of square
roots implies the use of such a notation.
The early use of the decimal system in India is evidenced by the verdict
names for the multiples of ten …” (930).
Among other Indian traditional astronomers who delved into
the area of mathematics was Brahmagupta.
He developed the application of explicitly general algebraic methods to
astronomical problems. He equally came
up with the general methods for solving indeterminate equations of the first
degree and for extracting one root of a quadratic equation. Also the invention
of a formula for the area of any quadrilateral with two parallel sides was
attributed to him.
Mahavira on the other hand, discussed the operations of
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, including the use of zero.
He maintained that the division of any number by zero gave zero as the
result. At this juncture, it is
necessary to mention that the earliest awareness of zero was found in a
monument at Gwalior in A.D.876. Mahavira, according to Wiet, “wrote a
relatively comprehensive treatise in verse covering the calculation of areas,
volumes, and projections. He studied
geometric progressions …” (634).
Bhaskara, another Indian scientist, expanded on the
trigonometric equations provided by Aryabhata. He, like his predecessor,
rightly assessed Pi to be an irrational number. His most important contribution
was his formula for calculating the sine function and was the first to work on
indeterminate equations. Bhaskara was also the first to consider quadrilaterals
with all the four sides unequal and more of the opposite sides parallel. It should be noted that Bhaskara was the
first to point out that the division of any number by zero would not result to
zero as insinuated by his predecessors.
Rather for him, the result will be infinity. Wiet acknowledges that “Arab scientists
recognized their debt to the Indians, and through them European science was
able to benefit from the discoveries of Indian mathematics” (635). This shows
that Indian mathematics developed prior to any of the European and Arabic
mathematics.
(c) Medicine
The treatment
and understanding or study of illness and injuries (medicine) in Indian
tradition took shape in the Gupta era. Some corpus of literary work indicates
that medical science was one area where surprising advances had been made in
ancient times in India. In specific
terms, these advances were in the area of plastic surgery, extraction of
cataracts, dental surgery etc. The most authoritative literary works on ancient
medicine in India according to Jean Filliozat are those of Charaka and the
Susruta. ’Charaka’s is however, known to
be “the most important text, as he clearly distinguished rational medicine from
magic and religious treatment” (930).
Mason on the other hand declared the Bower manuscript dating as far back
as the fourth century B. C. as the oldest Hindu medical work. Accordingly, Manson declares: “the manuscript
consists of a list of drugs, and the lore (knowledge) of their use, and these
are copied by later works, notably the Charaka, a medical compendium that has
been placed in the second century A.D., and the Susruta, a fifth century
treatise on surgery” (92). Here Mason apparently gives precedence or
antecedence to the Bower manuscript.
Later
works appear to have Greek influence and sources given that, the “Charaka”
spelt out rules of syllogistic reasoning
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undoubtedly taken from Aristotle. Three vital processes in the human body are
significantly distinguished in the “Charaka”.
These process are identified by Mason to include (1) The process due to
the operations of air in the region below the navel (2) The process due to bile which control the
region between the navel and the heart (3)
The process of activity of Phlegm above the heart. These vital processes engendered the seven
principles, chyle, blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow and semen, health. Depending
on the harmonious relations of the seven principles mentioned above, any
disorder would result in a disease (Mason 92). In other words, sound health as
it was believed, is experienced when the principles which have been further classified into water, fire and
wind work or function in harmony. While any excess or deficiency of one or more
of the active elements brings about ill health.
The three active elements Filliozat opines are also known as “Tridosho”
meaning the “three troubles” (930).
Gaston
Wiet further writes that “Ayurveda” the knowledge of long life (longevity) is
another name given to the works of Susruta and Charaka. Thus, the “Ayurveda” medicine accepted and
expresses the material of the body to constitute “five usual elements”, ether,
water, earth, fire and air; which meant that there existed in the body liquids,
solids, empty spaces, internal heat, and movement (638). Here, there is no
doubt that physiology in Indian medicine is closely linked with the science of
psychology.
It is on
record that in terms of superiority, the surgical work, the “Susruta” is more
superior to the ’Charaka’. The former
describes some 121 surgical instruments and gives an account of most of the
surgical operations known before modern times.
The “Susruta” (Shushruta) was the first to study the human anatomy. It described in detail the study of anatomy
with the aid of a dead body. Of importance is the fact that the connection
between malaria and the mosquito was noted in the Susruta as well as the
voiding of sweet urine by diabetic patients.
It is only in the Susruta that you find a description of medical
treatment as well as ophthalmic surgery (extraction of cataracts), and
embryology. The grafting of skin largely
practiced by a procedure even in the contemporary epoch is still known as “the
Indian method”. This suggests that the
act of skin grafting generally owes debt and credence to the Indian procedure.
In the
area of anatomy, Shushruta as he is sometimes called,
is said to be one of the earliest pioneers in surgery as
well as one of the earliest ones to study the human anatomy. The practice was such that after a dead body
has been cleaned, that is, the intestine, the body must be wrapped in bast (the
inner bark of trees), grass or hemp and placed in a cage (for protection
against animals). The cage is then immersed carefully concealed in a river with
fairly gentle current and the body left to soften. Seven days later, the body is then removed
from the water and with the help of a natural grass root and brush-like tool
and bamboo, one layer is brushed off one at a time, to the extent that the
naked eyes can observe every large or small outer or inner part of the body,
beginning with the skin as each part is laid bare due to the brushing.
Concerning
surgery, the dissection of corpses as part of anatomy was an essential
preparation for the practice of surgery.
Wiet quotes from the Susruta “He who wishes to acquire a clear knowledge
of surgery must prepare a corpse according to the accepted method and examine
each part of the body by means of a careful dissection so as to acquire a
dependable knowledge (638). It is pertinent to mention that the cutting off of the
nose and ears was one of the traditional common modes of punishment in the
early Indian Kingdom. In this respect,
Shushruta contributed immensely to plastic surgery by operation of rhinoplasty
(restoration of a mutilated nose by plastic surgery) which he did with surgical
skills, grace and success. This practice
is dated around the 8th century B.C.
It should
be equally noted that “the circulation of blood, rediscovered in Europe in the
eighteenth century, was known to the Indians, and even the circulation of
material body in the embryo. But oddly
enough the role of the lungs seems to have escaped Indian physiologists” (Wiet
638). In terms of pharmacology,
incipiency, methodology of preparation and application formed its various
classifications. Traditionally, India is known for the use of plants and their
efficacies. Many plants used by the Indians since the days of antiquity are
still in use today: In respect of equipment, Indian surgery was quite
remarkable especially those used in ophthalmology. The removal of cataract was
equally highly developed.
During the
medieval times Vagbhata was known to be the greatest Indian doctor with a
reputation similar but not above that of Charaka and Susruta. While towing a
great deal the path of Susruta,
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Vagbhata equally used other sources, and his work is seen
as a synthesis of Indian medical knowledge.
Vagbhata made his contribution to Indian medicine about the 6th or 7th
century. Worthy of note is the fact that Indian medical science spread beyond
India.
Magical
practices for therapeutic purposes were current in India as in all cultures. Of
significance is the practice of Yoga which is believed to allow modifications
in normal physiology. The fundamentals of Yoga were systematically presented as
early as 2100 years (21st centuries) ago. This was credited to Patanjali in his
work titled “Yogasutra”, that is, Yoga Aphorisms. Yoga of note creates important modifications
in normal physiology. For example, certain Yogi succeed in reducing the
circulation of the blood to the point where it is impossible to detect (Wiet
639). The practice of Yoga is seen as exercises for physical and mental
nourishment as well as self-discipline which is a kind of therapy for the body.
Summary/Conclusion
The image
of the past created by the play of the imagination and intellect on materials
left by earlier generations is simply conceived as history. Thus the history of science is the
description and explanation of the development and systematization of positive
knowledge about the physical universe.
Science is generally viewed as a cumulative and progressive
activity. Such a view, however, has
profound philosophical and historical implications, and in fact the effort to
define the nature of science is in itself part of the history of
philosophy. The nature of science here
covers the broad field of knowledge that deals with observed facts and the
relationships among these facts. Hindu science is no doubt a different
development especially when considered on the peculiar background of Indian
tradition and culture.
As we have
shown, the history of science in ancient India centres principally on
astronomy, mathematics and medicine associated with the tradition of the
Hindus. This does not suggest that the
Hindus never delved into other science-related disciplines. Apparently,
chemistry (alchemy), botany and zoology were linked directly with medicine and
pharmacy. In India, the earliest
applications of chemistry took place in the context of medicine, metallurgy,
construction technology and textile production and dyeing. Physical sciences including physics and
related disciplines
were not left out as part of Indian science.
While
arguing that religious beliefs including taboos and other indoctrinations
towards mystical or magical phenomenon or adherence to superstitions has often
posed as serious impediments to the advance of science, they however, on the
other hand helped positively in shaping the Indian mind given the fact that
progress of science in India was thus inextricably linked to challenges to the
domination of priests, and resistance to the proliferation of rituals and
sacrifices. Here, the role of rational
observation of the Indian world was necessary in shaping human destiny. It is
therefore no accident that by and large, developments in science and technology
came in parallel with the advance of rational philosophy in India.
To
buttress the point earlier made, Wiet argues that the study of Indian science
often neglected in works dealing with Indian civilization as a whole, is as
essential for knowledge of the Indian mind as that of philosophical systems.
Furthermore, “though the unity of scientific thought in India was opposed by
the extreme diversity of philosophical speculations, it is obvious that both
cosmological and psycho-physiological theories in particular the pneumatic
conception of physiology and physics, had shaped metaphysics since the
Upanishad era (640).
Thus, the
presence of certain common trends constituted a family resemblance to systems
in opposition with one another. This was
predicated on the inevitable diverse religions and derived from this heritage,
was a kind of immunity to the fluctuation of opinions.
It is of
interest to note that the various scientific conceptions and practices in
ancient Indian tradition have tremendous influence on the development and or
progress of science in India up to the modern period. This civilization pervaded Asia and other
continents. It is pertinent to also
state that it was at the end of British rule over India that research
institutes and scientific societies were established with largely theoretical
achievements (Filliozat 929). During the post independence period, science in
the area of electronics crystallography, solid
state technology and space meteorology was emphasized.
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Works Cited
Bernard, J. D. Science in History Vol. 3. “The
Natural Sciences in our
Time” Cambridge: The M. I. I. Press, 1971.
Clark, W. E. “Science in India” in The Encyclopedia
Americana
International Edition.
New York; Americana Incorporation, 1968.
Cohen, M. R. The Meaning of Human History. 2nd
Edition. Chicago: The
Open Court Publishing Co. 1961.
Filliozat, Jean “Classical Sciences” in The Encyclopedia
Americana
International Edition.
Vol. 14. U.S.A Grolier Incorporated, 1991.
Mason, S. F. A History of the Sciences. New York:
Collier Books, 1979.
Parmelee, Maurice. The History of Modern Culture. London: Peter Owen
Ltd. 1960.
Sarton, George. “History of Science” in The Encyclopedia
Americana.
Vol. 24. U.S.A Grolier Inc. 1991.
Thacker, M. S.
“Modern Development” in The Encyclopedia Americana
International Edition.
Vol. 14, U.S.A Grolier Incorporated, 1991.
Wiet, Gaston et al History of Mankind, Cultural and
Scientific
Development. Vol. 3
(II and III). London: George Allen and Unwen Ltd. 1975.
The World Book Encyclopedia. London: World Bank International, 1994.
Academic American Encyclopedia Vol. 17. U.S.A Grolier Incorporated,
1997.
Internet
Source
“Science in India: History of Mathematics: India
Mathematicians/Astronomers” At
http/members.tripod.com/-INDIA-RESOURCE/Mathematics.htm.
“Ancient Indian History: Philosophy, Development Scientific
Method. Ethics, Culture …” At http/India-resource.tripod.com/scienceh.htm.
“Ancient India’s contribution to Medicine and Surgery” At
http://India. Coolatlanta.com/Great pages/sudheer/medicine.html.
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Part
II
PHILOSOPHY
OF
SCIENCE
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192PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A PANORAMIC VIEW: POSITIVISM; CRITICAL
RATIONALISM AND SOME ALTERNATIVES
By
PRINCEWILL
ALOZIE
POSITIVISM
INTRODUCTION:
Philosophy of science has got to do with inquiry, discussions or views about the disciplines designated “science” This is not the actual study of those disciplines. Thus, the philosophy of mathematics is not the study of mathematics, but rather the inquiry or discussion of the various claims and methods of mathematics. In addition to philosophy of science being “ a talk” about science or an inquiry into various aspects of the scientific enterprise, philosophy of science also connotes some theories in the area. For instance, positivism, critical rationalism, methodology of scientific research programme, etc are specific theories within philosophy of science. We could also call these theories specific schools of thought within philosophy of science.
In this section, we shall examine a number of such specific schools within philosophy of science. We shall start with positivism and end up with the Marxist school of thought on science.
POSITIVISM
In philosophy there are such major schools of thought like empiricism, rationalism and scepticism. Empiricism has got to do with deriving genuine knowledge from human senses and sensory perception. Rationalism in turn believes that genuine knowledge is derived from human reason, instead of human experience. Scepticism is the school that believes that nothing can be known with certainty. Positivism belongs to the empiricist tradition. Pragmatism, logical positivism, empirio-criticism, phenomenalism are some of the variants of empiricism.
Positivism as a school of thought was popularized by Auguste Comte. Comte drew a lot of his ideas from his teacher, Saint Simon. At a point, Auguste Comte was an assistant to St. Simon. Disagreement between teacher and student led the then student - Auguste Comte- to deny linkage with his mentor. It must be stated, however, that both scholars reacted to the social, economic and political ideas prevalent in their days. During their days in France, monarchical forms of government; dogmatic, militant and totalitarian Roman Catholicism; and feudal social order were prevalent. Some philosophers reacted along lines of scepticism, anarchism and revolution. Some others like St. Simon decided upon revolution and socialism as ways out.
Auguste Comte resorted to social engineering in a way that enhanced capitalist thinking and practice. We shall continue with the tradition of regarding Comte as the founder of positivism because of the social and political significance of his approach to knowledge and society. What is more, Comte called his philosophy - Positive .
The word Positive is used in the sense that the quest for knowledge must correspond to sensory data and perception. Scientific laws are to be based on these sensory perception. Observations of facts are to be made in science, the phenomenon observed has to be described. Attempts are made to establish regularities and predictions of the behaviour of such phenomenon or entity.
What this implies is that the scientific enterprise has got to do with description, establishment of laws and making predictions. Explanation is not central in the positivist approach to science.
This approach could be accounted for partly from the fact that Comte’s positivism took cognizance of the history of the sciences. The science disciplines were classified by him thus: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, sociology. This classification portrays the sequence of the development of these subjects and the prime of place they occupy in the history of knowledge. It should also be stated that Comte maintains that our knowledge or conception of reality goes through three different stages. These stages are: theological or fictitious stage; the metaphysical or abstract stage and the scientific or positive stage. The theological stage is regarded as the most primitive and child -
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like in the development of the human intellect, according to Comte. You will recall that during General Abacha’s military dictatorship in Nigeria all occurrences in the socio-economic or political scene were described as “ Acts of God”. Abject poverty in most African countries whose economy follow neo-colonial directions are attributed to the “will of God” or to super - natural forces. The question is never asked “ Could God be so partial and continuously deprive the Africans the good things of life?” This kind of mind-set makes it possible for some very smart clergy to defraud fellow impoverished citizens through fasting and prayer alone in money - spinning churches where church founders become instant millionaires. It never occurs to the clergy and their followers that the founders of Christianity and Islam were not millionaires, and definitely not millionaires at the expense of their followers.
There are definitely certain things we could apprehend and learn from natural and social history. The situation we find ourselves in Africa today in terms of religion were similar to the ones that faced France and most of Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries. The reaction of European philosophers was to be anti-religion. Spiritual and religious pursuit could be desirable provided the practice would not become a smoke - screen that will enable dehumanization and heartless exploitation of people to go unchallenged.
The metaphysical or abstract stage differs from the theological stage in attributing phenomena to forces that could be comprehended by reasons or invisible agents. Whereas the theological stage had gods or God as the only reference point, the metaphysical stage refers to forces that are not visible but are definitely not deities. This stage includes reference to the word “Nature”. Comte regarded metaphysics and religion as very close stages. Although metaphysics could be seen as an intermediary between science and religion, the tendency is to keep it at arm’s length. This tendency of grouping metaphysics with religion, mysticism, magic, idealism, etc would be found in a number of modern philosophers of science whose programme include demarcation of science from non-science.
In the positive or scientific stage, the main focus is to discover the actual laws that govern the succession and similarity of phenomena through the combination of reason and observation.
Phenomena in question are subject to invariable (unchanging) natural laws. From the point of view of positivism, all the sciences are united. First or final causes, according to positivism are of no value as they are inaccessible. What is valuable in science is the systematization of indubitable knowledge and the continuous addition or accretism of new facts or knowledge derived mainly through the cumulative process. Induction is highly valued in the positivist methodology of science. Deductive method plays some role but not as decisive as the inductive method (Gorsky & (Graiznov, 1975 ; 1875: 20, 38)
The positive philosophy of Comte insists that science is useful only if directed to the improvement of society. Sociology, the last in Comete’s classficiation of the sciences, is designed to discover the laws that govern human society. Positivism was also directed along legal lines. Thus, we have the legal positivism of John Austine and Bentham’s utilatarian philosophy of law which is also positivist in outlook. Pure theory of law developed by Hans Kelsen moves within the philosophical framework of positivism.
We shall at this point discuss some of the assertions made in Comte’s positive philosophy. These assertions, as had been highlighted earlier, include invariable laws governing phenomena; cumulativity as a method of scientific progress; dichotomy between facts and theories; approval of induction as a method suitable for positivism while retaining some role for deduction. Central to these assertions is the commanding position of “facts”.
Scientific laws are constructed by human beings, usually based on observation and systematization of facts. There are schools of thought that maintain the transcendental or spiritual origin of scientific laws. In any of the sources of scientific laws, the human factor will always be present coupled with human factor in the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge is the world and object to be known. The place or relationship of the scientist or knower with the object to be known do play some role in the kind of knowledge - theory, law - produced. The point being made is that what we call scientific knowledge has cultural, psychological, political, and even religious undertone.
Let us illustrate some of the claims of positivism with episodes in physics. Isaac Newton (1642-1727) was a profound scientist who endeavoured to show that the Christian Bible was
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correct in terms of physics. He formulated some laws of motion, sometimes referred to as Newtonian mechanics. There are three such laws of motion. The first law states that every body continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in straight line except in so far as it is compelled by external forces to change that state. The second law states that the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force, and takes place in the direction in which the force acts. The third law states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. These laws were developed from antiquity, and popularized by Aristotle (384- 322 BC).
It is important to note that Aristotle based his work and scientific laws on a geocentric cosmology. The earth was the centre of the universe and bodies were at rest with respect to this centre. Motion was therefore regarded as a temporary (not permanent) state of things caused by actions of external agent. There is an unmoved mover who ultimately sets motion on. That unmoved mover is God! The Newtonian mechanics may have to be adjusted when considering micro-particles at probably outer space away from our solar system.
The geocentric cosmology is out of fashion today. It is also fashionable to think of motion as permanent not temporary. Thus, everything is in motion, relatively speaking; just as change is permanent. The implication is that the positivist position on invariable laws suffers some set-back since the presumptions governing the laws have changed.
If we consider the Newtonian laws, it will be observed that space was calculated in absolute terms just as time was also calculated in absolute terms. Some later approaches to physics consider both space and time in relative terms.
The issue of cumulative nature of scientific knowledge as presented by positivist school is faced with the problem of situating correctly and appropriately, scientific break through that radically moves away from previous world-view. For instance, Newtonian physics is radically different from Einstein’s physics.
There is yet another difficulty for positivist philosophy of science. This is in the area of dichotomy between facts and theory. Facts are said to be sacred. But facts are preceded by theories. Quite often, you will hear the professional scientist boasting of dealing with facts. These facts which can be sensed and perceived
do not give us uniform results at all times and for all places and persons. One major reason why this is so is because various theories support the facts from non-uniform perspectives. Let us consider the phenomenon known as “cloud”.
A cloud can be defined as a mass of fog, consisting of minute particles of water, often in a frozen state, floating in the atmosphere. Sometimes, a great volume of dust or smoke can be described as cloud, according to chambers dictionary. We are already having about three descriptions of cloud - of water, of dust and of smoke origins. The meteorologist would largely be interested in the cloud associated with particles of water. Dust and smoke become important for the meteorologist probably when considering visibility or the effect of dust and smoke on weather.
If a person is to investigate issues concerning cloud, that investigator must have an idea of what a cloud is. This conception of what a cloud is all about preceded investigation. A particular prior conception of what a cloud is will lead to investigating phenomena known as cumulus, cumulonimbus, stratus, altostratus, altocumulus, cirrus, cirrocumulus clouds, etc. Another perception of clouds would include the dust and smoke earlier mentioned. In outer space, astrophysicists could be discussing another type of cloud that differs from our own earthly clouds.
The “facts “ which the positivists adore are not only bestradled with theories. These facts are perceived according to mind-sets of people, according to cultural background, prejudices, social pressures, linguistic categories. Sometimes motives, desires and fancies would make us see a particular “fact” differently from the way other people will see it. Statistics is often used in scientific discourse to push forward a position and make a particular position appear elegant. In aesthetics, you could describe a person as handsome based on some external human features. Another assessor could describe the said handsome persons as worthless and ugly. This will be so especially if the person being assessed has some moral inadequacies or is very dull in intellectual ability.
The picture that has emerged is that human beings are the ones experiencing and making inputs in matters scientific and epistemological. This human being who is experiencing phenomena is enigmatic in several ways. He has fantansies, pretences, illusions, dreams, divided personality or insanity. R. D.
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Laing in his writings had tried to show that “real” madess can be as elusive as “real” sanity (Laing, 1961). He has further shown that some forms of insanity are sane reactions to an insane world (Laing, 19 60)
Given these psychological and non-psychological notions of “facts”, we are compelled to continuously re-assess the numerous circumstances surrounding scientific facts being articulated by human beings within the sphere of positivism. In a bid to escape some of this complicated problems of knowledge, there arose another brand of positivism known as logical positivism.
LOGICAL POSITIVISM
Logical positivism which is also known as logical empiricism is said to have been founded by philosophers and scientists in Vienna, Austria in the 1920s. These philosophers and scientists conducted meetings/seminars in which they examined a number of issues affecting the development of science. The group was known as the VIENNA CIRCLE.
The logical positivists held on strongly to mathematics. This hold on mathematics was not unconnected with Auguste Comte’s positioning of mathematics as number one in his classification of disciplines. This classification became very useful for logical positivism when some mathematicians and philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead among others, tried to reduce the whole of mathematics to logic. This was done in their joint work known as Principia Mathematica. Logic itself was prepared for this marriage with mathematics by logicians and philosophers who embarked upon reducing arguments to symbolic forms.
With this refurbished position of logic, this new brand of positivism asserted that any scientific theory that cannot be rendered in logico-mathematical language should not be regarded as scientific. Mathematics is regarded as an exact language which avoids contradictions. The same is said to be true of logic . In making this assertion, it was not borne in mind that both mathematics and logic had undefined terms in all situations. Take the case of geometry - a branch of mathematics. In Euclidean geometry, there are undefined terms and axioms. Axioms are said to be self-evident truths that do not need further support to show that
the truth positions are unassailable. The axioms continue to beg for explication in the light of new or unexpected circumstances. Consider the following axioms under Euclidean Geometry:
Undefined terms: Point; line
Axiom 1. Every line is a collection of points.
Axiom 2. There exist at least two points.
Axiom 3. If P and Q are distinct points, then there exists one and only one line containing P and Q.
Axiom 4. If L is a line, then there exists a point not on L.
Axiom 5. If L is a line and P is a point not on L, then there exists one and only one line containing P that is parallel to L.
Raymond Wilder has shown the difficulties that could be encountered in using the assumed truths of the undefined terms and the axioms (Wilder, 1965) : 10-13). Several years before Wilder, it had been shown that there are different types of geometry. There is the geometry developed by Nikolai Lobachevsky (1792 -1856) a Russian mathematician who found a different approach to the fifth axiom or postulate of Euclid which we have reproduced above.
In Lobachevsky’s geometry, the sum of the angles of a triangle is less than 180o . The sum of the angles of a triangle in Euclid’s geometry is 180o There is yet another deviation from the conventional truth of Euclid’s geometry. This deviation is from Bernard Reimann (1826 -1866) a German mathematician. According to Reimann, the sum of the angles of a triangle is always greater than 180o , and the sum decreases to 180o as the triangle gets smaller in area.
The replacement or challenges to conventional truth in geometry had a similar trend in algebra. Names like William Hamilton (1805-1865), Arthur Cayley (1861 - 1895) Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871), J. W. Gibbs (1839-1903), Evariste Galeis (1811 - 1832) and George Boole (1815-1864) were all associated with the development of different kinds of algebra.
We have not mentioned the problems of set theory or the problems of arithmetic. In arithmetic, when we say 2 + 6 = 8, we do not always bear in mind that 2 + 6 can be 2, if the 2 stands for hungry goats and 6 for fat fresh yams. The goats will eat up the 6 yams and we will have two fat goats.
What we find in mathematics also exist in logic as there are different types of logics that are poles apart from the traditional
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Aristotelian logic.
The mathematics and logic which the logical positivists relied on, had contradictions. To put the issue mildly, there are other alternatives to the traditional truths of mathematics and of logic.
Despite these observations on mathematics and logic, the logical positivists under the leadership of Moritz Schlick and with the active participation of Otto (von) Neurath and Rudolf Carnap among others in Vienna developed what they called protocol statements. This protocol statement or observation statement is a “ factual”, theory - free report of immediate sense - experience or of direct perception of a physical object by an observer at a particular time. Protocol statements were approached from different perspectives by members of the Vienna Circle including Alfred Ayer who combined the British empiricism with logical empiricism of Vienna Circle in his popular work: Language, Truth and Logic. Irrespective of the varying approaches, the logical positivists were united in their resolve to demarcate science from non-science.
This demarcation enterprise also meant that metaphysics should be removed from scientific theories.
Construction of protocol sentences in many ways meant the formulation of scientific propositions in symbolic forms. Newton’s third law which states that “forces with which two bodies act on each other are directed along one straight line, are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction” can be symbolically rendered as:
F1 = F2 (where F1 is the force acting on the first body, F2 is the force acting on the second force) (Koshkin & Shirkevich, 1977). The symbolized theory or formula does not grasp all the context of the theory. The formula is presented in a generalised fashion. There are definitely conditions under which F1 = F2 may have to be adjusted in order to be true, especially when considering micro events in outer space.
Talking of micro events in the micro - world, there is the problem of verification of matter. One important aspect of logical positivism is that known as Verificationism or Confirmationism. The formula we mentioned earlier or similar scientific theories do not capture all the material as well as the non-material aspects of reality. Confirmationism or verificationism becomes problematic because of this difficulty to capture all the aspects of the scientific object under examination. Even at the material level, there are some
aspects of reality that do not present themselves readily to immediate sensation. When we talk of matter and material entities, we also remember the micro-level aspects like neutron, protons, molecules, etc. These are some examples of the issues in science that are problematic for the logical positivists verificationist enterprise.
Verificationism or confirmationism as originally conceived by the positivists believed that observation statements had no theoretical coating. Later, verificationism and confirmationism regarded observation statements as the foundation of true knowledge and basis for meaningfulness.
The word “meaning” is very important in the logical positivists programme. According to Moritz Schlick, “It is the peculiar business of philosophy to ascertain and make clear the “meaning” of statements and questions (Schlick/Ayer 1959). Meanings of propositions are made clear by understanding the words which constitute the proposition. This is further pursued by having the definitions of the words which make up the propositions. Schlick and his counterparts realized that even in definitions, there is a stage when we have to assume the meanings of some words without rendering their definition. There is a little difference from the analytical /tautological logical approach to propositions. For, according to Schlick: The criterion of the truth or falsity of the proposition lies in the fact that under definite conditions (given in the definition) certain data are present or not present. If this is determined then everything asserted by the proposition is determined, and we know its meaning.
This method of stating the matter opens the way for non-existent or non-sensical entities to be defined and therefore made meaningful. Schlick and the positivists would react to the above by labelling the statement as empty and metaphysical. They drum home their dictum that “The empiricist does not say to the metaphysician” what you say is false, but “what you say asserts nothing at all.”
Meaning has to be concrete, verifiable by the senses. In physics, there were times it was assumed that there is a stuff known as Ether. According to Einstein and numerous scientists today, there is no ether. The ether is the medium that was supposed to fill all space and support the propagation of electromagnetic radiations.
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Despite the non -existence of ether, useful calculations have been made by scientists as if there indeed existed ether.
The emergence of the theory of Relativity by Albert Einstein meant that a number of the positions of logical positivism had to be withdrawn. The Special Theory of Relativity (STR) was partly the result of speculative thinking. If Einstein had tied himself on to the logical positivist’s tenets of observation as the foundation of indubitable knowledge and meaningfulness, he might not have developed the STR at the time he did. There are other ways of interpreting meaningfulness. This includes traditional usages of expressions in given contexts, as well as situating meaningfulness within world-views.
The positivist and logical positivist philosophy of science have so much in common. These positivists schools and their different brand believe in the pursuit of Truth as the goal of science. The Inductive method of inquiry which warrants the investigator to draw conclusion from particular instances to general; or from particular to particular instance was the more favoured method. The episodes in the growth of science as well as the internal problems of positivism impelled philosophers to look for better alternatives. One such alternatives was critical Rationalism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gorsky D. P. & Graiaznov B. S. (1975) Positivism and Science Moskva, Nauka (In Russian)
Benton T. (1977) Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies. London, Rout ledge & Keghn Paul
Harris, K. (1982) Education and Knowledge London, RKP.
Laing, R. D. (1960) The Divided Self Lond. Tavistock.
Laing, R. D (1961) Self and Others, London, Tavistock
Wilder, R. L. (1965) The foundations of Mathematics, New York John Wiley & Sons.
Koshkin, N. I. & Shirkevich, M. G. (1977) Handbook of Elementary Physics Moscow, MIR Publ.
M. Schlick, “Positivism and Realism” In Logical Positivism (Ed) A. J. Ayer, Free Press New York, 1959.
CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Critical rationalism is associated with Karl Raymond Popper who founded it. Karl Popper, an Austrian by birth, fled his country during the Nazi period in Germany and settled first in New Zealand but later migrated to England to teach in the London School of Economics and Political Science when the need arose to recruit an anti-marxist. The London school at the time was under the influence of the socialist Harold Larski, who joined the British Labour Party Government then. This introduction is necessary because it helps to explain the inconsistencies in Karl Popper’s philosophy. Belonging initially to the Communist Party of Austria, he abandoned the party when the communists were being hunted. Under a capitalist atmosphere he wrote the book that shot him to fame: The Open Society and Its Enemies. That book is regarded as a major attack on marxist philosophy, seen by the capitalist exploiter and capitalist nations as undemocratic. It was the good reception his book had in the predatory nations that his older book: The Logic of Scientific Discovery and subsequent works on philosophy of science were popularized.
His other books include: Conjectures and Refutations; Objective Knowledge; The Poverty of Historicism; The self and Its Brain (Co-authored with John Eccles) and Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery.
Critical rationalism has a lot in common with logical positivism. This is in the use of logic and empiricism. The demarcation between science and non-science was initially pursued by Popper, but he abandoned the project half-way, when he discovered that the demarcation task is an impossible one. The two schools placed mathematics and physics at the apex of scientific knowledge.
INDUCTION: Karl Popper was bothered by the use of induction in science. He gave several interpretations to the concept of induction before proceeding to replace induction with the deductive method. An examination of his perception and solution to the so-called problems of induction shows that Popper is still far from solving the problems of induction. David Hume’s presentation of induction was a starting point for Popper’s excursion into the field
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of Induction. According to Hume’s thinking, if the sun rises from the East everyday, we are not justified to conclude that the sun will continue to rise from the East everyday. In the words of David Hume: “Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover anything further. He would not at first, by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude; merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect” (Hume 1748: 335). After some experience, the new person will be drawing conclusion based on experience and custom.
Karl Popper divided Hume’s position into the logical and the psychological. Popper agrees with the sceptical problems posed by Hume’s presentation of induction. Since there may not be any necessary connection between sequences of events, it would be profitable for sciences to proceed negatively by refuting instead of confirming or corroborating. This leads to Popper’s theory of Falsificationism. By this theory, it is easier to get a negative report of a universal theory (that is capable of being subjected to a test) than to pursue positive instance which could lead to an infinite regress.
Falsification is one way of escaping from induction which he regarded as invalid because, according to Popper (and Hume), it leads to infinite regress and to apriorism (Popper, 1972: 86) . Popper is of the view that a good scientific theory must be put to test and should be in a position to explain in a better way observable phenomena.
Falsificationism brings out Popper’s closer affinity with logical positivism more than he or his followers will wish to concede. This becomes clearer when we remember that the aim of science according to Karl Popper is to move towards the truth. The positivists also aimed at the truth - empirically verifiable truth. The logical positivists tried to marry empirical content of truth with logical truth. It is true that Karl Popper articulated his own version of truth known as Verisimilitude. Verisimilitude simply means,
nearer the truth.
Truth is construed in terms of Alfred Tarki’s semantic conception of truth (popularly referred to as semantic theory of truth, even through Tarski would have regarded himself as a correspondence theorist): The concept of truth has to be reduced to logic, mathematics and the physical sciences. In correspondence theory, truth is equivalent to reality. It is indeed difficult to convert all that is real into logical terms and content without losing the essence and sometimes meaning of reality. Love, beauty, charisma and development are all parts of reality. Reducing all these to logic, mathematics and physical content may not capture the essence of those words. Whereas, Tarski is mainly concerned with truth corresponding with reality, Popper is concerned with a shifting reality. Verisimilitude shifts with the emergence of a better theory. Kevin Harris appropriately summarizes the falsificationist account of a good theory thus:
1. It should be able to explain all the acceptable observable phenomena that its predecessor could explain (i.e. it should have equal or larger content)
2. It should be able to explain the observable phenomena or anomalies that refuted the old theory.
3. It should be able to predict some new phenomena not previously known or not covered by the previous theory.
It should not be falsified by any accepted observable phenomena (Harris, 1982: 37).
When Popper writes of a good theory, there is an understanding that some kind of comparison is borne in mind. When comparing, there are consequences of the theory that could be infinite in extent. The very idea of comparing is inductive in nature because specific, limited theory is in question. Even if the theory is a universal one, you will be comparing it with another universal theory.
The concept of verisimilitude carries with it elements of induction. Some events, phenomenon, or aspect of reality is adjudged nearer the truth. Some boundaries or “initial conditions” are always present in the formulation of Popper’s method.
The falsification principle of Popper is inductive in nature. Karl Popper was not correct in asserting that he has solved the problems of induction. The claim of solving the problem of
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induction is puzzling when it is recalled that Popper states a number of times that there is no criterion of truth. According to him: “By a criterion of truth is meant a kind of decision method: a method that leads either generally, or at least in a certain class of cases, through a finite sequence of steps (for example, of tests) to the decision whether or not the statement in question is true. Thus in the absence of a general criterion of truth it may easily happen that we posses true theories, and yet are unable to show, to our satisfaction, that they are true. What can also happen is that we are able to establish some statements as true, by sort of lucky co-incidence rather than an application of a criterion of truth (which may not exist in the case in question) (Schillip, 1974: 1105).
The term verisimilitude is of no value since the person who introduced the term tells us that we may not know the truth if we come across it. The same treatment goes for Popper’s falsification principle. If you do not know the truth, what criterion would you be using in labelling a theory or phenomenon true or false? You can only falsify if you are standing on a firm ground of truth.
PROBABILITY
Probability is used in everyday life in every community including scientific community. Karl Popper does not have much regard for probability. Despite the actual use of statistics and its probabilistic conclusions, Karl Popper says that he would prefer to ignore these statistical results because the probability in a universal theory would tend towards zero. It would appear that the attack on probabilistic calculation is motivated by his deductive and anti-inductive stance. The other reason is that Popper was a determinist when he wrote The Logic of scientific Discovery. Anthony O’Hear has shown the various manipulation or interpretations of probability by Popper to fit in the orbit of Quantum Machanics (O’Hear, 1980). He adjusted into considering singular events while sticking to his deductive method and conclusions. Ellery Eell’s Probabilistic causality has endeavoured to show how we could approach probability with advantage (Eell, 1991) .
MODEL
Popper has a model of growth of science which is quite interesting. The model starts with a problem (P). Tentative Theory
(TT) is constructed for the solution of the problem. Error Elimination (EE) is applied to the tentative theory in order to make the theory adequate. At the time the initial problem was solved, a second problem emerges. The schema is something like this:
P1 TT EE P2 .
This schema fails to realize that problems are perceived from a theoretical position. What a particular ideology perceives as a problem may not be a problem from the point of view of another ideology. His schema of scientific progress however fits into the pattern of inability to locate Truth and proper solution.
The history and practice of science fail to support Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. His arguments and model of scientific growth have been falsified in real terms. The singular credit that could have been credited to him, do not belong to him. That credit concerns the proposition that science progresses by conjecture and refutation; by making bold and ingenious guess and trying to refute the outcome. Trial and error has always been with mankind. The people of the world have survived difficult situations using that method.
Given the reality that Karl Popper’s position is exceedingly eclectic and sometimes contradictory it is then obvious why he has no rational mandate to legislate on social engineering. His Poverty of Historicism and Open Society and Its Enemies have been criticized by non-marxists like Anthony O’Hear, Robert A. Solo and Paul Feyerabend. Rationality and critical rationalism is from the “good sense” of imperialist powers. Robert Solo has shown how disastrous the result could be to economic theories of predator nations when the Popperian schema is applied. Paul Feyerabend has severally shown that the world would be a better place if people of different culture live in freedom without economic and military intervention by technologically superior nations. What is more, Feyerabend has shown convincingly, that science as presented by philosophers like Karl Popper, could be regarded as an ideology equivalent to religion, myth, and mysticism.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hume , D. (1745) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding reproduced by Anchor Books, (1974) New York, p. 335.
Popper, K. R. (1972) Objective Knowledge Oxford, At the Clareadon Press.
Harris , K (1982) Education and Knowledge, London, RKP.
Schilipp, P. A. (ed) (1974), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, BK 1 & BK II (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court)
Benton, T. (1977) Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies, London, R & KP
O’Hear, A. (1980) Karl Popper London, R. & KP.
Popper, K. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism London, R. & KP.
Popper, K. (1966) The Open Society and Its Enemies (2 volumes) London, R. & KP.
Eells, E. (1991) Probalistic Causality Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1987) Farewell to Reason London, Verso Books.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1975) Against Method Lond, Verso BKS.
Feyerabend,
P. K. (1978) Science in a Free Society,
…
5.
Crises of imperialist/Western Science.
There is need to demarcate science from technology. Quite often, we read the words science tied together with technology. These are quite separate phenomena. What is dazzling a number of people about science, may indeed be the technological breakthroughs. The method of developing technologies do not follow the pattern recommended by the critical rationalists or logical positivists.
It has been discovered that the word “science” may not have a great technological value. Science has to be co-joined with technology for political and economic reasons. The under-developed, and impoverished majority of world population need to learn that there is an ideology which is superior to their various religions, myths, and cultural values. That superior ideology is science.
But the time of reckoning is fast approaching as various peoples of the world, minus the Black Africans, have developed nuclear weapons and some biological/chemical weapons of war. If the leaders of sleeping Africans would only realize that they are playing a deadly game by their ineptitude and slavish mentality, they may very well be the people to save this world from total annihilation. This is inspite of the present state of Africa today. The method of approach need not be publicised. Science, religion, culture and indeed, developmental philosophy would all have to be directed to the survival of the peoples of Africa. The current attempt
to have an African Union Government could have been plauded, if not that the majority of the African leaders who are pushing the programme are imperialist stooges. Their slogan is “Peace and Unity”. Peace of the graveyard and unity of slaves appear to be the understanding of these neo-colonial agents whose performances in their respective countries do not give us cause for joy. With the exception of possibly one country from North Africa and possibly three from Southern Africa, there is an urgent need to do the kind of thing Kwame Nkrumah did to have the Organisation of African Unity established.
CONSCIENCISM
Consciencism is the philosophy developed by Kwame Nkrumah. Since the social and economic situation is marching dangerously towards the colonial period in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah’s ideas are hardly mentioned. Nkrumah was a one - man brigade in the battle for the liberation of Africa from colonial bondage.
Consciencism is not devoted to science alone, but to the decolonization and development of the African Peoples. This philosophy recognizes the historical and social condition of the African and theorizes on what is on the ground.
To that effect, the mind-body problem for instance, is solved in a radical way which also takes into cognizance the African world - view. “Philosophical consciencism has no room for a mere parallelism on the mind-body problem. For philosophical consciencism retains the two categories of mind and body, recognizes the problem by accepting the fact of interaction, but offers a solution thereto. Parallelism, while recognizing the two categories, in fact denies interaction. The solution offered by philosophical consciencism is by way of categorical conversion (Nkrumah, 1964: 87)..
In the realm of science, philosophical consciencism asserts that Einstein’s theory of relativity is compatible with materialism, and points out that materialism was itself inconsistent with the absolute and independent existence of space or time. “If the sole existence of matter is asserted, then space and time, in so far as they are not matter, must be unreal. Philosophical consciencism does not assert the sole reality of matter. Rather it asserts the primary reality of matter. Here again, if space were absolute and independent
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matter could not with respect to it be primary (Nkrumah, 1964: 88). Nkrumah applied this line of thought to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. Nkrumah’s interpretation of Einstein ’s General Theory of Relativity as well as an exposition of dialectics and materialism makes his philosophy anticipate some of the issues in Quantum Mechanics and High Energy Physics.
The African leaders with a mission to salvage Africans from extermination, must establish an ideological school where philosophies like philosophical consciencism, Ujaama, coupled with Chekh Anta Diop’s works with that of Franz Fanon would be studied and disseminated. This is in line with Paul Feyerabend’s Epistemological and Methodological anarchism. The time to pursue the path of an African Renaissance is now. Tomorrow may be too late.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Feyerabend, P. (1975) Against Method London; Verso Books.
Feyerabend, P. (1978) Science in a Free Society. London: Verso Books
Benton, T. (1977) Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. London: R.K.P
Newton - Smith, W. H. (1981) The Rationality of Science. London: R.K.P.
Nikiforov, A. L. (1982) At Formalnoi Logiki K. istorii Nauki Moskva: Nauka.
Nkrumah, K. (1964) Consciencism London. Heinemann; International Publishers.
Nkrumah, K. (1970) Class Struggle In Africa. New York. International Publishers.
Lakatos, 1 (1970) “Falsification and the methodology of Scientific Research progamme” . In : Lakatos & Musgrave (ed) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, Cambridge Univ. Press.
DETERMINISM IN
BIOLOGY
By
Princewill Alozie
Determinism is the notion that all phenomena, events or things have a cause and could be predicted. This predictive and causative aspect could be by gods or God, human beings, or instruments constructed by human beings . Determinism as a concept is thus prevalent in religious circles as well as in scientific and technological circles. In philosophic parlance, determinism could belong to idealism or materialism (if we choose to divide philosophy into these two schools only).
Under idealism (a school which asserts the primacy of mind, spirit, or idea over matter) determinism takes the form of pre-destination, fatalism, and the assignment of all events or causes to super-natural powers. Mechanistic thinking which posits that all phenomena obey natural laws perceived as engines or machines veers towards idealism also. At a point or the other, the question is bound to be asked: How did the machines or engines and the laws governing them originate? What is responsible for the existence of these laws? The answers to these questions will eventually have metaphysical roots.
Under materialism (the school which asserts the primacy of mater over mind, spirit, or idea) the concept of determinism is woven into the principle of causality which states that one event or phenomena (cause) gives rise to another event or phenomenon (effect).
Both idealism and materialism generally agree that determinism assumes that a phenomenon which brings into being another phenomenon is, in relation to that new phenomenon, its cause. Cause, it is further assumed precedes effect in time.
Determinism in biology, and in science in general, specifically makes the following assumptions: 1. Nature is uniform and stable, thus making it possible to predict and resolve the issue of cause and effect, 2. If event or phenomenon A unfailingly follows event or phenomenon B, there exists a necessary connection between the two circumstances. 3. The sequence of the necessary connections and necessary conditions are one-dimensional in time
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and space. 4. Plurality of causes can be contained satisfactorily.
In this chapter, we shall argue that the division of determinism under idealism and materialism is very problematic in the face of advances in molecular biology and quantum mechanics. We shall further show that the four assumption of determinism in biology need some revision.
Biology is said to be the study of life or of living systems. Biologists are yet to agree on the meaning of life or living systems. It is fashionable among biologists to characterize living things as having the following qualities: mobility, irritability, respiration, growth. There are circumstances and conditions under which living organisms do not exhibit these qualities. Seeds, for instance, can suspend most of these characteristics of living things for a long period. Added to this is the difficulty of classifying living things into plants and animals. It is not clear where and how bacteria, viruses, and the blue - green algae could be classified. This problem is compounded by the fact that these organisms (now called procaryotic organisms) have no definite nucleus. Some bacteria and viruses could be boiled, heated and dried, stored for years but show signs of life when conditions are favourable.
These kinds of problems raise the issue of universality, uniformity, cognition, ontology and theories in reference to biological entities.
If we cannot be dogged about the universality of biological theories; or of the uniformity and ontology of biological entities, then we have to be very cautious the way we peddle determinism in biology. In other words, if we are not certain of the origin, nature, requirements of life of biological entities, we will not be certain about the truth of deterministic statements we make in biology. This is one reason why the division of determinism into idealism and materialism is not tenable in the light of developments in molecular biology, biophysics and quantum mechanics.1
According to Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle”, the position and velocity of the ultimate particles of nature cannot be defined without uncertainty.2
Cause and effect, the heart of determinism, had been discussed by David Hume, who maintained that we have no logical justification for maintaining that “A” causes “B” Our experience is what makes us think that when “A” appears we should expect “B”
unfailingly. Thus, that the day is followed by the night does not mean that the day causes the night to appear. On the biological plane, “heart failures” in human beings have been among other things, associated with cigarette smoking. This does not necessarily mean that once cigarettes are smoked, heart failure must necessarily result.
David Hume’s position leading to scepticism or agnosticism in some quarters is still very useful. It has been argued that we ought to accept the idea of “necessary connection” between events in order to explain, even if at a superficial level, the concept of “ cause and effect.” What is more, everyday experience of peoples in different cultures, tend to show that the principle of causation is fixed in their minds. This fixation to principle of causation does not make it right. Truth is not necessarily a function of the majority. If all Nigerians, for instance, believe that hormones and nerves affect a person’s behaviour, it will not negate the complementary reverse situation that “a person’s behaviour can affect his hormones and nerves”.3
The four assumptions of determinism have problems which are partly traceable to the methods of explanation and prediction in biology. Biological science uses the methods of analogy and of analysis.
Analogy here means comparing living things with non-living. Analysis here means breaking down, for study purposes, living things into minutest elements.
Biological entities have been represented as machines. Rene Descartes, for instance, in his book “On Man” presented a model of man along lines of the principles of machines. Today, some biologists conceptualize living systems as computers.4
A cursory look at some biology text books will reveal the use of machine languages as well as the languages of cybernetics in the description of living organisms. Modelling biological entities after non- living things helps in explaining what is modelled. For instance, the Tobacco Mosaic Virus ( TMV) was studied and found to contain the property generally believed to be responsible for the transference of genetic code - The Ribonucleic Acid ( RNA) and the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). Biologists believe that these properties DNA and RNA found in the tobacco mosaic virus is the same in all organisms! What is more, the structure of a DNA
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molecule has been likened to a twisted rope - ladder, the sides of which consist of sugarphosphate chains, and the rungs of linked nitrogenous bases. Those who are acquainted with twisted rope- ladders will find the analogy easy to understand.
This analogy, though useful at a certain level of comprehension, is likely to give a false understanding of chemical bonds or chemical entities.
Jevons has given an example of how Lavoisier had compared biological oxidation (respiration) with combustion (burning). Jevons noted some of the weaknesses of this analogy which include the great disparity in the temperatures at which the processes take place.5 Analogies, even when they are very close to reality can never be substituted for the biological entities studied. This is particularly so, when the matter concerns prediction, (if it is true that science is predictive in nature).6
The other method adapted by biology is that of analysis. In this method, organisms are dissected and studied. This has helped in increasing the amount of information available in biology. It has been argued, and we think correctly too, that when we dissect an animal, the functions of the organs will have ceased. A dead animal is not equivalent to a living animal! Biologists are trying to respond to this criticism by making use of spectroscopic observations of organs and cells of living organisms. Portions to be observed are brought into laboratories or unnatural environments.
The biologists are yet to state why they think that laboratory or experimental conditions give the whole and true picture of reality in the biological entity studied. The other reservation concerns the belief that our instruments used in observations do not distort the picture of reality. The problems of measurement in quantum physics and the measuring instruments to definitely show up at some levels in biological studies.
The determinism prevalent in biology also emanates from the fact that, most investigations in the discipline presumably arise from observation. Some observations of biological entities are made on the basis of noticeable repetitions, a hypothesis or theory is constructed. This theory is supposed to explain or predict future occurrences. The hypothesis or theory is supposedly confirmed by performing some so-called crucial experiments. This is what is generally referred to as the scientific method.
This scenario of scientific method ignores the fact that even our observations and the language in which the observations are rendered are clothed in pre-conceived notions and theories! Facts and theories are interwoven. The so-called crucial experiment is guided by given theories. For our theories and experiments to be of value in relation to matter of truth, we are required to give the condition under which it will be true. Thus, the universality and uniformity of biological events need revision in the light of this observation
It is therefore not surprising that new theories are springing up to either replace, complement, or contradict previous ones in biology.
Let us consider the case of “effectors” and ’behaviour’ in animals. An effector is a structure which responds directly or indirectly, to a stimulus. The most common effectors are muscles and glands7. Behaviour in animals means the various activities of the organism which includes its movements, reactions, changes in posture. etc.8
In considering how and why muscles contract when stimulated, we are also considering “cause and effect” issue. There are different types of muscles: skeletal (or voluntary muscle), visceral (or involuntary muscle), and cardiac (or myogenic muscle). Previously, there were theories which tried to explain all movements in the organism in mechanical terms. In animals with highly developed nervous systems, movements were usually traced to the activities of the brain. Some co-ordination between the brain, nervous system, and the given muscles was presumed sufficient to explain contraction of muscles as well. A close study of the chemistry of muscle has shown that the muscle is composed of two proteins: actin and myosin. It was further discovered that when actin and myosin were extracted and placed in a solution of ATP (Adenosine TriphosPhate C10 H12 N5 03 H4 P3 09) contraction occurred.9
The chemical theory of motion is being developed. It would appear that the “Sliding Hypothesis” developed by Hugh Huxley and Jean Hanson of London University is an attempt to combine the mechanical /electrical theory of muscle contraction with the chemical theory. Very closely related to the issue of effectors and determinism of muscle contraction is that of behaviour.
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Behaviours in animals are sometimes categorised into reflect action, orientation, and learning. If we take up learning as an example, we shall observe that attempts have been made to conveniently classify it into habituation , associative learning imprinting, exploratory learning, insight learning, trial - and error-learning.10 Learning which has been defined “as an adaptive change in behaviour resulting from the past experience” , has two major theories similar to the ones explaining muscle contraction discussed above. These are: A neural theory of learning and a biochemical theory of learning.
In the neural theory of learning propounded by J.Z. Young and reported by M. B. V. Roberts, “the theory is based on the idea that the brian contains numerous memory units made up of interconnected nerve cells. When a specific stimulus is registered by a receptor such as the eye, a classifying cell in the brain is activated. This has connections with two memory cells, one of which is connected with nervous pathway responsible for attack, the other with the pathway responsible for retreat.” This theory is mechanical and electrical in nature.
The biochemical theory of learning in its crude form states that previously trained animals could be crushed and fed to an untrained animals and the untrained animal will learn more quickly. It was claimed that the active principle which induced this change is the nuclei acid RNA (Ribonucleic Acid). R.I.Kruglikov has produced a more sophisticated version of this chemical theory of learning. He asserts that there are some neurochemical correlations between learning and memory. According to him: an investigation into the involvement of neuropeptides such as Leu-and mertenkephaline, B- endorphine, Lysine-Vasopressin and its analogues, P-substance, ACTH4-7 ACTH4-10 in learning and memory processes showed the effect of the injection of some peptides to depend upon the features of learning specific to the tested animals. Of the peptides listed above, metenkephaline was found to improve fixation of temporary connections in the animals that are poor learners, but keep it unaltered if not downgraded in the animals that learn well12. He concluded that certain correlations have been found to exist between the influences of peptides on the process of learning and memory and changes in protein synthesis in the brain structures.
The problem for determinism in the biological examples above will include chemical and molecular levels of explanations. At the molecular level the sequence of necessary connection and necessary conditions will not be one -dimensional in time and space. Adolph Grunbaum had argued unsuccessfully against time-reversal and for unidirectionality of time.
He was largely trying to reduce relativistic physics into classical (Newtonian) physics. Biophysics, at the quantum and molecular level, is faced with the problem of “ Arrow of Time.”13
The general perception of time -orientation is tied-up with the idea of necessary sequence in the causal sense. It is not always remembered that in the General Theory of Relativity, time and space are tied up. If physical entities, including biological entities, can be thrust forward or backwards, it appears to us that the space - time continuum would be involved in this forward, backward, or random motions! Time-reversal is thus possible.
With the possibility of time- reversal,the question of “cause and effect”, of determinism in biology needs to take a long holiday. Even the possibility of simultaneity of physical or biological events will have the same philosophical result on determinism.
Further devastating for determinism in biology is the possibility of multiplicity or plurality of causes. At the macro-as well as the micro-levels, multiplicity of causes makes it very difficult to point at one or few causes, ignoring the rest. Aronson has successfully shown the difficulties attendant upon the logic of explanation and prediction when different independent phenomena are identified with one and the same ontology.14
If we consider the cause and effect of heart beat, we could stumble on many theories with varying epistemological and ontological import. The standard position will be that muscles contract as a result of impulses reaching them from nerves. Since it has been discovered that the heart can go on beating after being separated from the body, we are now told that the heart muscle is myogenic, and that the connection of the heart with the sympathetic nervous system as well as the vagus nerve regulates heart beat. If the sympathetic nerve is stimulated, the heart beats slower.
Given the standard explanation as above, we should realize that so many things could stimulate the various nerves. Some of the possible stimulants are not known to us. The control of heart beat
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may be associated with events in the cosmos, heavenly bodies, universes, etc. This may not be an issue limited to the organism and its immediate ecology.
The biologists need to range far beyond their horizon in order to make useful temporarily “deterministic statements.
This explains why increasing attention is paid to works of heliobiology, lunabiology, geobiology, etc. Professor Chizhevsky, the Soviet “ father of heliobiology” published works in 1936 linking variations in the solar output to a wide variety of diseases, notably epidemics. “Increase in heart disease, death rates, mental illness, and other biological events have been traced to cosmic rays, solar system, the moon, etc. We are made to realise that earthquakes could be predicted by noting some animal behaviour reacting to the anticipated earthquake.
What all this boils down to is, that we should take our determinism in biology with a lot of accommodation for indeterminism. Our knowledge in biological science, as in all other tentatively divided branch of knowledge, is tentative. This also implies that blind dogmatism and unreactive learning of details will not help the advancement of knowledge.
From the foregoing , we will have discovered that science without philosophy is thoroughly hollow. Philosophy of biology will definitely enable us break new grounds in biology.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES
Determinism in Biology’ by I.T. Frolov and S.A. Pastuslny, In: “Philosophical Problems of Natural Science” Ed. S. T. Meluhin, Moscow, Vishaya Shkola. 1985, . (In Russian) discussed the topic as if science has found the last answer to the question of nature, origin, requirements of life of biological entities. Even the dialectical materialist approach was not adequately employed in the explanation of complex biological systems. (P.331-342)
1. Also refer to Beckett B. S. Biology: A modern introduction. London. Oxford University Press, 1976.
2. Isaac, plan: Introducing Science, Penguin, Middlesex England 1972. pp. 189.
3. See Beckett B. S. & Usua. E. J. Biology for the West
African Certificate Oxford University Press, 1979. P. 263.
4. Jevons, E. F. The biochemical approach to life. Northampton, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.1968, the problems of Analogies & Analysis has been discussed by the author. Recent developments could be added to the examples he used.
5. Jevons Ibid. p. 91.
6. Science has been described variously as predictive and explanatory in nature. Some participants in the debate have tried to show that explanation and prediction in science have the same logic. What has dampened the debate appears to be the realization that the ontological assumptions of scientific theories play significant role in the assignments of roles of prediction or explanation in science. The anti-science movement has used part of this argument to compare science with religion, magic, and voodoo.
7. Roberts M. B. V. Biology, A Functional Approach p. 314
8. Ibid. P. 343.
9. Ibid, p. 319
10. Ibid. p. 359
11. Ibid. p. 362
12. R. I. Kruglikov. “Some Neurochemical correlates of learning and memory” In: the Learning Brain Eds: Astratyan and Simonov. MIR Publishers, Moscow, 1983 ; p. 45.
13. Grunbaun. A. Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. 2nd Edn. Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973, pp. 788- 800, discussed the Time-orientability of space- time and the “Arrow” of Time. Similarly; Reichenbach, Hans in The Philosophy of Space and Time, New York Dover Publication Inc. 1958, pp. 135-149 raises questions for quantum physics which are yet to be properly addressed.
14. Aronson Jerold L. A realist philosophy of science, London. Macmillan, 1984, pp. 184-208.
15. Playfair G. L. & Scott H. The Cycles of Heaven: Cosmic Forces and What they are Doing to You. New York, Avon Publications, 1979, p. 183.
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PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE AND
POLITICS
By
PRINCEWILL ALOZIE
The word philosophy (derived from the Greek PHILEIN, to love, and SOPHIA, wisdom) means love of wisdom. It has not been easy defining either the word love or wisdom. We shall assume that the word love in this case approximates: desire, quest, or craving, while the word wisdom will approximate knowledge. The very concept of quest or craving for knowledge aims at a nebulous phenomenon. This probably is why philosophy was defined as “the knowledge of things in general by their ultimate cause, so far as natural reason can attain such knowledge”. That was how philosophy was defined during the European scholastic period. With a few modifications here and there, a number of philosophers will readily accept the sense in such a definition.
Given the nebulous nature of philosophy, it tries to comprehend reality through approximately four activities: viz: prediction, explanation, prescription and criticism. It is important to state that not all philosophers believe philosophy should be engaged in all the four activities stated above. Philosophers are guided generally by their world-views on their perception of the nature and role of philosophy.
Despite disagreements on the nature of philosophy, it is generally agreed that the following divisions are vital: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics, and a host of philosophies of different disciplines like-philosophy of mathematics; of biology, of physics, law, religion, geography, etc. It will be found that despite these divisions, there are a lot of overlaps and interconnectedness. If we take metaphysics for instance, we shall find that although metaphysics studies and pontificates the nature of reality, it has to answer the following questions: Is reality unitary, double, or many? Is reality physical, mechanical, chemical, teleological? What is the relationship between mind, body and nature? What is the nature of the cosmos? In answering these questions, general statements are made. Some of these statements are likely to be categorical, probabilistic or predictive, explanatory,
prescriptive, critical or analytic. It will also be discovered that logic-inductive, deductive, deontic, dialectical logics-epistemology, axiology, will be involved.1
Without going into the various schools in philosophy, we could assert that every discipline has got elements of philosophy. This will be illustrated in various parts of this chapter when we shall be examining the explanatory, predictive, critical, prescriptive aspects of science, politics, and philosophy.
This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part will examine the nature of the sciences-physical, chemical, biological, geological sciences- and the philosophical foundations of these sciences. The second part will examine the nature of politics through disciplines like political economy or political sciences, economics, and social sciences in general.
1
SCIENCES
The nature of science is not a straight-forward one. Science is a human activity, like philosophy. Human activities, like all other phenomena have history. Thus, the history of science also embodies the various perceptions of science. Scientific activities are found in all human societies. This science may be at a rudimentary stage or at an advanced stage.
Science is a cultural activity which is best understood if considered from a combined historical and logical perspective. The historical perspective reveals the various natures of science and its methods throughout human history. The logical perspective will constantly enable us detect what is consistent in science especially in the areas of scientific discoveries, explanations and conclusions.
Science uses the trial and error method in the acquisition of new knowledge. Modern experimental methods are aspects of this “trial and error” method. The hypothesis or scientific theory which informs the “trial and error” approach is anchored on logic. This logic could be inductive (reasoning from particular to particular; or from particular to general) or deductive (reasoning from general to particular). These forms of reasoning among others, were prevalent in primitive societies in antiquity. Some of these methods of reasoning were formalised or systemised in written form by Aristotle, Euclid and others.
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The history of western mathematics and logic shows that the early western pioneers in mathematics and logic starting from Thales, through Pythagoras to Plato-the teacher of Aristotle - settled and studied in Egypt for some time. Egypt is not necessarily Egypt of the Arabs of today. The Egypt we refer to in the history of science in Africa is Egypt of black-skinned and woolly-haired people. Early historians like Herodotus were very definite about this. Writings of Aristotle, Diodorus of Sicily, M. C.F. Volney, Cheikh A. Diop, Chancellor Williams, etc., show the great indebtedness of modern western sciences to the black-skinned people of Africa. We are emphasizing this continuity of knowledge from antiquity to the modern times to show that scientific enterprise is not restricted in time and space.
We could illustrate this continuity and the cumulative nature of science with the concept of space in physics. For Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, some connection has been established between the concept of space as stated by Perminides of Greek antiquity (6th to 5th century B.C.) with Leibniz concept of space (Monads) (1646-1716) and Einstein’s Space-time continuum (1879-1955)?2
We could recall that Perminides proposed the non-existence of the VOID. Joseph Agassi and a number of philosophers of science inform us that Perminides’ non-existence of the VOID became “the cornerstone of the theory of space developed by Leibniz, Faraday, and Einstein”3 Leibniz was of the opinion that space and time were only relations between objects. This means that the absence of objects would mean the absence of space and time. Isaac Newton, differed from his contemporary Leibniz, maintaining that there is absolute space and absolute time. Newtonian physics had a lot of problems as shown by his contemporaries. It has been pointed out that some of the praises directed towards Newton were misplaced. In the first place, Hegel had shown that “Kepler, whom Germany allowed to starve, was the real founder of the modern mechanics of the celestial bodies, and that the Newtonian law of gravity was already contained in all three of Kepler’s laws, in the third law even explicity”.4 In the second place, Isaac Newton was seriously criticised by Leibniz, Johann Bernoulli, etc. These cirticisms instead increased the popularity of Newton as a philosopher. What is more, the growth of interest in the English empiricist philosophy, and the French admiration for English government and society after
the failure of Louis XIV, coupled with the dominance of the Cartesian mathematical model, accounted for the acceptance of Newtonian physics with ease.
It was Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity that reinstated Leibniz and Perminides.
It should be noted that Perminides, Leibniz, Pythagoras, Newton, Descartes, Einstein were all philosophers in addition. Some of these philosophers were mystics, or religious leaders. Phythagoras, for instance was associated with a form of mysticism and did found a religion which believed in the transmigration of the soul. His mathematization of nature is closely linked with his religion and his perception of reality (metaphysics).
Another significant observation is that political and historical factors have influenced the preference of all about Newtonian physics to that of his adverseries. This value judgement is within the sphere of philosophy known as axiology.
In geology and geophysics, the hypothesis of the continental drift is now known to have a metaphysical or religio-mythical origin. The hypothesis of the continental drift states that, at a time in the earth’s history, the continents were united into what was known as pangea during the Carboniferous era. By the Mesozoic and later period, there was eventually the breaking up of the continents and drifting away to present positions. This hypothesis is associated with the name of Alfred Wegner. It has been pointed out that Alfred Wegner only developed the ideas of Richard Owen (1857) and Antonio Snider (1858); “that the Atlantic Ocean was created by the separation of the opposing continents during the flood of Noah”.6 Noah’s Flood is a Biblical story, the truth and validity of which is still not known. Despite this, Wegner started amassing evidence and constructing argument to support the hypothesis of the continental drift in 1912.
What is important here is that contrary to the claim of some scientists, a scientific theory could arise from a mythical, religious or philosophical source. Wegner’s hypothesis is just one out of many that try to explain the origin and the nature of horizontal earth movement. In fact, there are about three principal tectonic hypotheses. These: Hypotheses of an altered Volume of Earth (made up of contraction, expanding earth; pulsation or synthesis of contraction and expansion hypotheses); Radiological Hypotheses,
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continental Drift Hypotheses as well as Gravitational Isostatic hypotheses.7
A closer study of the continental drift hypotheses, for instance, will show that these scientific hypotheses have all the features of philosophy. The hypotheses are: predictive and speculative; explanatory and descriptive; perspective and normative; critical and analytic. Wegner observed the flora, fauna, geology and configuration of the coast line along the side of the Atlantic Ocean. A description of the observation was made and an explanation for that which was observed was attempted. The attempted explanation moved beyond what was observed and moved into the realms of speculation. Wegner speculated that there was a land mass known as Pangea which is of granitic rock containing plenty of silica and alumina (SIAL) with a density of about 2.65. This pangea was surrounded by an ocean whose floor was mainly rocks composed of silica, magnasium and iron (SIMA) with density of about 2.90. This ocean was called PANTHALASSA. Pangea, during the Mesozoic and later period broke into two continents: LAURASIA and GONDWANALAND separated by a sea of TETHYS.8
He further imagined (speculated) that the enormous force necessary to cause Pangea to split and drift was the lunar-solar attraction and the forces of the earth’s rotation. Criticism of this hypothesis included the inability to prescribe and adequately predict the force that can cause the continent to drift. The hypothesis of the continental drift was unable to adequately account for the different kinds of land forms (morphology of the earth)
Some geologists and geophysicists have flatly rejected the hypothesis of gravitational drift. V.V. Belousov tries to explain the nature of the earth’s crust and earth’s movements through graviational differentiation and radiogenic heat. According to Beloussov, geotectonic processes are caused by vertical oscillatory movements. His position has raised serious problems on some assumptions of modern geology. “This and many other problems had led him to suggest the introduction of a new science known as geonomy”.9 This anarchic situation in some aspects of geophysics could be found in other areas of science.
One of the reasons why we have these myriads of problems in science is that there is the tendency to make use of traditional logic
to the entire exclusion of dialectical logic. The other reason is the origin of the theories and the relationship of that origin with the cosmological and methodological position of the scientist.
The various brands of positivism regarded any subject that is not empirical, and which could not be subjected to confirmation, verification or justification processes as irrelevant; and therefore should not be regarded as science. The logical positivist brand of positivism tried to establish the criteria of demarcating between science and non-science. For the logical positivist, the language of science ought to be expressed in logico-mathematical language.
For this purpose, protocol statements were related in accordance with the correspondence principle. It was falsely believed that the expression of statements of facts were divorced from theoretical coatings.
The positivists discovered that their demarcation principle will eliminate quite a large chunk of what is regarded as science.
The verification of phenomena in the theoretical setting of the logical positivist was untenable. Consider the proposition..” All goats feed only on green leaves.” In order to verify such a statement, we have to find out the feeding habits of goats in our environment, and in the world at large. Besides, we have to go back time immemorial to find out if goats fed on green leaves.
The statement with the beginning, “All” could project into the future since there is no definite time-reference frame. The tasks will be found impossible. Scientific statements make conclusions that are encompassing and move beyond what is immediately observable. Scientific statements also predict. Added to this difficulty is discovery that all statements of fact are expressed in theoretical undertones. Our concepts of a goat will make us accept a particular animal as a goat or reject that animal as such if it fails to fit into our notion or idea of a goat. The notion of a goat is the theory. The most scandalous for the various brands of positivism was the discovery that even the language of science-mathematics-was riddled with contradictions or paradoxes. A paradox consists in the apparent equivalence of two propositions one of which is the negation of the other. For example (A.-A). The two mutually contradictory statements are equally demonstrable. Paradox of this nature abounds in antiquity and in modern times. Consider the following paradoxes: Liar’s Paradox; Barber’s Paradox; Zeno’s
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Paradox; Russell’s Paradox. The Liar Paradox: This paradox has been expressed in numerous forms from antiquity to the present day. We shall formulate it in the following way - “ If Alhaji Peter says he is lying. Is what he says true or false?” If Alhaji Peter’s statement is true that “he is lying”, then Alhaji Peter is not speaking the truth, since” he is lying” is true.
We arrive at a situation where the statement is both true and false, thus violating the principle of contradiction in classical logic. Two eminent mathematicians and philosophers thought they had resolved the Liar’s paradox. Bertrand Russell used the theory of orders of propositions, the theory of types.
Bertrand Russell’s simple theory of types could not solve the problem of Liar’s paradox and so, he formulated the “Ramified theory of types.” The Liar’s utterances will be identified according to their order. This complicated method prevents the formulation and the proof of a number of theorems in mathematics according to some mathematicians. Bertrand Russell himself realized this and therefore introduced the “axiom of reducibility,” with its attendant problems.
Alfred Tarski in a bid to resolve the Liar’s paradox relates the term “truth” to the semantics of the object language which requires the semantics to be formulated in a metalanguage that prevents the articulation of the paradox. This distinction between an object language and a metalanguage is indeed no improvement on Bertrand Russell’s attempt. The two attempts have the same effect on logic and set theory. The paradox persists and Kurt Godel’s theorem on the existence of formally “undecidable sentences” supports this assertion.10
The Barber’s paradox and Bertrand Russell’s paradox suffer the same fate as that of the Liar’s paradox. We could reformulate the Barber’s paradox to read: “Savimbi the barber in Malabo shaves all and only those persons in Malabo who do not shave themselves. Does Savimbi shave himself?” The Russell paradox on the other hand could simply be described as:” The set of all sets that do not contain themselves as elements. “In symbolic form we shall obtain the following:
R E R @ RER which could be read as :
the set of all set R is a member of R if and only
if R is not a member of R.
Russell eventually sought the solution of these contradictions in his theory of types and Ramified theory of types.
Zeno’s paradoxes have also been dismissed as paradoxes on the grounds that “ignorance of the theory of infinite convergent numerical series” produced the invalid arguments.11 Zeno tried to show the non-existence of motion in a dialectical format. The two most popular of Zeno’s paradoxes are that of ’Achilles and the tortoise” and that of the “flying arrow.”
Despite the dismissal of the problems raised in Zeno’s paradoxes by contemporary mathematics and physics, it appears there is still a great need to re-investigate Ernest Mach’s and Albert Einstein’s relativity theory of dynamics. It is outside our focus at this moment to go into the problems of “the relativity of motion”, of space and time; quantum mechanics and cosmology. The issues raised in these fields call in an indirect way, for a re-assessment of the paradoxes of Zeno.
The crucial point here, is that the exact and reliable language of science, mathematics and logic, contain paradoxes or contradictions. Proponents of positivism were further alarmed when it became crystally clear, that even the referred axioms of Euclidean geometry are capable of leading mathematicians into error if given an absolute and universal interpretation.
Positivism was subsequently overthrown and replaced by critical rationalism. Anthropological, sociological, historical, and political science alike. Out of these numerous philosophical schools, dialectical-materialism or the marxist school has stood the test of time.
The dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes the material foundation of all that is. Politics has a material base, which is the economy. In this regard, we comprehend the connectedness of economics and politics.
This relationship has given rise to the discipline known as Political Economy.12 Professor Eskor Toyo has compared the non-marxist theories and methodologies with the marxist one and correctly showed the superiority of the latter in explaining socio-economic reality.13 Marxist approach to politics and science is historical, since it is concerned with tracing the historical causes and laws governing the phenomena, as against the a-historic approach of Karl Popper. Marxism is also materialist as it considered
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the material conditions of society and phenomena as the objective determinant of social change. Idealist philosophy on the contrary posits that the super-structure like ideologies, law, great personalities, subjective reasons are the determinants of social change. Marxism has an attendant logic between opposites in the process of social and scientific progress.
Molecular biology provides us with a good illustration
There has been a long-standing debate on the methodology of scientific discovery. Among the various camps in the ”Logic opposed to karl Popper’s Deductivist camp. Mclaughlin maintains that Inductive method performs the dual role of invention and verification or appraisal. J. Watson’s work in molecular biology was quite handy for his argument14.
It was pointed out that the helical structure of the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecule relies on its analogy with the chemically simiar TMV (Tobacco Mossaic Virus) molecule, which is helical. He derived the same conclusion from simplicity argument employing the principle that the simplest form for any regular polymeric molecule is a helix. These and similar advanced arguments for the hypothesis about structure of DNA serve equally well as enhancement arguments for that hypothesis, giving it a degree of initial plausibility.15 The method of using analogy in philosophy is an old one, which was only formalised by John S. Mill in his System of Logic.
The origin of a hypothesis in geology, biology, or any of the branches of science is based on some assumptions. These assumptions are like axioms in mathematics which are prone to the production of contradictions of paradoxes. The assumptions or axioms could, in fact, be false. The axiomatic method in mathematics is also adapted by logic. This has become necessary ever since mathematicians like Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead had set to reduce all mathematics to logic. We had earlier stated the obvious fact that logic is a branch of philosophy.
Returning to the hypothesis of the structure of the DNA, it is now not often remembered that this hypothesis was derived from drawing an analogy from the chemically similar Tobacco Mossaic Virus (TMV). Today, it may sound odd to ask if DNA is equivalent to TMV, despite the chemical similarity. The nature of reality, of being, of truth and similar categories in philosophy will require that
we ask such question. Querying the result of scientific investigations will prevent science from becoming a dogma. This is one of the ways philosophy helps scientists to break new grounds.
The relationship between science and philosophy is so close that it is surprising that there are now universities in the developing countries which graduate students who have never taken courses in philosophy.
In the history of molecular biology, we are aware that there was a time when proteins were recognized as monopolising the HEREDITY phenomenon. This monopoly was later transferred to the DNA. By the 1970’s it was recognized that DNA has some necessary interaction with Ribonucleic Acid (RNA). The RNA is the long thread-like molecules consisting of single polynucleotide chains.
Today, the position is that the essence of the phenomenon of HEREDITY lies in the process of the interactions of DNA molecules, RNA molecules, and proteins in an integrated, historically created, open living system.16
This new, and in our opinion, correct methodological and philosophical position impels us to query the long-term effect of a new method in genetic engineering for increasing milk yield and weight in cows and other livestock.17 The Agricultural and Food Research Council (AFRC) in London found that, giving some dosage of growth hormone complexed with monoclonal antibody, increased the bioactivity of the animal. The long-term effect of this approach to the specie and to the ecosystem has not yet been determined. It will be recalled that the European Economic Community (EEC) has recently banned the use of anabolic steroids or bovine somatotropin (BST) which use has been suspended for eighteen months.
We wish to suggest that there is the possibility of this new method not paying adequate attention to the other factors which influence life in a biosystem. The increase of yield in animals has to take into consideration the effect of such yield on the longevity of the specie: on the ecosystem and related issues. Philosophy does not just aid discovery, it also examines the possible consequences of discovery on the whole question of being and material existence. The dialectical materialist approach in philosophy considers the interconnectedness of phenomena. It is the philosophy that
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appropriately serves the interest of scientific progress and mankind in general. This is the approach that we shall find viable in politics.
II
POLITICS
Politics is the science of the organisation of society. Politics with its attendant ideology, in a class society, expresses the kind of class struggle and relations of classes within and between various polities and institutions including nations and states. Within a state for instance, public institutions and organizations (including political parties) are designed to capture and retain state power which could be used to promote or deter the development of society.
Given the fact that politics has to do with acquisition and retention of state power in society, some have come to associate politics with intrigues, manoeuvring in policy and public issues. Politics is wrongly divorced from its material and ideological connectedness. This slopsided view of politics has made some people assert that politics cannot be subjected to a scientific treatment. Thus, political science or the study of politics was initially not regarded as science in consonant with the tradition of positivism, logical positivism and neo-positivism.
There is a sense in which political science may not qualify as science - despite the tag “science” joined with “politics”. Claude Ake has used an aspect of political science - development studies in political science- to prove very successfully, that this kind of study by imperialist and megaphones of imperialist scholars in developing countries is “useless as science” and amounts to imperialism. Ake maintains that western social science scholarship on developing countries is imperialism in the sense that:
a) it foists, or at any rate attempts to foist on the developing countries capitalist developments
b) it focuses social science analysis on the question of how to make the developing countries more like the West; and
c) it propagates mystifications, and modes of thought and action which serve the interests of capitalism.18
Political science is a part and parcel of social science. We could illustrate this capitalist mystification of social and political reality with Rostow’s Politics and Stages of Growth.
In this book, W. W. Rostow attempted, though
unsuccessfully, to respond to the inadequacies of his earlier book: The Stages of Economic Growth. Rostow openly states that he was rendering an alternative to the historical-materialist conception of society.
He had divided what he calls “Economic growth” into five stages. Traditional society, (2) transitional society, (3) take-off stage (4) rapid mature stage (5) the age of high mass consumption.
Typical of capitalist mystification, Rostow continued to divorce the economic well-being of a people from the main factors determining historical and political reality. Having failed to sell his non-communist alternative, Rostow now posits that socialism is only possible in less developed countries. He made a tactical withdrawal of his original thesis, that developed societies which had overstepped the “take - off stage had no need of communism. He cited the Soviet Union where the communists had the advantage of coming to power after the economy had moved beyond “ take-off”19 He laboured in vain to propagate the erroneous view that socialism is not a natural stage of human development. In order to make his views sound interesting, he played down upon the capitalist stage of development. Even in the face of the crime against humanity by the monopoly companies of the United States of America, Rostow put up the fallacious argument that capitalism does not increase the concentration of production and capital, nor does capitalism lead to monopolies and domination of policies in the United States of America.
He failed to appreciate the view that developed capitalist countries do have contradictions within and between them. These antagonistic contradictions do lead to social revolutions as well as to international wars. This is so, irrespective of the fact that capitalism functions as an integrated world system opposed to socialism. With the illusion of a withering socialism, the capitalist system will sooner or later find itself engulfed by a socialist revolution that would be continental in some zones of the world, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The political changes in Europe will enable people of different socio-economic systems to compare notes. Rostow had to admit that his “age of high mass consumption” is very unsatisfactory to the masses. He has currently noted the existence of dangerous inflationary trends; unemployment, rise in violent crime rate;
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environmental pollution; low rate of economic growth. He admits that these are the reasons why the capitalist “consumer society” is being combated by national minorities and the youth.20
The pseudo-scientific nature of Rostow’s thesis can even be seen from the work. According to him, it is not possible to predict what could follow “beyond consumption”21. He later pondered how America could move unto a sixth stage of “the politics of the search for quality of life.”
This inability to predict situations emanates from the historical and idealistic nature of his thesis. His use of history is akin to that of Hugo and Hess of German historical school. Karl Marx waged a philosophical war against this school.23 History and politics rest on desires, appetites for different kinds of goods, according to Rostow and capitalist scholars. Deliberate attempts are made to hide the fact that the capitalist mode of production can be overthrown in a socialist revolution. Even a book with politics as part of the title, discussed little in the area of politics.
The developing nations are gradually realizing that neo-colonial arrangements in politics and economics can lead them only to a mass grave. Scholars from the “Third World” are combating mystification of economic and political reality as much as they can.
In Nigeria for instance, politics has been guided by various brands of capitalism. Nigeria’s dependent capitalism has been changing names. When it is not called mixed-economy, it is tagged either” “American presidential system of government,” or “British parliamentary system of government”.
In all cases, no mention is made of capitalism. Professor Inya Eteng has masterly shown how the mixed-economy approach is a smoke-screen for capitalism.24 Professor Okwudiba Nnoli and a number of authors have shown how the various political and economic models of the West have been reproducing under-development in Nigeria25. Nigeria pursued a political transition programme aimed at ensuring political stability. The politics of that period was being organised by the military party. The military will protest that they have no political party, but the truth is that theirs is a one-party system. The head of the military establishment is also at the head of this political party. This explains why the Nigerian military president had called upon the military not to allow themselves to be disgraced out of office. Indeed, it is strange that the
military is trying to regard itself as a political party. The strangeness arises from the fact that the structures of any effective government includes the coercive forces. This coercive force which is a unit or part of government is trying to assume the posture of the whole. This, looks like a paradox in which the part is greater than the whole. Perhaps this paradoxical posturing of the military accounts partly for the instability manifested by the military complex.
It is interesting that the unstable military (characterised by several coups detat) did pursue a policy aimed at ensuring a stable government. The proposed stable government will definitely convert into its opposite, which is instability.
The philosophical reasons for this are as follow:
(1) the unstable military organisation cannot give the stability which they do not possess. (2) The material well-being of the military is predicated on hierarchical structure, nutured by a dependent neo-colonial capitalist system. (3) capitalism never makes for the kind of stability sought for in a neo-colonial situation.
The issue of political instability is worsened by the World Bank /International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Nigeria. These capitalist economic bodies have imposed on Nigeria the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes’s (SAP) irresponsible and inhuman conditionalities. It has to be stated that SAP benefits from the multinational corporations, superfluously wealthy Nigerians, banks and the ruling class (including top military personnel). Those who suffer under SAP are the workers, peasant farmers, their women and children. As these groups or class constitute the majority of the Nigerian population, tension, riots, strikes, coup detat, and various forms of instability arise.
The logic of those who benefit from SAP is that undemocratic, totalitarian, and repressive political regimes are necessary to maintain the unjust status quo. Those who are dehumanized by SAP conceive of a logic that demands the volent overthrow of their oppressors. It is very clear in the minds of the oppressed, pauperised and dehumanised people that such intolerable conditions should not be stabilized. This explains the support to, and silence by capitalist powers on atrocities perpetuated by dictatorial regimes of capitalist orientation.
The relationship between politics and economics has a philosophical connection. The philosophy of government under
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SAP is an eclectic concoction of monetarism, laissez-fairism, and Keynsianism. This unscientific and confusing philosophy is difficult to define precisely. Frances Stewart was correct in the articulation of the philosophy of the World Bank’s and the IMF’s SAP. According to Stewart, “The philosophy is the term used here to describe the set of beliefs about political economy and economic causality which lies behind every Fund Programme...
Although difficult to define precisely this philosophy is broadly monetarist (for a long period of the Fund explicitly adapted the “monetarist” approach to the balance of payments, as expounded by Polak, then leading member), and also (somewhat inconsistently because one instrument cannot control two variables, monetarist view of inflation; the philosophy is laisser-faire, with a belief in prices, not controls, faith in the private sector, not the public.., and in free trade not protectionism26.” It has been correctly argued that the neo-classical monetarist philosophy of international financial instruction is not proven, neither theoretically nor empirically.27 The philosophical assumption informing SAP has to be rejected, and an appropriate one put in its place.
Indeed, there is the need for restructuring the neo-colonial economy and the political system it has given birth to. This restructuring will have to take another form aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the majority of the Nigerian populace.
The philosophical foundation of politics is further illustrated by the structure of racial domination and the character of contemporary South African State.
“INSIDE
THE WHITE LAARGER: THE STRUCTURE OF RACIAL
DOMINATION AND THE CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN STATE”
The white laager is a mighty prison. It is a country turned into a prison. The ruling class are the prison warders and officials, while the oppressed or down-trodden are the prison inmates. Generally, it is obvious that a state is an instrument of oppression in the hands of one class over the other. The instruments of oppression include the armed forces the police and various state security organs, the judiciary, the prisons, etc. The way these instruments of state power are wielded depends primarily on the nature of a particular state. Democratic states are likely to respect fundamental human rights, rule of law, and eschew state terror. Fascist and
dictatorial states are likely to violate fundamental human rights; rule of law and replace these with state terrorism.28
South Africa is a colony of a special type. She has the features of a colony as well as some features of an independent state. South Africa is largely dependent on the multinational corporations, and developed capitalist countries for her survival. She was actually administered directly from Britain at a point in time in her history. To that extent South Africa could be described as a dependent capitalist state. At another level South Africa is a colony in which the owners of the land are the subjects while the colonialists represented by the so-called white population of South Africa live in the same country. She thus, has all the pervasive and ruthless character of a colonial state, while relating to the rest of Africa and the world at large as a sovereign or independent state.
Understanding the nature of a state is important for those who wish to appreciate the structure of racial domination in South Africa as well as for those who do contemplate the changing of a particular social order. The character of the state dictates the kind of government that serves the state, although there are occasions when a government influcences the character of the state. Thus, those who conceptualise the South African state from the prism of Prime Ministers: Verwood, Vorster, or De Klerk need to understand that a military coup detat, aimed at removing these heads of state do not mean changing the nature of South African State. The institutions that define the nature of the state have to be changed if a new social order is to be truly effected.
Here, we will examine the structure of racial discrimination within the framework of the dominant institutions that sustain this colonialism of a special type. The reactions and response of the oppressed majority - the prison inmates - examine structures like multinational corporations, nationalist party, state security organs, information network, chauvinistic secret societies The second part will examine the responses of the “prison inmates” to such structures in contemporary South Africa.
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
Inside the White Laager (South Africa) it is the multi-millionaires who control and own the factors of production . We refer to this type of millionaires as the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie
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of the White Laager control insignificant aspect of the economy.
It is probably this realisation of economic powerlessness of the bourgeoisie of the White Laager, that has made them preserve government large scale corporations like Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) and the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (GASOL). These government corporations are under the guidance of the giant multi-national corporations. These giant corporations include, Anglo-American, (the Oppenteimer mining giant), SANLAM, SA, Mutual and Rembrandt. By 1987 these four giant corporations controlled 80% of all shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, while Anglo-American alone controlled 55%)29
The Anglo-American Corporation covers the following areas: Finance and investment companies, gold, diamond, copper, coal, tin, manufacturing industries, real estate. These activities cover the whole of Africa. Other off-shoot of the Oppenheimer empire includes De Beers Consolidated (specializing in diamond business,) and Consolidated Gold fields of South Africa.30
The significance of the dominance of multinational and giant corporations in the structure of racial discrimination becomes clearer when we realise that, besides controlling more than 80% of all fixed assets, 50% of the country’s Gross National Product; the multi-national corporations also employ more than 50% of the labour force. These companies are out to make super profit. In order to make the desired super-profit, wage have to be criminally and inhumanly kept low. Those who produce wealth or surplus value have to learn how not to ask questions. Trade unions had to be made ineffective or divided. This also explains why workers who produce this wealth had to be divided along ethnic lines. They have to be reminded of their being Zulus, Xhosa, Thembu, or Ndebele. They have to be crowded into the so-called independent Bantustans of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda or to other unfavourable areas.
To further compound the problems of organizing the repressed and exploited masses, the owners of industry and farms have to remind their victims or prisoners that there is colour of the skin or racial differentiation. This means that you have whites, Africans, coloureds and Asians.
The desired profits are made in the interest of the captains of industry but at a great cost to the South African white Laager. The
South African labour force is largely under-developed. The education policy ensured that the Africans who constitute 26 million of the 35 million people inhabiting South African are mostly unskilled or largely uneducated.
South African minority whites are compelled to rely on labour from the developed capitalist countries. This means further flight of profit to those who already have.
In terms of market, it also means that South African manufacturers and producers cannot rely on their internal market. There is this often quoted example of household electricity supply. About 26 million South Africans have no household electricity out of population of 35 million. Very low electricity consumption is one of the indices of under- development. What is more, the other industrial powers can always find market for their finished products but South Africa cannot boast of ready market from the industrial power. Let us consider a case in which the state owned Iron and Steel corporation (ISCOR) desired to put up semi-manufactured steel plant. ISCOR had a controlling share of 51%. But this control is more mythical than real as the real controllers are the foreign money markets from where ISCOR borrows as well as the foreign firms who have 49% of the equity shares. The Austrian firm, Voest is authorised to transfer as much as 23% of its shares to other partners. These were distributed to West German, Dutch and Italian firms, with the possibility at the time of French firms participating in the deal. It was also agreed that these countries supply capital goods and equipment, high level skilled manpower. This is the kind of scenario prevalent in other developing31 African countries where the aim of production is to export semi-manufactured goods when the country is not relying on one product (mono-cultural).
The various foreign firms can decide to stall the construction work as they did, and are doing in Nigeria’s iron and steel industry with the tacit approval of an idiotic ruling class. All the borrowed money are meant to service the industries of the lending countries. The technology of producing the desired goods is often lost on the beleaguered population. People do not improve fast under prison conditions.
The structure of institutions controlling the White Laager is further complicated by the fact that Oppenheimer through the
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system of joint stock ownership and directorship, is related to economic organisations in different parts of the world. This partly explains the very benevolent attitude of the world bank and the International Monetary Fund to South African economic problems.
The International Monetary Fund made funds available to South Africa in 1967/77 and in 1982 without insisting on the usual conditionalities being met. The financial assistance was offered on the two occasion despite the fact that over 68 countries, including the United Nations Organisation, opposed such an assistance. “The need for assistance was questioned in the light of South Africa’s huge gold reserve and its capacity at that time to borrow in the private capital market, given its credit worthiness and its very low (7.9%) debt servicing ratio. It was also pointed out that the programme did not meet even the minimal normal conditionality requirements it called for nor reduction in the relative size of the excessive budget deficit; and, unusually, not even the credit restraint appeared to be called for; indeed, the government had recently lowered reserve requirements and anticipated greater domestic borrowing to meet its own needs.
There was no requirement for South Africa to end its extensive subsidization of domestic energy, or to lift its import surcharge.
Above all, there was absolutely no mention in the proposed agreement of South Africa’s need for structural adjustment in the labour market, which means calling for the abolition of the apartheid system.32
South Africa received the IMF assistance in 1967/77,1982 despite protests because of the tight political control of the Fund by the United States of America and a few advanced capitalist countries. Those who control the IMF and the World Bank also control the economic and political life of the White Laager in South Africa.
African leaders or misleaders should compare the harsh conditionalities imposed on their respective countries with what is known of South Africa in relation to the Bank and the IMF. They will quickly realize that such organisations as the World Bank and the IMF are agents of recolonization. The medicine they prescribed for others they do not prescribe for their own country. We do not need to argue here, that the economic doctrines or theories informing
the World Bank and IMF policies are patently wrong. It is sufficient to mention that the World Bank/ IMF recommendations bear the eclectic and confusing stamp of classical Keynesian, monetarist, and neo-classical theories combined.
The picture that has emerged form this examination of the plans of multinational corporations and financial institutions is that while they strive to dehumanize, exploit and trivialize the lives of Africans in South Africa, they also extend the same treatment-dehumanization, exploitation and trivialization of lives-to the rest of the African continent. Racial discrimination is being sustained by multinational giant corporations which some misinformed or mischievous African leaders falsely believe can bring economic progress and useful knowledge. Let it be stated that it is criminal hypocrisy of the worst type to pretend that you are against the apartheid system (which connotes not only racism, but also ruthless exploitation of labour with the political framework of colonialism of a special type) and allow the very international organs funding and directing apartheid? Policies to virtually write your national budget, supervise your Central Bank operations, devalue your currency, increase interest rates, determine your educational policies, control your armed forces, and even think for you.
AFRICAN NATIONALIST PARTY
The African Nationalist Party formed by General Hertzog, was the ruling political party in South Africa. This Nationalist Party was formed on the basis of socio-economic history of South Africa and an ideology which helped them obtain and retain state power.
The IDEOLOGY of the Nationalist Party is APARTHEID.
Professor Eskor Toyo in a lecture had currently shown that the problems of Apartheid South Africa go beyond the issue of racism. Apartheid includes racism, the issue of democracy, ownership of land and country; genuine independence, and the issue of social justice.33 Even a Dictionary of Afrikaneer language defines apartheid as a political doctrine based on the following fundamental principles (a) difference in race (b) preservation of the individuality of the different colour groups constituting the population and their separate development in conformity with their individual essence, traditions and abilities, which create obstacles to integration. The
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issues of levels of civilization or of development has always been there in the apartheid doctrine. This ideology received a booster from Hitler’s Mein Kampf and from the ideology and practice of National socialist party of Germany. Nazi Germany had the problem of separate existence for Aryans and non-Aryans, as well as the problem of the development of human and material resources in the lands of non-Aryans. Hitler’s Germany resolved such a problem by embarking on conquests and occupation of such non-Aryan territories as well as committing pogrom on such population.
Hitler was a hero for the fathers of apartheid. The theory and political practice of Nazi Germany was to become an educational model for the white South Africans, Baaskap or white domination as a component of apartheid was articulated thus: “In our attitude towards the native, the fundamental principle is the supremacy of the European population in a spirit of Christian trusteeship, utterly rejecting every attempt to mix the races”.34
Apartheid as an ideology shaped Dr. Verwood’s obnoxious Bantu Education Act and the Extension of University Education Act. The Education Act for instance, established different curricula and standards for the education of whites and black and limits the amount of money to be spent on Africans’ education by the South African State. The impoverished Africans must fund education if they so desire. The state sets no limit on the amount to be spent on the White South Africans.
In Nigeria where the minority ruling class collaborates with and serves the interest of the perpetrators of apartheid policy in South Africa, we have education policy that approximates that of South Africa. You hear of Nomadic Education, Fishermen Education, Education for the Gifted Children. The gifted children are of course children of the ruling class. The children of the nomads and fishermen belong to the toiling masses. Education in mother-tongue under our neo-colonial setting is designed to achieve the same effect as in apartheid South Africa. Nigeria compounds the problem of under-development by insisting on making religion a national priority. The Muslim insists that his religion is the best and that non-muslims are infidels. Nigeria must be made a muslim state, some of them seem to be saying. The Christians on their part become fanatical and would not see anything worthy in a non-Christian religion. The Nigerian inept ruling class is trying to make
us have many “Homelands” or “Bantustans”. At one level there are two homelands: “Muslim” and Christian”. At another level, you have ethnic homelands: Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Efik, Ibibio, “Middle-Belt”, etc. Within this confused state, the important issues of the ownership and production of the national wealth; social justice; genuine national independence and education necessary for scientific and technological break-throughs are swept under the carpet. The similarities between South Africa and Nigeria make it easy to discuss any of the countries interchangeably. Two African countries - Chad and Sudan, perpetual battle fields-are available to educate muslims and Christians alike, as well as ethnic chauvinists, what will become of their countries if they continue with the apartheid ideology and policy.
The Nationalist Party which sustains apartheid South Africa appears to be dictating policies for African countries, including Nigeria. Perhaps this is the case. For, we find it difficult to understand how an independent government can proceed to negotiate for loans meant to send our country back to the fifteenth century. The conditionalities for such loans in the sphere of education, economics, and politics should make patriots tremble with rage. This explains why the Soweto massacre is repeated in many parts of Africa including Nigeria. Students are massacred for peaceful demonstration in various parts of the African continent.
The Nationalist Party is not only the custodian of the fascist ideology of apartheid, it is also the co-ordinator of the information net-work, and the state security system. The Nationalist Party, in conjunction with the multi-national giant corporations form the nerve centre of the brain of apartheid.
SECURITY SYSTEM
The other important structure supporting and sustaining the apartheid state is the enormous security system. Capitalism combined with colonialism is a terrorist phenomenon. The amount of terror needed to keep the majority permanently subjugated and exploited is reflected in the defence spending. The White Laager-a surrogate of developed capitalist countries and the multi-national corporations-is supplied with sophisticated weapons. She has been aided to produce some of these weapons. As the defender of Western imperialism in Africa, the apartheid regime uses” IBM
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computers, British General Electric radars, French Mirage jet fighters, Italian reconnaissance aircraft, West German nerve gases in NATO FN rifles”. Bombs of various types, including fragmentation bombs and napalm, are used. Missiles of all sorts, submarines, and even nuclear weapons are in the arsenal of racist South Africa. Japan and Israel have found it convenient to help South Africa update her instruments of destruction.36 South Africa spends over 3 billion U.S. Dollars on her military budget.37
The military not only repress and intimidate the majority in White Laager, they also destabilise neighbouring African states opposed to the policies of the criminal regime. In addition to the role of the military within the security network, there is the security police and the legal system fashioned to serve the interest of the apartheid system, though laws are enacted to ensure that workers do not effectively challenge the supper-profit propensity of the owners of industry. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924; the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 and the Labour Relations Act of 1981 are mainly anti-workers legislations. Despite legal barricades, police harassments and brutality of the security forces, workers in South Africa continually exercise their right to strike. In 1986 alone, there were 643 strikes and 150 work stoppages. In 1987 there was a strike action that lasted for three weeks in 52 gold and coal mines involving over 340,000 workers.38
In addition to these “security” arrangements, the South African regime has established another apparatus of terror, known as Boss. Boss was established as an independent organisation responsible to the prime minister.
There are times when it is confusing to ascertain when the security police is operating or when Boss is in action. The results of these operations are similar. In the words of Ahmed Abdullahi, “ Citizens are killed, robbed, brutalised, tortured, imprisoned and ’disappeared” by agents whose duty is ostensibly to protect their interests.
The South African defence budget has some affinity (in terms of proportion to other sectorial allocations) to the defence budgets of many African countries. A number of African governments have established death squads similar to Boss
These Heads of State equate their miserable lives with that of a whole people. History has been showing us constantly that it is
senseless to liquidate the citizenry in a bid to stay in power. Like the South African security system, African governments now link up their internal security system with the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the British Intelligence Network; the Israel Intelligence Network, etc. When the people’s enemy is protecting a particular Head of State, it is easy to understand the role of such Head of State within the polity.
III
RESPONSES TO THE STRUCTURES
OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The response to the apartheid regime by Africans in South Africa almost equalled the response the Afrikaneers or Boers gave the British who dominated the Boers at a time in their history. Just at the time the Boers were forming the Afrikaneer National Party, the Africans formed the African National Congress. In 1912 the name was the Native National Congress, but this was changed to African National Congress in 1935.
The Africans understood from the onset that meaningful change can only come if they are in control of state power. The A.N.C. was to formulate policies and produce appropriate ideology for that purpose They also knew that apartheid ideology was a smoke-screen for exploitation of the people’s labour and for stealing their land and wealth. The opening speech of Congress by Dr Pixlley Seme indicates that defence issues will be involved. According to him:
“We have discovered that in the land of
their birth, Africans are treated as
hewers of wood and drawers of water. The white people of this country have formed what is known as the Union of South
Africa: A union in which we have no
voice in the making of the laws and
no part in the administration. We have
called you therefore, to this
conference so that we can together find ways and
means of forming our national union for the purpose of creating national unity; and defending our rights and privileges.”
In contrast to the racist, eclectic and capitalist ideology of the apartheid state, the founders of the African National Congress, counterpoised a class-oriented, popular democratic and non-
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capitalist ideology. They showed that South Africa contains two nations: A nation of the white, capitalist and exploiters: and a nation of the expropriators and exploited, and wretched majority who are mostly Africans. The relationship between the two nations in one, or of the two major social classes is an antagonistic one. The wealth of the minority white ruling class and their mentors, is the poverty of the majority, black workers and exploited citizens.
The South African class relations is similar to the scene in many African countries today. In Nigeria, for instance, we have two nations: A nation on the one hand, of the multi-millionaires who are direct commission agents of the multi-national corporations, World Bank/IMF; of a worthless and thoughtless minority ruling class fronting for imperialist powers like the United States of America, Britain, France, Japan etc; of an insensitive minority group who enjoy the benefit of the Structural Adjustment Programme and appreciate the sense in SAP; on the other hand we have a pauperised, dehumanised and thoroughly marginalized nation where the most important item on the day’s agenda is death and what happens after death; a nation of the living dead, terrorized, militarized populace which is manipulated along ethnic and religious lines in the interest of the mentors of apartheid South Africa.
In order to establish one united nation the A.N.C after trying the peaceful means of change for a long while, discovered that it is exercise in futility to speak Hausa to a person who understands and can only communicate in Yoruba. ANC found the language of apartheid, and that language is the language of violence. A.N.C learnt and spoke that language, and the apartheid state is understanding what the majority are talking about.
In May 1961, Dr. Nelson Mandela called for a nation-wide strike which was successful. The following month, he and his colleagues formed an underground movement, dedicated to grabbing state power through violence and responding to state power through violence and responding to state terrorism with equivalent terrorism. Mandela was later arrested, tried and imprisoned.
On December 16, 1961, this underground movement launched an armed struggle to fight for popular democratic principles and for human rights in the sphere of land ownership, political independence and social justice. The military arm of the
A.N.C. Umkonto we Size (MK) recruited pupils, students and a cross-section of the oppressed masses for the armed struggle.
Military training was received inside and outside South Africa. Science and engineering students learnt how to produce explosives, portable radio-transmitters; and weapons of different types. Poetry, music, drama, literature, religion were all geared towards raising the consciousness of the people and of sustaining the fighting spirit of the Freedom fighters.
Pamphlets and leaflets were prepared by intellectuals and distributed to expose the falsehood being disseminated by the internationally supported information network of the apartheid regime.
Permission for the establishment of a political party like the A.N.C. or the people’s Army (MK) was not sought from the apartheid regime. Those who find themselves in a similar condition as the South Africans should organise to seize power. The struggle in South Africa continues, until the structure sustaining the apartheid regime is dismantled.
We have tried to present the nature and role of the structure that sustains the apartheid state. This structure which includes the giant multinational corporations dictate the socio-economic life in countries like the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan etc., as well as the socio-economic life in Africa. These giant corporations find it expedient to use the coercive state machinery of South Africa to subjugate, exploit, and dehumanize Africans in the whole continent. The National Party was the political party with a well articulated ideology of apartheid which pursued with fanatical zeal the goals of the apartheid state.
The major foundation of any state is the economy. The South African economy which is dominated by these giant corporations ensures an effective co-ordination for the other components of the state like the party, the security system, information network. Following upon this, the organization of a coup d’etat does not necessarily change the nature of the state in South Africa, in Nigeria, or elsewhere.
The structures sustaining apartheid operate on a continental and global level. This means that an effective attack on those structures will also have to take into account, a co-ordinated assault on both continental and global scales as well. After all, the
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multinational corporations are also causing havoc in Asia and Latin America. This is why it is utterly ludicrous to find some ethnic leaders behaving as if their chauvinism can bail them out of the snares of these wolves.
We have noted that the individual can play a significant role within a state, the decisiveness of such a role is usually enhanced in an organisational form. The organisation must be guided by a well articulated ideology, that goes beyond the present and projects into the future.
It is important to note that the leadership position in such vital organisations is not imposed on the people. Total dedication to a cause plus an appropriate mental preparation, marks a person out as a leader.
We shall end this section with two citations. The first is directed at Africans leaders and followership who crave for any kind of foreign “investment” and “partnership” from the multinational corporations and the imperialist countries. For them, this Chinweizu’s poem is appropriate:
“On Welcoming Predators”
(In
memory of Lobengula)
Who
welcomed in Cecil
Rhodes)
“With
open arms
He
welcomed a smiling tiger into his home;
With
open jaws
The
tiger welcomed him into its belly
After
all, smiled the beast,
One
good welcome deserves another
To the Africans who wish to truly combat apartheid in all its manifestations, they should imbue themselves with the Nelson Mandela ideal which goes thus:
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself
to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in
which all persons live
together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I
am prepared to die.”
Nelson Mandela has moved from the prison to the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. A number of the forces opposed to minority rule in South Africa are now functioning in one arm of the government or the other. This is a great lesson for many African leaders who cling to power in a very pathetic way which gives the impression that there are lots of things wrong with the mental and physical health of such leaders. It also looks as if the world has seen the end of apartheid policy in South Africa. This is however, an incomplete picture of the nature of apartheid system in South Africa. Much as the change of guards in the Government House in South Africa is salutary, the social and economic structures that sustained apartheid regimes for these years are still in place.
What is more, it appears that those very structures have decided to allow Africans have political power, while the main foundation of politics-the economy-continues to be in the hands of the multi-national corporations. This position is in line with the school of philosophy known as historical materialism which holds the economy and the material foundation of society paramount and decisive in political matters. It has to be stated that historical materialism is not flawless. Despite the problems of historical materialism, this philosophy better explains the politics in South Africa, Nigeria and indeed, the developing countries than any other philosophy taken singly.
SCIENCE, POST-APARTHEID POLITICS AND
GLOBALIZATION
We have noted the various problems facing some elementary philosophies of science like positivism, critical rationalism, and others. What became obvious is that the human factor is very important in the knowledge production enterprise. The nature and rate of producing scientific knowledge is dependent largely on socio-economic factors of the psychologically conducive human environment. This means that, it is almost impossible to be devoted fruitfully to research and development in the sciences on empty stomach by citizens who are for various reasons traumatized and treated like modern slaves. The modern slave is not bought with cash and bundled to another country. The modern slave stays in his
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or her place of birth to fulfill the socio- economic roles required by the modern slave owner who doubles as the owner of capital as well as the real director of neo-colonial regimes.
Critical rationalism, while embracing various aspects of empiricism and positivism, also showed the limits of positivism and empiricism. Other philosophies based on the history of science and of society sprang up. Thomas Kuhn was one of the prominent philosophers who used history of science to show how science develops. According to Thomas Kuhn, there is the normal period in scientific development in which scientists work within a given and generally accepted theoretical frame-work. There is the period when working within the accepted frame - work is faced with puzzles that are insoluble within that accepted frame - work. This gives rise to what he calls anomaly. Attempts to solve the puzzles and rectify the anomaly gives rise to a new frame - work and a breakthrough. This new frame - work is what he calls a new Paradigm.
The movement to the new paradigm defies logical rules. The break - through makes use of psychology more than logical instruments. The inarticulated assumption here ( and I think Kuhn is correct in the assumption) is that the human being who is making the “gestalt” leap or psychological approach to scientific discovery must be a psychologically stable human - being. This is an important angle for societies who wish to belong to those, who constantly make scientific and technological break - throughs.
The various schools in philosophy of science quickly showed that there is no one truth. Truth was dependent on time, condition and school. Some philosophers advocated the abandonment of truth as the goal of science. We could have subscribed to the abandonment of truth, if we were aiming at absolute truth. The truth we subscribe to takes cognizance of logic, history, and empirical factors. This truth which considers the inter-connectedness of phenomena is nonetheless tentative and objective simultaneously. New ’facts’ and developments could lead to new truths! With this approach, the debate between deductivism and inductivism should have long ended, since these are different aspects of the same coin. Similarly, verificationism and falsificationism are rather complementary aspects of the scientific enterprise. Trial and error approach as well as bold guesses are
exceedingly fruitful, if grounded in the past experiences and history of science and the community.
Problems and solutions to problems in philosophies of science have revealed that Karl Popper was wrong in ruling out marxism and psycho-analysis as pseudo-science. Politics, economics, sociology are social sciences. Their subject-matter may differ, but the methodological approach will be the same in general with biology, chemistry and physics.
If we focus once more on South Africa after the apartheid era, we shall notice some significant changes in the apparatus of government. It is easy to observe that apartheid as practised under Botha and Verwood do not exist. Black Africans are virtually in charge of some political positions in South Africa. On issues involving the economy, the whites (or black skin-white mask) would necessarily be in charge. The economy is the heart of politics. The law, educational system, and religion derive from the economy. Under Nelson Mandela through President Mbeki’s tenure, the white population are firmly in control of the economy. In order to ensure that there is no mistake about the hold on the economy, the South African State has been properly integrated into the World Economic Order under the name “Globalization”.
Globalization is the new political and economic philosophy of imperialism. During the cold war era, anti-communism was a very important philosophy for imperialism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, anti-communism is no longer suitable and attractive as an imperialist philosophy. Human Rights was first used, and is still being used as an interim philosophical outfit. When the various dimensions of human rights are being stretched to show the hypocrisy of the advocates of human rights by imperialist nations, there will be the need for them to fashion out a philosophy under the umbrella of globalization.
Majority of black South Africans, Nigerians, and in deed most Africans and developing countries, will be attacked and are being attached globally by a united imperialist, capitalist force. Those countries and peoples who are being attacked by this global force are not members of the global village. This is why it is necessary and imperative for the Arabs, Africans, Asians and Latin Americans to unite in concrete ways to ward off this evil gang-up against a greater part of humanity.
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Popular education is a necessary requirement for the programme of action that will help liberate the people from this new imperialist yoke. The oppressed people should be aware that science would be used as an ideology to dislodge the enlightenment work of the new patriots of the oppressed. The very fact that the concept of science has been changing, should prepare the minds of the people for the people - oriented philosophy in both science and technology as well as in economics and politics.
CONCLUSION
We have tried to show that the so-called natural sciences are deeply rooted in philosophy. It was noted that some of the discoveries in science emanated from religion, philosophy or the mythology of our ancestors. It is now recognized that mathematics could have paradoxes and contradictions if it is seen as an enterprise that is universally consistent and valid in time and space. Thus, mathematics, or theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, molecular biology, all forcefully show that science is impossible without philosophy. This is why it is very necessary to study the history and philosophy of any discipline if we intend to appreciate the particular discipline deeply.
We also noted that philosophy guides the practices of politics. Sometimes, the political philosophy may be inarticulate, even though the guiding philosophy is very obvious. Nigeria’s economic structural adjustment programme and military rule is a brand of the philosophy known as capitalism. The majority rule that is now being introduced in South Africa will try out the indirect neo-colonial style of politics prevalent in most parts of Africa, where the Africans rule in the general interest of the multi-national corporations.
What is important is to realise the type of philosophy guiding our actions and to appraise such philosophy on the basis of our aspirations and physical reality.
NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Alozie, Princewill. “The Nature of Philosophy”
Academic Digest, may - June 1990 pp. 44-48
Treated this aspect in a greater detail.
2. Alozie, P. I. And Ofuegbu C. O. “Introduction to Science”
In: Science, Technology and society, University of Port Harcourt Press, Port Harcourt, 1987, pp. 1 - 8 There is an erratum on P. 7.
The example of the deductive reasoning should be as follows:
1. If there is sunlight, then trees grow well (General Rule)
2. There is sunlight in Umuahia - Ibeku. (Observed Fact)
3. Therefore trees grow well in Umuahia - Ibeku. (Inferred Fact)
3. Agassi, J. “The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics”. In: Bunge, M. The Critical Approach to science and Philosophy, N. Y. (A. O) 1964, p. 206
4. Engels, Frederick: Anti-Duhring, N. Y. International Publishers, 1976, p. 16
5. Ruper Hall, From Galileo to Newton 1630-1720. N. Y.
Harper & Publi., 1963 p. 319
6. Rander, D., Randner H: Science and Unreason. Belmont, Wadsworth Publ., California, 1982 p. 88
7. Vasiliev Yu. M. (A.O) General and Historical Geology, Moscow, MIR Publ. 1981 pp. 248-258
8. Monkhouse F. J. Principles of Physical Geography.
London, University of London Press, 1970 p. 25.
9. Beloussov, V. V. “Osnovniye Voprsi Geotektonikie”
M., Gosnatekizdatelstlva, 1962 p. 540. (In Russian); Beloussov, V.V, Zemliya, Iyo Stroeniai razvitiye.M., Nauka, 1963 p. 135 (In Russian), Vasilier Yu. M. op. cit. pp. 256-257
10. For a detailed treatment of this problem, refer to Berth, Evert W., T Amsterdam, 1959, and Van Heijenoort, John,
Cambridge, Mass.
11. Whitehead A. N. “ Process and reality”, Harper &
Brothers, 1957, p. 107.
12. ’See: Beckman, Bjorn “Political Science and Political Economy” In Political Science in Africa, Ed. ByY. Baronco,
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London, Zed press, 1983, pp. 101 - 111.
13. Toyo, Eskor: “Non-Ethnocentric Flaws in competing
Non-Marxist Paradigms of Development” 3/4 In: Barongo Ibid, pp. 156-1777.
14. McLaughiin, Robert “Invention and Discovery” In:
Philosophy of Science Vol. 49 No. 2, June, 1982.
See also: Watson, J. “The Double Helix”, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1968.
15. Mclaughiin op. cit. p. 204.
16. Philosophical Aspect of Biology, Moscow USSR Academy of Science, 1979, p. 10.
17. Dixon, Bernard: Using Antibodies to Increase Yields - In: Biotechnology N. Y., nature Pub. Co., 1989, vol. 7, No. 11p. 1118
18. Ake, Claude: Social Science as Imperialism U. Y. O. Ibadan, 1979.
19. Rostow, W. W. Politics and the Stage of Growth, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971, p. 289.
20. Rostow Ibid. p. 239, 248.
21. Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth Cambridge Univ. Press, 12960, p. 11.
22. Rostow, Politics and Stages of Growth, p. 230.
23. See various articles in: Writing of the young Marx on Philosophy and Society” N. Y. 1967, Anchoe Books.
24. Eteng, Inya “Myths and Fallacies in Nigerian Development” - In: Nnoli, O. (ed) “Path to Nigerian Development” Dakar, Cordesria, 1981, pp. 48-75
25. Nnoli, C. (ed) “Path to Nigerian Development”
26. Stewart, F. “Should Conditionality Change?” - In: The IMF and the World Bank in Africa, Uppsala, 1987, Scandinawian Inst. of African Studies p. 32.
27. IMF and World Bank in Africa, p. 20.
28. It is important to note that we have capitalist democracy and socialist democracy. There is need to ascertain the content and quality of democracy when such words are used. A situation whereby a country like the United States of America sustains undemocratic regimes all over the world, including South Africa, and ensures that only the fabulously wealthy few in the United States of America exercise state power, cannot be referred to as democratic.
29. The African Communist No 118, 1989, p. 92.
30. Nkrumah, Kwame, Neo - Colonialism: the Last State of Imperialism pp. 39, 127-131; and Wilmolt, P. F. Apartheid and African Liberation. pp. 58-61 throw more light on the activities of these corporations.
31. Wilmot, P. F. Ibid. pp. 62-63.
32. John Loxley: “The IMF, the World Bank and Sub-Saharan
Africa: Policies and Politics. “- In: “The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: by K. J. Havnevik, Uppsala, 1987, p. 55.
33. Toyo, Eskor: South Africa: The Struggle continues”. Unpublished lecture, Calabar 23rd April, 1990.
34. South African parties and Policies 1910 - 1960. London, p. 71
35. Wilmot, P. F. op cit. p. 102.
36. Ibid, pp. 20-121
37. Ibid., p. 103.
30. The African Communist No. 110 cf 1987 and No. 113 of 1988 have details of how the white and black workers fight together against the reign of terror in South Africa.
39. African
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AND ITSIMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT
BY
CHRIS
O. AKPAN
INTRODUCTION
Any discourse on African development, whether from the economic, political, religious, scientific or philosophical perspective would always provide an exciting challenge and, in fact, an amazing curiosity. This becomes more evident when the discourse is in relation to ’philosophic-scientific’ issues. But much as one strives to negotiate, understand and evaluate such discourse, one would seem to find himself talking more about underdevelopment even more than development. The implication here is that Africa is underdeveloped and therefore, in need of development.
In this contemporary world, science and its application, technology, provide the most important index for distinguishing a developed society, country or continent from an underdeveloped one. Africa has been tagged “a third world” continent because of her underdeveloped status in the sphere of science and technology. The reason is that Africa is mainly dependent on the ’first world’ (Western or developed world) in its scientific and technological needs. The corollary of this is that scientific categories of the West, in whatever shade and colour, whether it is congenial to the African world view or not, have been imposed or dumped on the Africans. The Africans, satisfied with their dependent status have sat back and swallowed everything from the “developed world” without harnessing their own path to development. Based on this demeaning situation, our developmental rate has often been tied to this dependent status.
The questions then are: Can the Africans not harness their own mode of scientific development? Must we always follow the Western scientific paradigm? Can we not create alternative knowledge to modern science? Feyerabend’s philosophy of science seems to offer some answers to these questions and many allied ones. Thus, in this chapter, we present Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy of science: a philosophy of science which challenges
the Africans to wake up, develop in their own ways without depending solely on the Western scientific paradigm. His philosophy of science anchored on his idea of “anarchism” and “anything goes” suggests that modern science and its method of rationality is not the one and only method for doing science nor the only route to development. The aim of this paper is to dig out those latent or hidden meanings which Feyerabend’s philosophy of science has for African development.
AN EXPOSITION OF FEYERABEND’S PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
Feyerabend’s Background and Influences
It is often said that a philosopher’s ideas are, to a large extent, the offshoot of his socio-cultural milieu and the intellectual ferment of his time. This appears to be true of Feyerabend, a former Professor of philosophy at the University of California and a Professor of philosophy of science at the Federal Institute of Technology at Zurich.
Explaining the origin of his ideas, Feyerabend notes that the problem of knowledge and education in a free society struck him during his tenure of a state fellowship at the Weiner Institute Zur Methdologiscen Erneuerung Des Deutschen Theaters in 1946 (Science in a Free Society 107). Here, he studied arts and theatre. After a year, he left for the University of Vienna where he studied history, physics and astronomy. He, along side his other colleagues, founded an organization called the “Kraft circle” named after his class teacher, Victor Kraft, who incidentally became the chairman of the organization. The organization was basically a philosophy club engaged in debates and arguments. Occasionally, it had in attendance such eminent philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe, Von Wright, Hollistscher, Julos and so many others. In such debates, Feyerabend would defend what looks like “absurd views” with great assurance.
He notes that Felix Ehrenhaft whom he called “an excellent experimenter” unraveled the difficulties of “scientific rationality” and profusely shaped his critical mind. Ehrenhaft, a teacher of theoretical physics on his visit to Vienna, according to Feyerabend, opened his eyes and held members of the “Kraft circle” spell-bound.
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The “Kraft circle” had heard so much about this critic of “some scientific theories” and had conspired to criticize and “expose” him for his criticism and rejection of the relativity and quantum theories as being idle speculation. For, this was the physical theory which the “Kraft circle” held in absolute reverence and had always defended with all their critical might. But when Ehrenhaft visited, he stunned them as he successfully tore apart, not only the relativity and quantum theories, but the Newtonian Law of inertia and the electromagnetic theory. Feyerabend would claim that Ehrenhaft’s lesson would later on provide him an excellent illustration of the nature and limitation of scientific rationality (111).
In Vienna, Feyerabend also came under the influence of some foremost Marxist intellectuals like Walter Hollister. Though he read Stalin’s pamphlet on dialectical and historical materialism, he was more of “a raving positivist” who favoured strict rules of research. Afterwards, he was converted to realism, for according to him, “realism had fruits positivism had none” (113). Another influence on Feyerabend was Elizabeth Anscombe, a powerful British Philosopher whom Feyerabend claimed to have discussed Wittgenstein’s manuscripts with. Feyerabend actually was to become a student in Cambridge under Wittgenstein but he died before Feyerabend arrived in England. Karl Popper then beame his supervisor and according to Feyerabend, Popper had “freedom of manners… joyfully putting forth his ideas, unconcerned about the reaction of the professionals” (115). But he would later remark that the relatively unknown Popper whom he met in 1948 was very different from the “established Sir Karl of later years.”
Feyerabend in his studies and research in quantum theory found out that scientists do not always follow their laid down rules during research, and that falsification of the rationalists was not a solution to the problem of scientific methodologies. By this position, the rationalist influence of Popper on him had started to wane. Feyerabend would note that it was Professor Von Weizsacker who had the prime responsibility for his change to anarchism. Weizsacker made Feyerabend to realize that no idea, knowledge or ideology should be imposed without regard to circumstances, for if this is done, it will be more of a hindrance than help. Influenced by Weizsacker’s position, Feyerabend notes:
… a person trying to solve a problem whether
in science or
elsewhere must be given complete freedom and
cannot be restricted by any demands, norms, however plausible they may seem to
the logician or the philosopher who has thought them in the privacy of his
study (117).
The implication of what Feyerabend says here is that every problem has its concrete situation and that no general rule or law formulated by a scientist or logician, no matter how reasonable it may appear, should be generalized to cover problems outside its own universe of discourse. Another event that prompted Feyerabend to turn his back against rationalism had to do with how social problems were solved. Those who call themselves “intellectuals” (a version of the rationalists), or “policy makers” (what some Nigerians would call leaders of thought), make policies concerning others as if they were their own private affairs. They simply take it for granted that their ideas and those of their colleagues are the only important ones and that people have to adopt them (118). Feyerabend saw in such ideas what he would term as the tyranny of truth or reason.
Given this background, Feyerabend lost faith in the methodologies of science peddled by some of his contemporaries. He rather saw them as a hindrance to the development of the individual and the society at large. He would rather pin his faith in the idea of “anarchism,” which he believes could enhance free exchange of ideas and development.
Feyerabend’s Critique of Logical
Positivism, Critical Rationalism and Kuhn’s Historical and Revolutionary Model
of Science.
Before presenting his anarchistic view of science, Feyerabend pointed out the loopholes inherent in other methodologies of science as put forward by the logical positivists, critical rationalists and Thomas Kuhn.
Taking on the logical positivists whose major tenet was the “verification principle,” Feyerabend contends that theories do not always follow from facts in the strict logical sense as held by them (logical positivists). They had held that propositions which cannot be verified are meaningless and should be thrown out from the corpus of knowledge. Their aim was to demarcate science from
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non-science, since according to them, non-scientific propositions could not be verified through observation. But Feyerabend explains in his “Science without Experience” that observational knowledge is not the most reliable knowledge human beings possess (794). In this vein, Feyerabend would say that science is just one tradition among many. It is closely related to other traditions and cannot be wholly separated from them, for it does profit from an admixture of unscientific ingredients (Against Method 305). For him, the attempted separation of science from non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the achievement and growth of science.
His attack on critical rationalism as propounded by Karl Popper was also devastating and revealing. Critical rationalism was an offshoot of logical positivism. The aim of critical rationalism as Uduigwomen explicitly states was to “provide the criteria for distinguishing critical and rational thinking, behaviour and actions from uncritical and irrational thinking, behaviour and actions” (87). The method which Popper felt was good for this task was “falsificationism.” In the falsificationist methodology, theories are made to undergo some test of reasoning and if they cannot stand up to critical tests, such theories are jettisoned. According to Popper, it was a method of “trial and error or conjectures and refutations” (46).
But Feyerabend holds that Popper’s standard was too rigid and fixed, and that if it were to be strictly applied, then, science itself would be wiped out without any suitable replacement (Against Method 176). To drive home his point, Feyerabend states that it is meaningless to give a negative criterion (conjectures and refutations or falsification) by saying that good theories are theories which can be refuted, but which are not yet contradicted by any fact. In his words:
A principle of falsification that removes
theories because they do not fit the facts would have to remove the whole of
science… facts alone are not strong enough for making us accept or reject
scientific theories, the range they leave to thought is too wide. Logic and methodology eliminate too much…
(303)
By implication, what Feyerabend is saying is that knowledge of reality cannot be limited to observational facts and
cannot be exactly measured by a given privileged method or standard. Rigid tests by verification, logic or scientific rationality as reveled in by modern science and worshipped by the rationalists and positivists would, if strictly applied, mean that we may be unable to find anything that could live up to those standards.
For Imre Lakatos, whom Newton Smith sees as “the revisionary Popperian” (77), Feyerabend gave some little respect. According to Feyerabend, Lakatos does not stipulate methodological rules that direct the scientists to either retain or reject a theory. For Feyerabend, Lakatos’ “Scientific Research Programme” is more superior to Popper’s and Kuhn’s approaches of science. Lakatos, for him, “only offers words which sound like elements of methodology but not methodology …” (How to Defend Society 161). For this reason, Feyerabend sees Lakatos as a fellow anarchist. However, Lakatos could not entirely escape his critical sledge hammer. He criticizes Lakatos on the grounds that he takes or upholds science against other disciplines as if modern science is superior to magic or myth. He maintains that science is only one ideology among several other ideologies.
On Kuhn’s revolutionary method of science, Feyerabend says, “Kuhn’s ideas are interesting, but alas, they are much too vague to give rise to anything, but lots of hot air” (160). He sees Kuhn’s notions of “paradigm,” “normal science,” “crisis,” “revolution” etc. as boring and in fact connected with no ideas at all. Generally, Kuhn’s ideas according to him were false; for, there has never been such a period of normal science in history. He challenges anyone to prove the contrary (160).
The foregoing is a strong indication that Feyerabend did not favour any method of science that was couched in fixed and unchanging rules. Science, therefore, according to him, could only thrive through the anarchistic route. We shall then move to consider his anarchistic notion of science.
Feyerabend’s Anarchistic Conception of
Science
Feyerabend’s view of how science should progress is based on the idea of ’Anarchism’. He opens the introductory chapter of his Against Method by stating that: “Anarchism” though not “the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent for epistemology and the philosophy of science” (17). His idea of
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anarchism is predicated on his rejection of the idea that science can, and should be run according to fixed universal rules. He was simply opposed to a certain method of science which involves firm, unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science; that is, the idea of a fixed theory of rationality. He argues that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality rests on too naïve a view of man and his social surroundings (27). He rejects universalism because this would inhibit the liberty of man in leading a full and rewarding life, and may even inhibit man’s ways of discovering the secrets of nature. For him, all the methodologies peddled by philosophers and scientists have their own limitations. He discovers that all important physical principles rested on methodological assumptions that are even violated by scientists in the course of research and propagation of theories. For him, the only rule that does not inhibit development is “anything goes.” However, he is apt to warn us that by this principle he does not recommend it as “the one and only principle of a new methodology” (39). The principle of ’anything goes’ implies that neither science is the only form of knowledge that has the sole right of interpreting realities nor its method of rationality the only route to knowledge. In view of this, he notes that science is not sacrosanct; nor is it possible and in fact necessary for it to be demarcated from myth, religion, voodooism, astrology, witchcraft and so on. Science rather benefits from these categories in its interpretation and explanation of phenomena.
Feyerabend’s idea of anarchism and his principle of “anything goes” have been variously attacked by many scholars. For example, it has been argued that, in a society where “anything goes,” the principle that will be at work is “everything stays.” Besides, his comparison of science with myth, voodoo, witchcraft, astrology and the like has been regarded as “unholy” (Uduigwomen 118). Again, it has been held that Feyerabend’s anarchistic ideas (as a post-modern albatross) would imply that where “anything goes, nothing goes, for anarchy and disorder would easily become the order of the day” (Ozumba 51).
But it seems to me that these attacks on Feyerabend sometimes arise from the misconception of his usage of the term “anarchism” and the phrase “anything goes.” If we consider “anarchism” from its etymology, “an archos,” meaning, “Without a
chief or head” or “without a top authority” (Sylvan 218), we would see that Feyerabend’s usage might have been in this sense. In this sense, anarchism implies decentralization. It does not revel in arrangement structured with a controlling centre. Relating this to science, we would see why Feyerabend said science should be dethroned from the top pinnacle and made to occupy the ’ordinary field’ like every other form of knowledge. And that it should not be made to swallow other traditions up by presenting it and its paradigm of rationality as the absolute and universal standard of understanding reality. On the question of “anything goes,” Feyerabend, we believe, could not have used it to mean that even diabolical forms of knowledge, which possibly could lead to the extermination of humanity, should be expressly encouraged or allowed. Thus, when he states that “knowledge is a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local problems …” (Farewell to Reason 28), he implies among other things that, each ’locality’ has its own standard of justifying knowledge and perhaps the ability of developing itself. The idea here is that if any knowledge claim does not meet the standard of justification in a locality it springs from, and cannot satisfy nor solve its needs and problems, then it should not be taken seriously. If this is so, then, it follows that not “everything stays” even though “anything is allowed to go” in order to prove how it can solve human problems.
Following his idea of anarchism and anything goes, is his idea of proliferation of theories or ideas. This was in opposition to the “consistency principle” of science. Scientists have always held that any new hypothesis or discovery should cohere or be consistent with already established theories. But for Feyerabend, this is very unreasonable because this condition would always preserve the older theories and not a better one. It would bring about uniformity of individuals. He however, argues that scientists normally go against this principle, yet it has always been taken for granted. Having recognized the problem of consistency principle, he rather calls for proliferation of theories. For him, “proliferation of theories is beneficial to science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual” (Against Method 35). Feyerabend’s call for proliferation of theories hits hard on Popper’s recommendation of single theories as a unit of appraisal. His position is rather in line with Kuhn’s. Kuhn accepts a
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situation where there are many competing theories struggling to win general acceptance during what he calls the pre-paradigm or revolutionary period of science.
On the idea of incommensurability, he opposes the view of the rationalists. For them, a set of principles could be articulated for objective assessment of the relative merits of rival theories against a given background of evidence by way of comparing the theories. In other words, the rationalist’s position is that theories can be compared through their respective content classes. But Feyerabend’s contention is that the logical relations of inclusion and overlap, which are required for such a comparison, cannot always be established between the content classes of competing theories. Such theories are incommensurable, and between them, no rational choice is possible. Here, he gives an example that the Newtonian mechanics is incommensurable with relativistic mechanics, on the grounds that the latter suspends a universal principle of the former, that shapes, masses, periods are changed only by physical interactions (Against Method 271).
Feyerabend’s position again appears to be similar to that of Kuhn’s. For Kuhn, during “revolution,” theories or “paradigms” competing for acceptance are incompatible and incommensurable. The implication here is that theories differ in meaning in respect of its epoch and what it sets out to prove. Feyerabend holds that the meaning of every term depends upon the theoretical context in which it occurs.
On the concept of rationality, Feyerabend observes that scientists and some philosophers have blurred the original meaning of the term. Though he accepted that it is good to be rational, he did not accept the kind of rationality peddled by the scientists and intellectuals of his day. The common idea on ground was that rationality was a universal criterion which every form of knowledge or tradition has to pass through in order to be accepted as knowledge. It was this conviction that science is the only rational enterprise that drove Popper and the positivists to seek a demarcation criterion that would distinguish science from non-science.
Rationality is a word that is derived from reason. Thus, for one to be said to be rational, he must be seen to be capable of making decision and judgment based on reason rather than emotions. Aristotle professed the universality of rationality when he said that
man is by nature rational. However, rationality came to achieve a more technical meaning when it was reduced to a system of some formal deductive and inductive rules. Aristotle who had declared that “all men are rational” became the first philosopher to systematize all forms of positive thinking which culminated in formal logic the acclaimed cannon of science.
In reaction to this trend, Feyerabend talks of a “new kind of knowledge” (rationality) that arose in Greece and later on led to the sciences (Farewell to Reason 73). Feyerabend here refers to rationality as theorized by those he calls, “the founders of Western Culture … Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, Kant, Russell, Popper and Lakatos” (Rationalism 9). This form of rationality, which he regards as “Naïve” simply means, acceptance of certain procedures (rules, standards) together with the results of these procedures, rules and standards. He further notes that, according to Western tradition, this idea of rationality does not mean “the acceptance of views except insofar as the views emerge from the application of the procedures, rules, standards” (8). In this regard, one becomes rational if and only if one’s knowledge conforms to these general rules and standards.
Feyerabend is against this idea of universalism. For him, any ’rational’ procedures or valid standards that run counter to sociological and psychological tendencies, and that do not belong to any traditions is hopeless (14). What Feyerabend is saying is that rationality is defined by tradition or society. Each tradition may have its own rationality. In this light, there cannot be one general or universal standard of rationality to which all other forms of life, culture or knowledge systems must conform. Hence, for him, “there is not one rationality, there are many and it is up to us to choose the one we like best” (16).
Feyerabend’s relativistic view here was probably a replay of Peter Winch’s alternative criteria to the Western type of rationality. Winch states:
The criteria of logic are not a direct gift
of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of ways of
living or modes of social life as such … science is one such mode and religion is
another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself (100)
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The point Winch is making is that there is no independent or absolute standard (rationality), which is compelling on all men, and which can therefore be used to measure different forms of life or knowledge systems.
If science deals with the explanation and prediction of phenomena, and the way the Africans conceive of, or reason about these realities are different from the Western’s conception, then it cannot be the case that, the logocentric (logic-centred) form of rationality (Western) would be compelling on the Africans. In this wise, we can see reason with Feyerabend’s conception of rationality, for it seems to point to the truth. Feyerabend’s conception of rationality and his philosophy of science in general could give Africans the leverage to finding an alternative path for development, thus complementing the efforts of modern science.
Feyerabend yearns for a free society where all traditions including science can be made to have equal rights and equal access to the centre of power (Science in a Free Society 106). He wonders why there should be separation between state and religion, state and other forms of knowledge, but there is no separation between state and science. He notes that in America, for instance, a citizen can choose the religion he likes, yet he is not permitted to demand that his children learn magic, legend or astrology rather than science. He frowns at how government spends more of its resources on the improvement of science without doing the same for other traditions. Science, he maintains, is just one ideology among many others in the society.
Implications of Feyerabend’s Philosophy of
Science for African Development
It is a fact that Africa is underdeveloped, hence in need of development. Underdevelopment here does not mean absence of development. This, according to Rodney, is because “every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent” (21). Underdevelopment is, therefore, understood when we compare the levels of development between societies, nations or continents.
At this point, we define development along with Mc Gurk as “the advancement or improvement over some primitive status” (28).
Considering this definition, it is a fact that Africa cannot be said to have remained in her ’primitive status.’ Africa has actually gone through some levels of development. But when this is compared to the developmental strides in the Western World, especially in terms of science, technology and education, we certainly would agree that we are underdeveloped.
In her quest for development, Africa has seriously been influenced by the Western paradigm of development, which hinges on the purely rational/scientific outlook. Many have even argued that Africa can only develop if it discards her cultural and primitive scientific categories. For example, Wiredu in his Philosophy and An African Culture advocates the application of the method and result of modern science for the improvement of the condition of human life (43). This involves, according to him, the discarding of certain superstitious beliefs and customs that inhibit scientific growth. In view of this he advocates an educational blueprint where the “rational, analytical and scientific orientation” is propagated (15). He notes:
Our children should be initiated early in
life into the discipline of formal and informal logic and into the methodology
of rational thinking …, the kind of training that will produce minds … capable
of logical analysis and fully aware of the nature and value of exact measurement
(15
16)
We quite agree with Wiredu that modern science is an important agent of African development. We may also take side with Wiredu that certain traditional cultures may inhibit African development. But this is not enough reason to say that the logocentric, rational methodology of the West is the only paradigm of interpreting phenomena nor the only route to harnessing the path of development.
Feyerabend, we have stated earlier, was against such imposition of the methodology of modern science (as Wiredu has done). This, according to Feyerabend, would blur or impair the free development of the indigenous outlook of the people. This is exactly what is happening to Africa. Before the advent of modern science and its application technology, the Africans had known how to: brew beer, distil local gin, preserve corpses, weave clothes, make pots of different shapes, colours and size, build houses, make
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astronomical observations, heal diseases of different types through herbs and roots, rear cattle and do so many other things. But what has happened to these indigenous sciences today? Some of them have been lost because of the influence of “Western scientific paradigm.” The result is that Africa has been derided as an underdeveloped continent because it has failed to build on those “ancient civilization” strides. It rather caves in to the Western influence. Ivan Sertima, writing on the “Lost Sciences of Africa,” rues the African situation by stating that even though it has been discovered (in the past few years) that Africa had great scientific traditions, “it is quite clear that the finest heart of the African world receded into the shadow while its broken bones were put on spectacular display” (26). The implication of this is that African glorious scientific achievements of the past are not recognized as its dependence and underdeveloped status have overwhelmed such achievements.
The implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African development, following the above, is that we should re-examine our attitudes toward such scientific traditions of the past and perhaps build from that to create indigenous scientific and technological traditions like the Chinese and Japanese have successfully done. This is why he challenges that “primitive thinkers showed greater insight into the nature of knowledge than their enlightened philosophical (scientific) rivals. It is therefore necessary to re-examine our attitude towards …all those ideas which rationalists would like to see forever removed from the surface of the earth” (Against Method 298-9).
Another implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is that it challenges Africa to develop alternatives to scientific knowledge of the West. Feyerabend repeatedly (in fact in almost all his writings) says that neither science nor its method is the only form of, or paradigm to genuine knowledge. In his Three Dialogues on Knowledge, Feyerabend says that one has to find different methods to obtain different kinds of knowledge (57). The implication of this is that there cannot be one fixed method for doing science. That is why he explains in his “How to be a Good Empiricist” that, though empiricism has been taken as the core of the sciences (3), it will be futile to attempt to make it (empiricism) a universal basis of all our factual knowledge (8).
Feyerabend’s position here lends credence to some trado-
medical sciences in Africa. For example, K. Ojong tells us of traditional orthopedics as practiced in Yala and Boki in the Northern part of Cross River State of Nigeria. Here, they use both the metaphysical knowledge and empirical knowledge to treat fractured or broken bones. In treating a fractured bone, the traditional orthopedic doctor would proceed by breaking the leg of a cockerel (if he is treating the fractured leg of a male patient) or the leg of a hen (if he is treating the fractured leg of a female patient). As he ’sets’ or treats the leg of the cockerel or hen, and as it gets well, so would the male or female patient become healed (174). The significant thing here is that the “orthopedic doctor” may not even get to see or touch the legs of the human patients involved. What he does is just to treat through a medium, which the traditional African calls ’forces.’
The fact is that this type of medicine certainly defies explanation in Western logic and scientific rationality. The Western minded scientist may be left to wonder about the relationship between the cockerel or hen and the human patients, or how the medication on the cockerel or hen is transmitted to the human beings without any visible contact. Meanwhile, we should note that Feyerabend gives credence to this type of medicine when he states that “…. Some forms of tribal medicine may have better ways of diagnosing and treating (mental and physical) illness than the scientific medicine of today” (Science in a Free Society 9). It is true that such forms of traditional medicine abound in Africa. But the problem is that they are not carried out on such a large scale as to give Western Medicine a serious challenge. However, it is true that when measured against the logic of modern science, such traditional medicine is seen to be fraught with some mysteries. Though we should encourage research into these types of medicine, it does not mean that the rationality of modern sciences or its method must be imposed on them. The major concern should be whether it can solve human problems without causing any nuisance. If it does, then such medicine and the like should be encouraged. We think it could provide alternatives to modern medical treatment such that every one can make a choice, where and what form of treatment he is to receive. Besides, the profession of the traditional healers would be boosted. This can then take care of spiritual needs, social needs and even physical needs of the wider range of people in the continent.
Following the above, we can point out another implication
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of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African development. The implication is that Government should be ready to provide funds for researches and development of “ethno-sciences” (local sciences). It is a known fact that most African governments do not give the same helping hands to other “local sciences” as they do to modern science. Feyerabend frowns at the situation where modern science and state work closely together while other forms of knowledge are left to lick their wounds. He notes that while scientific subjects are compulsory subjects in schools, no interest is shown by government in such subjects as astrology, magic, legends, myths etc. Yet, science benefits a great deal from these non-scientific subjects. In short, he would want these forms of knowledge to also have free and equal access to the seat of power (106).
Sound as Feyerabend’s challenge above may appear, the problem in most African countries is, whether the custodian of this “ethno science” will be willing to carry out, or aid such researches and at least make the result known to government and the public or not. The questions are: Will the traditional healer open up on his secrets? Will the bone setter (such as we mentioned above), let us know how his medication, for example, on the broken legs of a cockerel or hen lead to effective cure of the human patient? Will the traditional rain-maker tell us the secrets of how he can send down the rain or stop it, or how he can relocate thunder to specific targets? (Alozie 9). The above posers lead us into the problem of secrecy in ethno science in Africa. It is one major problem that has demeaned local sciences in Africa. This is why Kwame Gyekye notes that the refusal of the custodians of the verities and secrets of nature to open up on how they achieve their feats led to the demise of what could have passed for credible scientific knowledge on the death of such ’custodians.’ According to him, this is why the development of science has stagnated (30).
Gyekeye’s observation is quite correct. Even in this contemporary world, it is not uncommon to see an African traditional healer being so esoteric and personal about his knowledge claims, such that on his or her death, such knowledge would just evaporate into thin air. To stop this ugly trend, it is government’s place to call the custodians of such knowledge and make provisions for these subjects to be taught in schools. In fact
the custodians of such ethno sciences should even lead the charge for the sciences to be introduced in schools. After all, Feyerabend says in his Science in a Free Society that in any democratic society, the citizen has a say in what should be taught in schools, whether folk-medicine, astrology, voodoo, etc. (86). The implication of this is that the citizens of such society would have seen the usefulness of such forms of knowledge in the development of their spiritual and material well being. If this is done, we believe that such forms of knowledge will be properly projected. Thus, we will be talking about “exotericization”of knowledge rather than “esotericization.” This, of course, is one important implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African development.
Apart from the above, another implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is that he encourages a shift from logocentricism to functionality. This means that the justification of science should no more be based on whether it conforms to the logic and rationality of modern science or not, but whether it can solve human problems. This is why he states in Farewell to Reason that knowledge (science) is a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local problems (28). This means that Africans can build their own mode of scientific development instead of over dependence on the paradigm of the Western world.
Furthermore, Feyerabend’s Philosophy of science poses a serious advice to Africans to be wary of the kind of technology and science they import into the continent. The fact is that not all scientific and technological knowledge is congenial to the African world view. It is a fact of life that some of these imported technological devices have more or less helped to erode or reduce our moral value to a near zero mark. The Africans, at least, in the traditional setting are known to be highly superior in morals than their Western counterparts. But what are we seeing today? Some Africans have gone haywire in perpetrating acts of immoralities because of the influence of modern science and technology. This is why Feyerabend in his Three Dialogues on knowledge explains that Western civilization (science),
may have done some good here and there, for
example, in the restriction of infections disease but the blind assumption that Western ideas
and technology are intrinsically good and can therefore be imposed without any
consultation of local conditions
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was a disaster (74)
Indeed, one can only be left to reflect on the moral disaster we have been plunged into by jumping into or swallowing everything Western, as far as it is scientific and technological.
Conclusion
The foregoing was an attempt to draw out the implications of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African development. We have found out that Africa’s over-dependence on the Western paradigm has to some extent impaired the Africans from developing through their own indigenous mode. This is not to say that modern science as projected by the West does not contribute to African development. It does, but it has its own loopholes when we place it side by side with the African view of the world. This is why we corroborate Kanu’s position that Feyerabend’s philosophy of science could provide a “philosophical blueprint” for African development, since it challenges Africa to use its resources (as based on their own view of the world) to build her own scientific and technological empire instead of over-dependence on the West (6 9).
The important fact about Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is that it is not an exclusivist philosophy especially, when compared with other philosophies of science. His philosophy of science takes into consideration a people’s view of the world and their existential conditions to the extent of challenging them to develop from their own local perspectives. This challenge based on his philosophical pillars of “anarchism,” “anything goes,” “proliferation of ideas,” “rationality” and many others mentioned in this chapter attest to the humanitarian and liberalized nature of his philosophy of science.
In the light of this, it is our thinking that his ideas are veritable pointers to the way Africa can develop by not being swallowed up by the Western paradigm, but in complementary effort with the achievements of modern science. It is such situation that can lead to a greater rate of development in Africa.
Works Cited
Alozie, Princewill. “History and Philosophy of Science in Ancient Africa.” Ed.History and Philosophy of Science. 2nd ed. Calabar: Clear LinesPublications, 2001: 2 32.
Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic TheoryKnowledge. London: NLB, 1975.
__ __ __. Farewell to Reason. London: Verso, 1987.
__ __ __. “How to be a Good Empiricist A plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological.” Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar.
2. New York: 1963: 3 39.
__ __ __. “How to Defend Society Against Science.” Scientific RevolutionsEd. Ian Hacking. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1981: 156 167.
__ __ __. “Rationalism, Relativism and Scientific Method.” PhilosophyiContext: An Experiment in Teaching. 6. (1977): 7 19.
__ __ __. Science in a Free Society. London: Verso, 1978.
__ __ __. “Science Without Experience.” Journal of Philosophy. LXVI. 22(1969): 791 794.
__ __ __. Three Dialogues on Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Gyekye, Kwame. “Philosophy, Culture and Technology in the Postcolonial.” Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Ed. EmmanuelCEze Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997: 25 44.
Kanu, Macauly A. “Paul Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Science: A Philosophical Blueprint for Development of Science and Technology in Africa. “Ph.D dissertation”, 2002.
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Mc. Gurk, Henry. Growing and Changing. London: Methuen, 1975.
Newton-Smith, W. H. The Rationality of Science. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
Ojong, Kyrian A. “Feyerabend’s Methodological Anarchism: The way forward for the Progress of Science in Africa. “Ph.D dissertation” , 2002.
Ozumba, Godfrey O. “Epistemology and the Science of Politics.” Sophia: African Journal of Philosophy 2.2 (2000): 40 54.
Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of ScientificKnowledge. London: Routledge, 1963.
Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle - L .Ouverture, 1972.
Sertima, Ivan V. “The Lost Sciences of Africa: An Overview.” Ed. Blacks inScience. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986: 7 26.
Sylvan, Richard. “Anarchism.” A Companion to Contemporary PoliticalPhilosophy. Eds. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993: 215 243.
Uduigwomen, Andrew F. History and Philosophy of Science. 2nd ed.
Aba: AAU Industries, 1996.
Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science. New York: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1958.
Wiredu, Kwasi. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980.
SCIENCE AS AN IDEOLOGY
By
MACAULAY .A. KANU (Ph.D)
1. INTRODUCTION
Like way other field of knowledge about reality, science studies about man and his environment. As a product of human knowledge science has limitations. But science and its promotions and defenders appear to subject and subjugate other fields of human knowledge to its control and dictate. This is because of the unprecedented achievements it has made human society in the last century.
It is apparently acceptable that the contribution of science and technology are virtually felt or seen almost every sphere of human endeavour. These could be seen in the following examples. With adequate explanations regarding earth movement man can now boast of a good astronomical and meteorological knowledge of the world, thus making possible the forecast of the weather for aviation and farm production. Very heavy ships are used for transportation, exploration, fishing and welfare today as a result of growth of technology informed by scientific theories especially Archimede’s explanation of why and how objects float. In communication, it is common knowledge that to an unprecedented degree, the remotest corners of the would have become timelessly accessible via modern media of communication, including the radio, television, GSM, Internet and the press. The achievements of science and technology are numerous and inexhaustible.
Given the achievement of science so far, the scientific image of the world appears to affect every corner of human experience. It has given rise to a new temperament, a new faith in the power of reason to reveal the structure of things. It places new demands on political thought, ethics, religion, and psychology to establish the credentials on a similar basis.
Also, the achievements of science, so far, have made some scientists and thesis proponents to believe that science can answer all philosophical and religious questions.
With the development of science so far one would have
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thought that even Third World Countries would have benefitted from science as science apparently claims that it is a knowledge open to every man and society. The questions are: why are some countries left out in the science- knowledge acquisition? Why are the Third World countries like Nigeria not featuring in the scientific discovery and development? Why are so many countries still remotely controlled on what science is and its application?
It must be pointed out or noted that science is open to every one and that the application of scientific theories and methodology should be in line with environmental needs and discovery. The idea of western manipulation as to the direction of science, method and application have shaped the crises of poverty, alienation, unequal economic relations and institution. This is more manifest in the growing protectionism in the name of patent rights and transfer of technology. Being rational in the view of how the west becomes the dictate of scientific direction for developing countries science becomes ideological. It is no longer open to individuals to adopt and adapt science to one’s promotion and development. Seeing science from the western manipulation and direction (using the agents of Africa leadership) it becomes an ideological propaganda that is negatively indicative of the blatant absence of the human aspect. So the western ideological propaganda of science confuses social contents with its technological expression and provides no answer as to how society can shape the course of scientific and technological revolution.
Against the expectations of the apologists of the western model of science as the only solution to our problems, it is evidently manifest that most developmental theories have been characterized by theoretical contradictions and ideological polarizations and therefore have not captured the reality and aspirations of the people.
It is along this context that Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is fervently invoked to prove that the western model of science is ideological. According to him, there is no privileged method or theory of scientific development (as the west arrogates). This is because every theory has a particular condition under which its principles can be considered valid and true. He holds that our observation of any given phenomenon is guided by some personal expectations or assumptions. This means that what we label as
“facts” are theory-laden. He therefore condemns the approach which deals with singular method or a fixed theory of rationality and any such, rests on too naïve a view of man and his surroundings. He adduces that these is no pure way of describing the world independently, and this leaves us with the possibility of a variety of conceptual systems among which there are no means of adjudication independent of all theoretical assumptions. So, he calls for methodological anarchism in the perspective of “anything goes”. Here he calls for the proliferation of theories (ideologies) which in our context of discussion appears to have matured to environmental or cultural relativism in matters scientific. By this, the insistence of the west in the dictate of scientific development is ideological and not universal.
It is in this line of reasoning that this paper is written. Accordingly, this paper will proceed with definitions of ideology and science seen in that perspective with a view to supporting Paul Feyerabend that science is ideology.
2. DEFINITION
OF CONCEPTS
(A) WHAT
IS IDEOLOGY?
Ideology is commonly used and understood, and in some cases differently. This depends on the dimension it is seen and the way “ideology” functions. However, one element that is prominently indisputable in the use of the concept is the “total belief system”. In the analysis of Karl Marx’s view of ideology, Kevin Harris explains that ideology is represented as the lived consciousness of the actual political events that are taking place (or are being aimed for). According to him, it is a picture of the world seen from a particular standpoint, which is influenced by multifarious collection of factors. (Education and knowledge, 63).
Given that ideology is a total belief system, it could be seen that its “Core” consists of fundamental values and existential beliefs that would be relinquished only when it is judged that a rival ideology provides a more powerful and rational basis for action. Harris has pointed out that it is not the case that even where science has taken the place of ideology what is the case is critical preference, but noted that in such situations theoretical products arise out of social practices that contain with themselves conflicting social
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interests. Here science is not an exception, this is why Paul Feyerabend says science “is just one of the many ideologies that propels society and it should be treated as such. (Feyerabend, How To Defend Society Against Science, 6)
In the exposition of ideology as received view, it is a set of beliefs or theory, the prevailing way of seeing the world in a particular society. This is usually determined by the ruling class in a class society through the power they have. In our own social circumstance, lived consciousness, received views or ideologies are brought into being such that they favour one particular interest group while working against the best interests of the majority. This is where Harris still insists that much of what passes as philosophy (and science) is really only ideological support” (66). By this scientific methodology reinforces and legitimates its own presuppositions rather than provides insights into the world. What is science is what the ruling class advocates and promotes.
Given what ideology is and how it operates, this writing will not only support Paul Feyerabend in his insistence that science is an ideology but justify the same.
(B) THE
CONCEPT OF SCIENCE
The concept “science” is a complex one. The meaning of science has taken various forms and connotations overtime. It is in this regard that it is difficult to give a universally accepted definition of science. Science has been defined variantly by different people depending on the angle the concept interests them. Science as a discipline means that it has characteristic methods, addresses specific types of questions, advances specific types of answers and carries with it a fund of result as well as a characteristic set of propositions.
In the light of this, Jean Ladriere says “science may be regarded as the sum of our present scientific knowledge, or as a research activity, or as a method of acquiring knowledge” (19). The disciplinary nature of science is the striking aspect that makes it to be socially organized and institutionalized and therefore highly planned. Research activity has become a profession like any other often dictated by motives quite other than those of science in the strict sense of the term.
According to N. Campbell “Science is the field of those judgments concerning which universal agreement can be obtained”. He also sees science as a well-ordered activity of discovery and explanation of whatever has been discovered. Francis Bacon sees science as “a combination of comprehension of nature and conquest of nature”.
For Karl Popper, any meaningful definition of science must see science in the light of conjectures and refutation (Aronowitz 8). It is the falsifiability of scientific facts that make them different from the moribund areas of human endeavour. In the view of Carl Hempel “science seeks to explore, to describe, to explain, and to predict the occurrences in the world we live in”. (1). According to him, scientific statements therefore, must be checked against the facts of our experience, and they are acceptable only if they are properly supported by empirical evidence.
From the forgoing, it could be deduced that science is a diverse discipline; this has made it difficult to reach a common definition. This is why Paul Feyerabend sees science as a particular form of world-view, which is dominating the world today. According to Feyerabend, science is an ideology, which has equal status with other ideologies, myths and religion. It is in this reasoning that Claude Levi-Strauss stresses that the sharp break between science and magic is false, that their relationship is one of continuity as well as discontinuity (Aronowitz, 123). For him, both science and myth are systems of knowledge, possessing theories of causality and so on. This apparently tallies with Feyerabend as he says “science is just one of the many ideologies that propels society and should be treated as such”. (How to Defend Society Against Science, 6).
This Feyerabendian view could be shocking to people who have learnt only a particular meaning of what science is. In this sense Alozie reminds us that a study of the History of science and of Philosophy of science will reveal that the meaning of science has been changing in time and space (Alozie, 4). This is why this writing sees science in the Feyerabendian view and gives it leverage. In the subsequent section we will see science from the Feyerabend’s point of view.
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3. SCIENCE
AS AN IDEOLOGY: FEYERABENDIAN POSITION
Giving our understanding of the operation of ideology, this paper supports Paul Feyerabend’s position that science is an ideology. This view stands as a result of his examination of science and also the operation of science in relation to other fields of knowledge. In this sphere, Feyerabend acknowledges the existence of different fields of knowledge and culture for mirroring reality. He observes that science, like any other form of knowledge, is limited and inadequate. He charges that the presentation of science as a paradigm of rationality by many ideologies of science is a misnomer and misconstrual of the intricacies of knowledge. Contrary to the misconception by Lakatos and other apologists of the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge like magic, Aristotelian science, witchcraft, sorcery, telekinesis and acupuncture, Feyerabend holds that such position is an illusion and there is no shred of agreement in favour of such belief.
Feyerabendian position is given support by Levi-Strauss when he infers that the sharp break between science and magic is false. Both are systems of knowledge, possessing theories of causality and so on. For him, the slight distinction rest on the ground that the magician is a handy worker whose tools are collected haphazardly from the surrounding environment whereas the tools of science are as one with its general system. Thus the technology of science is literally scientific whereas the tools of magic are identical with the refuse of everyday life. (Aronowitz, 126). In another distinction, he says despite its informal methods, magic postulates a complete and all-embracing determinism. Science, on the other hand, is based on distinction levels, only some of which admit forms of determinism whereas, on others, the same forms of determinism are held not to apply (126).
What the position of Levi-Strauss is implying is that both science and other fields of knowledge aim at the same result. The importance of science lies on it imposition and promotion by the ruling class. This is why no matter its claims, science is ideological. Feyerabend maintains that science like all ideologies must be seen in perspective. Science is one of the ideologies that should be treated as fairytales. It is his position that all ideologies must not be seriously but should be treated as fairytales. Though they have a lot of
interesting things to say, but contains so many wicked lies (Feyerabend, “How to Defend Society Against Science”, 156). He protests that proponents of the superiority of science do not take time do investigate other forms of knowledge. For him, theories of science as proposed by Thomas Kuhn and others are ideologies. This ideology, according to him, could only give comfort to the most narrow-minded and the most connected kind of specialism. It would tend to inhibit the advance of knowledge. And it is bound to increase the anti-humanitarian tendencies, which are such a disquieting feature of much of post-Newton Science (Feyerabend, “Consolation for the Specialist, 197).
What he says is manifest in developing countries where the leadership has inferiority complex to promote the different fields of knowledge. Besides, the leaders of African countries especially Nigeria apparently believe that it is what the West dictates as knowledge or science that will stand. Even where discovery is made by the citizens, for it to stand, such must have been taken over by the west before transfer is made for the use of it in Africa. This has been shown in the insistence and imposition of what the ideology is by the ruling class without justification.
For Feyerabend, if justice and fairness are to be done in comparing the acclaimed science with other forms of knowledge, a thorough investigation of the nature, methods and aims of science must be carried out in relation to other forms of knowledge. This according to him, can be done by studying “historical records … textbooks, original papers, records of meeting, and private papers, letters and the like” (197).
In his “How to Defend Society Against Science”, Feyerabend accepts that science originally was in the forefront of the fight against authoritarianism and superstition, and to science we owe intellectual freedom vis-à-vis religious beliefs.
However, since science turns around to lay a claim to be a comprehensive system of knowledge, since it claims, it can answer all human problems, the questions of liberation and enlightenment become suspect. For Feyerabend any truth (as science assumes) that reigns without check and balance is a tyrant. On this, he says, “pursue this investigation further and you will see that science has now become as oppressive as the ideologies it had once set out to fight”. Modern science has been institutionalized and become state
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instrument (organ). And this must be overthrown, and he even says any falsehood that can aid us in the overthrow of this tyrant (science as noted to be) is to be welcome. Against the liberating nature of science, Feyerabend says.
It does not follow that science is bound to remain such instrument. There is nothing inherent in science or any other ideology that makes it essentially liberating, ideologies can deteriorate and become stupid religions … the science of today is very different from the science of 1650 is evident at the most superficial glance. (“How to Defend Society Against Science” 157)
Science as an ideology has become an indoctrination where criticism is absent. In society, at large, the judgment of scientists is received with the same reverence as the judgments of bishops and cardinals were accepted in the past. His criticism is that the way modern science is pursued inhibits freedom of thought and does not allow the pragmatic relevance of other fields of knowledge. He therefore, calls for demythologization of and liberation from the strangle hold of science. He advocates a humanitarian attituded according to which any individual should be free and allow to possess liberty so that he lead a full and rewarding life.
Feyerabend believes that the institutionalization of science is totally against the humanitarian attitude it seeks to defend. In schools, science is taught as a compulsory subject, and whereas an African is free to belong to any religion of his choice, he is not free to demand that his children be allowed to study magic, astrology, or legends at school. Even it is not every aspect of science that is allowed to be taught. The state power and it agencies determine what becomes science whereas there is a formal separation between state and church, there is no separation between state and science, state and science work closely together. The state spends immense sum of money on the improvement of scientific ideas, while other areas are not given prominence. (Uduigowmen 115-116).
As against the prominent and paramount role given to science, Feyerabend holds that there does not exist a single argument that could be used to support the exceptional role which science plays in society. According to him, science has done many things, but so have other ideologies. Science often proceeds systematically, but so do other ideologies (just consult the records of the many doctrinal debates that took place in the church) and, besides, there
are no overriding rules, which are adhered to under any circumstance. For him, there is no scientific methodology that can be used to separate science from the rest. Having denied the rationality of science, he concludes that “Science is just one of the many ideologies that propel society and it should be treated as such. (Feyerabend, “How to defend ….” 162).
In alternative, he calls for an anarchistic programme whereby science, myths, dogmas of theology and metaphysics were seen as some of the many ways of constructing a worldview. In this sense, he perceptively advocates for the proliferation of ideologies. Why is it so? According to him, reason does not permit us to see science as the comprehensive knowledge (answer) (as against other ideologies) to solving human problems. He counters the position of Kuhn that the work of the scientific community is to promote the growth of knowledge. For him, puzzle solving activity as held by Kuhn is not responsible for the growth of our knowledge but the active interplay of various tenaciously held views. He maintains that a fruitful exchange between science and non-scientific worldviews will be the best interest of scientific approach. Anarchism, he believes besides being necessary for the internal progress of science is also required for the development of our culture as a whole.
Feyerabend further holds that anarchism makes for progress and progress has always been achieved by probing well-entrenched and well founded values. This is how man gradually freed himself from fear and from the tyranny of unexamined systems. Analyzing the arguments of Feyerabend, Newton-smith points out that science.
… is
privileged neither in terms of methods nor in terms of results; and in view of
this, we ought to remove science from its pedestal and strive to create a
society in which all traditions have equal access to power and education. Among
the traditions, which Feyerabend wishes to see benefit from this equal access,
are astrology, witchcraft and traditional medicine (125).
What is implicit and emphatically called for is the encouragement of cultures and values. This encouragement will only be to the extent to which they can contribute to the advance of some individuals. There is the insistence of the exclusion of the institutionalized values for condemnation or perhaps even the elimination, of those who prefer to arrange their lives in different ways.
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The Nigeria case of dependency on the west for solution to under development is worsening our case as this creates room for institutionalization of a system of science that does not reflect our cultural and existential circumstance. Rather, what the West does through their agents (our leadership) is the indoctrination of people with some ideologies of mental enslavement and dependency. Such appears to deprive us of our rationality, independence and creativity. It is against this background of science that I buy Feyerabend’s position when he calls for exclusion of attempt to “educate” children in a manner that makes them lose their manifold talents so that they become restricted to a narrow domain of thought, action and emotion. Writes he:
Adopting this basic value we need a
methodology and a set of institutions which enable us to lose as little as
possible of what we are capable of doing and which force us as little as
possible to deviate from our natural inclination (“Consolation …” 210).
4. SCIENCE
AS AN IDEOLOGY CONFIRMED
So far, one can hold that the import of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy is the encouragement of the proliferation of ideologies and cultures. Like any other field of human discipline and endeavour science is artistic, ethical and ideological. Philosophers have rediscovered that categories of moral agency and social interest presuppose science. By this, there is apparent denial and contradiction of the claim that science is immune from the influence of social, and historical situations. As a human discipline and like any other field of human knowledge, science pursues its procedure. This procedure is only to science and therefore is not comprehensive as the propagandists portray, but narrow.
Against the false comprehensive nature of science and the insistence of a particular method of science, this writing supports and encourages the interplay of cultures and expediency of cultures. To the understanding of the reality, a society should not be discovered at the advent of another culture. As noted earlier, science is an ideology of a culture and therefore its presence in any society as culture should not diminish the heuristic function of other normative methods of interpreting reality
The allowance of science to operate in its unrestricted form pari pasu other cultures can swerve essentially toward the
production of the real object. This is so where the production of the real object takes precedence over social practice and political manipulation. The real practice of science is dominated or distorted by social practice such that what is produced is not real object, but rather knowledge that serves certain social interest and practices. A good example that is clearly manifest is Dr. Agbalaka’s discovery of a cure for AIDS VIRUS and vaccine for immunity to AIDS.
The fact that Dr. Agbalaka does not belong to the expected group and the belief that such discovery can never be made in Nigeria made the leadership (imperialist Western Agent) to discourage the promotion of such discovery. The belief that science is what the western ideology holds apparently refused to support Dr. Agbalaka because of the social effect that the discovery might have. In view of this, the paper holds that the political and social practice support a different theory on their social criteria and ignore the real objects which reflect the circumstance of the social foundation. It is in this line of reasoning that Kevin Harris writes.
We
can see that if theoretical practice essentially serves social practices and
interest rather than production of the real object then production of real
object (knowledge of the real world) must necessarily be subverted; and the
theoretical product resulting from such practice must barring coincidence, present
distortions of the real world (59)
An ideology that is acceptable whether science or other cultures must be one that emerges from the actual situations people are, their aspirations, and the things they need to know as presented to the people by those situations. Why science will not be allowed to be comprehensive and over shadow other cultures is that it is the dictate of the scientific community. According to Aronowitz
…
Science is a type of discourse with special languages, rules of investigation,
and forms of inquiry that determine the form of result. These constitute
element of an ideology that is accepted by the scientific community and, to the
extent this ideology becomes hegemonic in the large social context, that is
accepted as “truth” other discourses become poetry, religion, metaphysics, or
whatever, but are zealously marginalized from what signifies science by those
who constitute the scientific community (148).
The limitation of science as seen in the acknowledgment of philosophers that nature offers more than one options, and this
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depends on the framework of operation. Hence, the interference of other possibilities like mystical and supernatural account of event and their metaphysical expediency in meeting the needs of the people. As pointed out earlier, it is a basic error of ideology of modern science to assume that it possesses a comprehensive grasp of all that there is in reality, that whatever is not analyzable and explicable in its terms is not real and does not exist.
Being, deceived and carried away by this distortion, propagandists priorities for scientific research is common to all nation-states. These priorities embody the economic and political programmes of these states, are formulated in terms of technical problems that require solution for the benefit of the entire society. In this pursuit, the branches of science have stumbled on anomalies that cannot be fitted into the existing ideological presuppositions of science, not merely the particular paradigm, the question of the internal processes by which new paradigms are formulated is thrown into doubt. (Aronowitz, 333)
Against the limitations of science (Ideology), it is unphilosophical for science and its advocates (propagandists) to treat as “myth” and superstition whatever lies outside the purview of scientific analysis and explanation, as if science embraces the whole of reality. This basic error arises from the failure to recognize the limits of the competence of science.
Relating this arguments to Africa, it can be said that traditional medicine, magic and religion are other means through which the understanding of forces (physical and super-physical) operating in the world manifest themselves. Although in the contemporary times the states’ support for science and its methods have made science very expedient. However, other methods, which are not scientific, are still effective in some areas.
In bringing this writing to conclusion, the development and progress of science and changes in its methods (myths) in understanding and explanation of the universe notwithstanding, it can authoritatively be said that modern science (ideology) is still very young; there are many things in nature which it cannot in its present stage explain, but which with admittance and acknowledgement of other fields of knowledge, it could be equipped with such explanation and understanding. There are certain things in nature which given the limits of the scientific analysis and
experimentation will always remain inexplicable in scientific terms. This calls for complimentarity of other fields (ideologies). The sooner scientists and their apologists make room for the development of other fields (by acknowledging the limits of science) the more the growth and development of science will be better appreciated. Given the Feyerabendian philosophy and its prescription for the proliferation of methods and cultures, I submit that a blend of science, and a modified and systematic African methods (“Ideologies) will enhance and accelerate African development in dimension not wholly Western, but uniquely meets the needs and aspirations of African people.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alozie, Princewill, History and Philosophy of Science, Calabar: Clear Lines Publications 2001.
Aronowitz, Stanley: Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern society UK. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988.
Feyerabend, Paul K. Against Method, London: Verso, 1978.
Feyerabend, Paul K. “How to Defend Society Against Science” in Scientific Revolution, Ed. Ian Hacking, Oxford: University Press, 1981.
Feyerabend, Paul K. “Consolation for the specialist” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Eds. Imre Lakatos and Allan Musgrave, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970. London: Verso 1993.
Harris, Kevin. Education and knowledge, London: Routledge and kegan Paul 1979.
Hempel, Carl. Philosophy of National Science New Jessey: Prentice Hall Inc. 1992.
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Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Ladiere, Jean. The Challenge Presented by Science and Technology, Paris: UNESCO 1977.
Newton-Smith, W.H. The Rationality of Science Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd 1981
Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scienctific Revolution, New York: Science Editions, 1961.
Popper, Karl, Conjecture and Refutations: The Growth of Scienctific knowledge London: Routledge and kegan Paul, 1963.
Uduigwomen, A.F. History and Philosophy of Science, Aba: AAU Industries, 1996.
LOGIC, LAW OF EVIDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
By
EMMANUEL BASSEY EYO
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary advancement in knowledge and academic pursuit has revealed that the interconnectedness of disciplines is the unique trait that has characterized scholarship. It is also the foundation on which scholarship is based. This foundation traverses the ambit of philosophy, law, mathematics and science to mention but few.
It is a succinct presumption that the prolonged independence of disciplines where great thinkers believe they can progress all alone has stagnated knowledge. This stagnated form of knowledge is obese with insufficiency, inadequacy and one-sidedness. It is in this respect, that an urgent philosophical surgery is required to, at least, put scholarship back on track. The eventual solution therefore is the symbiotic coloration of all disciplines; the thought of this symbiosis in conjunction with the topic of the essay brings to fore the interdependence of disciplines.
The topic “logic, law of evidence and philosophy of science” directs our minds to the fact of the interconnectedness of disciplines. In the discussion of this topic, basic questions are pertinent; what are the impacts arising therefore from this relationship and are these impacts beneficial to man’s epistemological framework? Responses from these questions will broaden our horizon and extend the limits of these disciplines to accommodate the criticisms arising from this write-up.
The topic “logic, law of evidence and philosophy of science” betrays a wider picture of relationship between philosophy, law and science. Essentially, some philosophers across the different periods of philosophy have shown the interconnectedness in these disciplines. Mostly pronounced evidence of relationship between these disciplines appeared in the works of the logical positivists (the members of the Vienna circle) namely, Rudolf Carnap, Moritz,
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Schlick, A. J. Ayer and Otto Neurath. Also, the logical atomism of Russell and Whitehead, and Frege’s philosophy become relevant in this discussion. Carl Hempel’s hypothetical deductive nomological model of explanation comes under x-ray.
The other perspective which logic, law of evidence and philosophy of science have exuded comparable links is in the theory of probability (Inductivism). In this essay, we shall present and examine the meaning and the interconnectedness of these disciplines and also examine the theory of probability as one of the key concepts that links these disciplines. At the end of this essay, it shall be explicit that logic, law of evidence and philosophy of science have comparable coherency. …
WORKS CITED
Alozie, Princewill, Philosophy of Physics. Calabar: Clear Lines
Publication, 2003.
Black, Henry Campbell, Black Law Dictionary. USA: West
Publications, 1980.
Broadie, Alexandar, Introduction to Medieval Logic, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993.
Buzuev, Val and Gordonov, V. What is Marxism Leninism? Trans.
S. Chukak, Moscow; Progress Publication, 1989.,
Cohen, L. Jonathan, The Probable and the Provable. Oxford:
University Press, 1991.
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Philosophy of Science
Logic, Law of Evidence and Philosophy of Science
Elegido, J. M. Jurisprudence, Ibadan: Spectrum Law Publications,
2000.
Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method. London: Verso, 1984.
Gaskin Richard, H. Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. London:
Yale University Press, 1992.
Kneale Martha and William Kneale. The Development of Logic.
Oxford: University press 1978.
Lakatos, Imre, “Falsification and the Methodolgoy of Scientific
Research Programme” in Lakatos & Musgrave (ed). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Lewis, C. I. Survey of Symbolic Logic. Oxford: University Press,
1992.
Lukasiewicz, Lan ’Many value systems of propositional logic’ in
Mc call Storrs, Ed. Polish Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
Nagel Ernest, The structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of
Scientific Explanation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.
Nwadialo Fidelis, Modern Nigerian Law of Evidence, Lagos:
University of Lagos Press, 1999.
Uduigwomen Andrew F. History and Philosophy of Science. 2nd
Edition Aba, Vitalis Books, 1996.
REALISM IN SCIENCE
By
DR. ANDREW F. UDUIGWOMEN
INTRODUCTION
According to W. E. Hocking, “realism as a general temper of mind is a disposition to keep ourselves and our preferences out of our judgment of things, letting the objects speak for themselves...” (Cited in H. H. Titus and M. S. Smith, 1974; 225).
With its assumption of an external world existing quite independent of the human mind, realism was widely accepted among Western philosophers until it was first seriously questioned about the 17th century. Most of us think we exist in the midst of a world of objects that are independent of us. Thus it is our belief that though our mind interacts with the external world, nevertheless, this interaction does not in any way affect the basic nature or structure of the world. The world predates the mind and will continue to exist after the mind has ceased to be aware of it.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the place of realism in the field of science. But before this can be judiciously done, it will be germane to discuss the meaning, history and types of realism.
MEANING AND TENETS OF REALISM
For a clearer understanding of the meaning of realism, it will be necessary to distinguish the term from two other related terms - real and reality. The term real refers to the ’actual’ or the existing. In other words, it refers to events or things that exist in their own right, as opposed to events or things that are fictitious or imaginary. In a nutshell, real refers to what is. Reality is the state or quality of being real or actually existent, as opposed to being a mere appearance. In popular usage, realism refers to devotion to fact, to what is the case, in contrast with what is desired, wished or hoped (H. H. Titus and M. S. Smith, 1974; 442). Any view can qualify for the name ’realist’ if it emphasises the existence of some kind of thing or object (e.g. material objects, propositions, universals), as opposed to a view which dispenses with the things in question in favour of words (nominalism), ideas (idealism, conceptualism), or logical
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constructions (phenomenalism) (A. R. Lacey, 1976; 180). In philosophy, the term realism is used in a more technical sense.
In its strictly philosophical sense, realism refers to the position that the objects of our senses are real in their own right, and that they exist independent of their being known to, perceived by, or related to the mind. In other words, realism is the doctrine that there is a real world of things behind and corresponding to the objects of our perception (A. P. Sharma and J. T. Hyland. 1981, 52; H. H. Titus and M. S. Smith, 1974, 442; Ozumba, 2001, 91)….
CONCLUSION
The focal question addressed generally by realism is - is the physical world in any degree dependent on a perceiver for its existence? The meeting point of all the trends or versions of realism highlighted in this chapter is their unanimous ’No’ answer. They are all agreed that the physical world existed long before the emergence
of sentient life on earth and will continue to exist long after all such life has disappeared from the scene. Commonsense (naive) realism, in particular holds that our unaided senses reveal to us the shapes, sizes, colours, sounds, solidities, etc. that are really ’out there.’ Modern physics reveals to us that by the use of magnifying instruments (e.g. microscopes, telescopes, amplifiers, etc.) we can transcend the limits of our unaided senses to perceive certain features of the world that are indiscernible to the senses. It is the opinion of this author that the account of the physicist does not in any way contradict that of the commonsense, rather it augments, supplements or complements it. It will therefore be arbitrary to claim that the position of commonsense is invalid while the observations of the physicists are valid.
WORKS CITED
Chalmers, A. F. What is this Thing Called Science? 2nd edition. Queensland: Queensland University Press, 1982.
Churchland, P. N. Scientific Realism and Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Daglish, R. (trans.). The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979.
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. USA: Peter Smith, 1960.
Engels, F. Anti-Dühring. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947.
Everyman’s Encyclopedia. Vol. 10.
Feyerabend, P. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left Books, 1975.
Halverson, W. A Concise Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Random House, 1967.
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James, W. Pragmatism and Four Essays from the Meaning of Truth. Edited by R. B. Perry. New York: New American Library, 1974.
Knight, G. Philosophy and Education: An Introduction in Christian Perspective. Place and date of publication not found.
Lacey, A. R. A Dictionary of Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.
Locke, J. “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” in The Empiricists (Abridged by R. Taylor). New York: Dolphin Books, 1961), pp. 7 - 13.
McGilvary, E. B. “Perspective Realism,” in Perception and the External World. Edited by R. J. Hirst. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1965, pp. 199 - 208.
Northrop, F.S.C. “Ethical Relativism in the Light of Recent Legal Science,” The Journal of Philosophy. Vol, LII, No. 23, 1955.
Ogar, J. N. “The Problem of Realism in Relation to Theoretical Entities,” in SOPHIA: An African Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 6 No. 2, April 2004, pp. 98 - 110.
Ozumba, G. O. A Concise Introduction to Epistemology. Calabar: Ebenezer Printing Press, 2001.
Popkin, R. H. and Stroll, A. Philosophy Made Simple. London: W. H. Allen, 1969.
Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963.
Randall, J. H. and Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971.
Sharma, A. P. and Hyland, J. J. Philosophy of Education for Nigeria. Kaduna: Gbabeks Associated Publishers, 1981.
Titus, H. H. and Smith, M. S. Living Issues in Philosophy. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1974.
Uduigwomen, A. F. Studies in Philosophical Jurisprudence (1). Calabar: Ebenezer Printing Press, 2001.
Von Fraassen, B. C. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press,1980.
REFLECTIONS ON THOMAS KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
By
DR. D. I. O. ANELE
SENIOR LECTURER
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
FACULTY OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, NIGERIA
REFLECTIONS ON THOMAS KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
1.1 BACKGROUND
ANALYSIS
The American scientist, philosopher and historian of science, Thomas S. Kuhn, had an epiphany one memorable very hot summer in 1947 which drastically changed his perception of science for good. Before that dramatic event, Kuhn says, his conception of the historian’s task was one which saw it as the examination of historical documents, extraction of facts from them and recounting those facts with literary grace in approximate chronological sequence. However, when he was asked to suspend his doctoral research to prepare a set of lectures on the origins of seventeenth century mechanics, he discovered that theories of motion deriving from Aristotle were generally incorrect, although Aristotle himself was an acute and penetrating observer and interpreter of biological and political phenomena. Consequently, Kuhn wondered how those characteristic talents the ancient Greek philosopher displayed in biology and political theory could have failed him in the study of mechanics…
1.6 EVALUATION
AND CONCLUSION
Kuhn’s historico-philosophical exegeses of scientific development have over the years been subjected to criticisms that can be classified two viz (a) criticisms that are due to deliberate unfairness and misunderstanding (eg. Watkins 1970:25-37; Lakatos, 1970:177-80; and Feyerabend; 1970:197-229) and (b) those that are fair and constructive (Masterman, 1970:59-88, Shimony, 1974: 569-586 and Honingen-Huene, 1993). Criticisms that Kuhn is an “irrationalist” and a “relativist”, no matter how partially responsible his initial formulations in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions might have been in suggesting those lables to his critics are based on a distorted interpretation of Kuhn’s major theories. Perhaps, the uncritical assumption that the positivist and falsificationist theories have
virtually exhausted the essential insights in philosophical analysis of science explains the flippant criticisms of Kuhn by Watkins and Lakatos, for example. Having said that, there are two sound criticisms of Kuhn’s model of scientific development which have not received adequate attention from philosophers of science. The first criticism is on Kuhn’s choice of the expressions “normal science” and “extraordinary science”. The label “normal science” is not appropriate for classifying the type of scientific activities Kuhn had in mind because it creates the untenable impression that revolutionary science, that is, scientific research that eventually leads to scientific revolution, is not really a normal feature of science. Similarly “extraordinary science” is too dramatic and misleading. If, as Kuhn says, normal science is a necessary presupposition of revolutioning research and that the later leads to a new theory that defines a new tradition of normal science, it should follow that both “normal science” and “extraordinary science” are normal features of science. In other words, there is no need to over-dramatise the differences in the pattern of research conducted when a paradigm is secure and when the paradigm generates anomalies that lead to its radical modification or outright replacement. Kuhn could have avoided criticisms of his normal science/extraordinary science typology by using the labels “consolidative science” and “revolutionary science” consistently. The locution “revolutionary science” is generally accepted by scholars as a legitimate characterization of radical theoretical breakthroughs in science. “Consolidative science” captures all the essential of “normal science”, and is free from the negative connotations of the latter highlighted by Popper. (Popper 1970:52-52) Kuhn himself says that the bulk of scientific research is a complex and painstaking “…mopping-up operation that consolidates the ground made available by the most recent theoretical breakthrough and that provides essential preparation for the breakthrough to follow.” (Kuhn, 1977:188) Therefore it is surprising that Kuhn used “normal science” which is problematic when a much better expression, “consolidative science”, was readily available.
The second error is the anti-realist flavour of some of his dominant theories. Kuhn has successfully drawn attention to the complexities of applying the usual epistemological-cum-logical canons of theory
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choice in science, to the arduous task of attaching theories to nature, and to the epistemological lacuna created by ignoring the manner in which knowledge of nature can be tacitly embodied in whole experiences structured by group-licensed perception of similarity relationships between different data. But why did Kuhn write as if there is no clear sense in which what more recent scientific theories posit about the knowable world approximates closer to what this world really is than what older (superseded) theories posited about the same world? Part of Kuhn’s problem here is that he overstressed the valid points he made concerning (1) the impossibility of constructing a language of pure percepts or pure sensation reports for comparing the empirical consequences of competing theories in the same scientific field, (2) the nonexistence of a generally accepted philosophical framework to validate the assumption that the ontologies of successive theories in science are approaching a limit and (3) the problems of partial communication between scientists in the opposing sides of the revolutionary divide. One of the best ways of responding to Kuhn’s skepticism about a realist construal of science is to call attention to the methodological lessons that can be drawn from the history of experiments. (Shimony, 577) Skeptical arguments against the ontological and epistemological claims of realism do not pay adequate attention to the nature of experimental work in science. In science, a pioneer experiment is delicate and difficult to replicate, such that its epistemic status is doubtful. With time, however, as researchers learn more its reliability increases to a level that the experiment is incorporated into routine laboratory work or into engineering. This transformation is due to improvement in the control of perturbations, the gradual elimination of systematic errors, the correction of instabilities in the equipment and increase in the sensitivity of detectors. Seen from the realist position this kind of progress can be explained in a natural way: there is an objective world to which scientific research must refer, although the causal relation between it and the appearances in the laboratory are complicated and often veiled by various factors, and the improvement of experiment consists in the identification and control of these factors. As Ian Hacking stated (Hacking, 1983:262), “Experimented work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism.” Science aims at true theories. Few theoreticians, and fewer experimenters still will, deny that. Only philosophers are skeptical about it, by allowing the inadequacies of traditional philosophical notions of scientific knowledge to engender doubts in their minds about concepts of truth and theory-independent objective world that determines decisively which theoretical construction out of all conceivable constructions is the superior one. (Einstein, 1934:4)
about it, by allowing the inadequacies of traditional philosophical notions of scientific knowledge to engender doubts in their minds about concepts of truth and theory-independent objective world that determines decisively which theoretical construction out of all conceivable constructions is the superior one. (Einstein, 1934:4)
To sum up: Kuhn’s theory of scientific knowledge to some extent is iconoclastic. His model of normal science-crisis-revolution-new normal science marks a significant departure from the more traditional positivist and falsificationist theories of scientific knowledge. Kuhn, in several of his writings, has drawn attention to certain crucial features of scientific research usually relegated to the bark-burner in philosophy of science discourse influenced by positivism. He has highlighted the cognitive functions of shared examples in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. He has also eloquently analyzed the decision problems scientists encounter when they have to choose between rival theories in a specific research field. More than any positivist, Kuhn has demonstrated the important insights which thorough knowledge of the details of the history of science can provide for a robust philosophy of science. Yet, like the positivists he ignored the essential lessons that the philosopher should learn from the practical applications of scientific theories, lessons which throw light on the realism versus anti-realism debate in the philosophy of science. Theory-oriented philosophers of science overlook the fact that the so-called unobservable entities in science are regularly manipulated by scientists to generate new phenomena and probe other aspects of nature. In the case of electrons, for instance, scientists are completely convinced of their existence after engineers have constructed new kinds of instruments that employ various well-understood causal properties of electrons to interfere in other more hypothetical parts of nature. (Hacking, 265) If philosophers of science pay more attention to experiments and to the applied sciences (engineering), they would avoid the excesses and pitfalls in one-sided theory-dominated philosophy of science typified by the highly influential theories of Thomas Kuhn.
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REFERENCES
Abner Shimony, (1976) “On Two Epistemological Theories of Kuhn,” R. S. Cohen et al (eds.) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrect-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Vol. XXXIX.
Albert Einstein, (1934) Essays in Science, New York: the Wisdom Library.
Douglas Anele, (1997) “Disambiguating the Concept of Disciplinary Matrix (Paradigm) in Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Scientific Research Programmes” M. Dukor (ed.), Essence, Journal of the Department of Philosophy. Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos. Vol. 1, No.2.
Dudley Shapere, (1981) “Meaning and Scientific Change”, Ian Hacking (ed.) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edward A. Fath, (1926) Elements of Astronomy, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ian Hacking, (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Imre Lakatos, (1970) “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Israel Scheffer, (1967) Science and Subjectivity, Indinapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
John Watkins, (1970), “Against ’Normal Science’, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit.
Karl Popper, (1970)”Normal Science and its Dangers”, Ibid.
Margeret Masterman, (1970) “The Nature of a Paradigm”, Ibid.
Mary Hesse, (1967) “Laws and Theories,” Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (4th ed.) New York: Macmillan.
Morris H. Shamos (1987), Great Experiments in Physics, New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
Paul Feyerabend, (1970) “Consolatians for the Specialist,” In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene, (1993) Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Robert P. Crease & Charles C. Mann, (1991) The Second Creation, Lagos: Page Publishers Services Ltd.
Rudolf Carnap, (1959) “Psychology in Physical Language”, A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, New York: The Free Press.
Stephen F. Mason, (1962) A History of the Sciences, New York: Macmillan.
Thomas S. Kuhn, (1970a) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
_____________,(1970b) “Reflections on My Critics,” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit.
____________, (1977) The Essential Tension, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
_____________,(1997) “The Road Since Structure” Alfred I. Tauber (ed.), Science and the Quest for Reality, Hansphire: Macmillan Press Ltd.
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THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVISM
IN MODERN SCIENCE:
class=Section2>
ITS PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
By
G. O. OZUMBA
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
DEPT. OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR,
CALABAR.
class=Section3>
THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVISM IN MODERN
SCIENCE:
ITS PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
INTRODUCTION
In this paper our attempt is to examine the concept of relativism in modern science. This we hope to do by delineating the philosophical underpinnings that had made relativism a pervasive concept in almost all areas of human endeavour whether in the arts, humanities, ethics, law, social science and science.
We can say that relativism has its natural springboard from the fact of human limitations, multiplication of existences and the interrelatedness of all things.
In handling this topic care must be taken in order not to conflate the many nuances, which the concept of relativism are amenable to. For instance, we must not be understood as concerned with how the different things in our world are related one to another, of course, this would be an impossible task neither are we concerned with showing how the different theories in science are related one to another. This task again cannot be easily accomplished in a short work of this nature.
Our concern here is to examine what relativism is ordinarily speaking, then, its philosophical and scientific renderings. We shall with these definitions as foothold, go on to explain how the concept of relativism has helped in the search for better and more comprehensive knowledge. We are interested in explaining the role relativism plays in science in general. Much of the disquisitions we have in science, the polemics, the claims and counter claims are
because of the relativistic character of human knowledge. It is believed that when this character is clearly mirrored in the development of modern science we shall be in a position to exercise more sympathy, empathy and appreciation as we evaluate the epochal shifts in scientific world views. Feyerabend, Quine, Sellars and others have made this point loud and clear, that there is no theory or worldview, which is immune to revision or that cannot be superceded. And the supercession must not always be seen from the point of view of inferior-superior complex but from all arrays of possible reasons. May be from the point of pragmatic appeal, rationality, simplicity, explicative or problem-solving capacity, popularity, theoretical adequacy, etc.
In this work we shall define our concept and other related terms. After which we shall offer a brief historical survey of relativism as a concept from the ancient to the contemporary periods of philosophy. This will be followed by the delineation of the types of relativism we have before discussing the place of relativism in modern science. We shall look at the implication of relativism in modern science before our conclusion…
IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIVISM FOR MODERN
SCIENCE
Relativism as we have already discussed is an inescapable consequence of human limitation and the variegatedness of existing things. This makes it possible for philosophers, scientists and even lay people to perceive things differently.
Human beings, communities and ideologies perceive things from the point of their interest, need, ideological leaning and from the point of their perceptual power.
Relativism in science has led to such views of seeing science
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as a cultural process, as theory laden, as cumulative, as research programmes, as anything goes, as a rational process, as irrational, as psychological, as sociological, as anarchistic, as paradigm shift, as gestalt switch and as pragmatism. All the above have serious and far reaching implications for modern science. Today, only few can gain say the acceptance of science as the paradigm of knowledge. The question that immediately comes to mind is this, if knowledge, to wit, science is relative, does this not put a question mark on the reliability, truth likeness and dependability of the fruit of science? If science cannot produce proven, universally applicable and lasting theories, how can we continue to build on quick sand and to stand on it as though it was rock-bottom solid.
Popper may have said the whole truth when he says that science is like driving in the pillars of a building down into the earth to the point where we feel the foundation is strong enough to hold the structure. There is no rock bottom foundation upon which science builds. How then can we build a solid structure on a shaky foundation? There are many reasons why science has to progress the way it does.
(1) Science embarks on the knowledge of reality through the use of inductive method. Inductive method is a tentative, piecemeal method.
(2) Science is about gaining a more inclusive view of reality. This it can do by hypothesis, conjectures and refutation.
(3) Science is based on confirmation and disconfirmation of theories. Theories are never conclusively confirmed or disconfirmed except within a specified limit. There are always possibilities of surprises, as new facts, evidences and extenuating circumstances can show up at any point in the scientific process.
(4) Reality is unlimited and man’s means of unraveling it is limited and at times very inadequate.
(5) The life of man is not long enough to encourage sustained inquiry that will uncover more truth. Discontinuities in research and lack of the financial, instrumental and logistic wherewithal to accomplish great scientific feats remain dogged hindrance to scientific progress.
(6) The subjective nature of scientific research at times
makes objective, collaborative and universal judgments difficult. Objectivity leads to intersubjective controllability and vice versa which are important hallmarks for scientific progress.
We must say that there are negative and positive implications of relativism in modern science. On the negative side we see that:
(1) It makes the criteria for judging the merits of theories dependent on the values or interests of the individual or community. This will make the demarcation of science from non science difficult because one man’s closed book becomes another man’s flight of fancy.
(2) It drowns the idea of rationally in the ocean of arbitrariness. We can not accept theories on the ground of being more rational. The concept of rationality will also be affected by the same ignobility of arbitrariness.
(3) Relativism will also connote probability and what is probable cannot conduce to certainty and what is uncertain ends up as a “chance game” or mere gamble.
(4) Relativism confers the same cognitive status on all theories. No theory is sacrosanct and there are no theoretical hardcore that must be saved while revising the data except arbitrarily. The Popperian crucial test becomes only a disguised make-believe that has no discernible ultimate relevance to truth.
(5) Logic of scientific discovery that is universally applicable becomes a farce.
(6) Relativism makes science a cultural process and that means that the assimilation of scientific culture becomes a process of enculturation and cultural domination.
On the positive side, we can say that relativism is just one of the best options open to man. Imagine what would have become of science if we had insisted on universal, absolute and paradigm based science. Scientific practice would have fallen into a straight jacket of conservatism.
Relativism has no doubt encouraged.
(1) A hundred flowers to bloom as different research programmes go on simultaneously, thereby enriching
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research, engendering competitiveness and rigour.
(2) Relativism engenders progress because of the possibility and the room created for the supercession of one theory by another and we have seen great transitions from Aristotelian/Ptolemaic to Copernican and to Newtonian and to Einsteinian worldviews.
(3) Relativism provides for the sovereignty of the individual. As Aristotle has pointed out, men are always at their best when set to work on that which is their own. Science has progressed more through the independent researches of scientists like Galileo, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Newton, Faraday, Maxwell, Bohr, Planck, Einstein, etc, than what any organized scientific community can achieve.
(4) Relativism creates room for criticisms. For Karl Popper science can only make progress through austerity in conjectures and boldness in refutation. This is better than the so-called normal science of Kuhn where the scientist is compelled to adhere strictly to the paradigmatic requirements of his scientific community.
(5) Relativism instigates wide-ranging research, which can provide a leeway during crisis in the operations of a dominant paradigm.
(6) Relativism makes room for background theories to inform our scientific research. We don’t need eternal conditions which may never be met before we go into our research. Good conceptual schemes provide us with a guide and scope for research and checks unrealistic “wild goose chase”.
We also have the benefit of cumulative growth of science. It is the inherent relativism of scientific research that has brought us this far.
CONCLUSION
However, it is important to stress that the growth of science must be controlled so that science does not become a growing chaos. Some measure of standardization is important in everything we do. A science that cannot regulate the areas of research may provide room for all kind of destructive inventions which may pose serious
threat to human life. Bertrand Russell and Einstein became vocal pacifists on seeing the danger posed by science to the world of human kind. The dangers of world war three is still looming large. The memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still evergreen in our minds.
We need a rational interplay of objectivism, absolutism and relativism if we are going to moderate certain inimical excesses of the scientific enterprise. Today, the search for simple picture of atoms has led scientists to move from atoms to quarks (Tefil 137, 149) and there is every likelihood that before the close of this century, Einstein will be surpassed. Another important insight we gain is from Richter who sees science as a cultural process. This means that if Nigeria is going to make progress in science there is need for us to develop our own culture of science, which may not necessarily follow the pattern of western science.
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MARXIST’S METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE
IN A CHANGING WORLD
By
TAMUNOSIKI V. OGAN, Ph D.
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT
INTRODUCTION
For an adequate treatment of Marxist’s methodology of science to be grasped, it will be of paramount importance to examine some basic assumption of science via its historical study as a way of assuming the grounds on which Marxism could be designated science and its method tallying with the traditional notion of the subject. To this end we shall begin by looking at what science is or better still give a working definition to the subject.
WHAT THEN IS SCIENCE?
Science according to Panatie Charles in his work titled, the book of Breakthroughs “Astonishing Advance in your Life Time in Medicine, Science and Technology” is “the systematic and unbiased study of the world, including everything that can be seen or detected in nature man, and society and the knowledge that grow out of such study”1980:278). The word science according to Aigbodioh in his book Philosophy of Science, Issues and Problems, generally means any “systematized, organized or classified body of knowledge which has been critically tested and is beyond doubt (1997:5). Ernest Nagel in his work The Structure of Science, Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (1981:3) says in simple term that science means knowledge. Aristotle in New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967:1190) described it as, a type of perfect knowing (scire simpliciter) which is also echoed by St. Aquinas when he said that it is the knowledge of something through its proper cause (1967:1190). It will be necessary to note at this juncture that no one single mode of definition of science exist.
Etymologically, the word science, is a derivative word from Latin “Scientia”, meaning knowledge. In modern English usage, science
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is generally confined to the old established natural
sciences physical, chemical and
biological; mathematics though not excluded. ….
CONCLUSION
Science is linked by many threads to the most diverse phenomena of society’s life. Its emergence, the struggle between the traditional mystic view and generally views concerning man’s cognitive activities and the source of all change under way in the world all are underlined by social causes.
But to find out the principle according to which science and society are interacting, it is necessary to trace the social formations of science, the role it is playing in the society to reveal the specific way in which social reality is reflected and to bring to light the dependence of the evolution of scientific problems on the stage of society’s development.
As a method Marxist scientific philosophy is not like that of Hegel who writes that science cum philosophy is “like a cockerel ushering in the new dawn of the world’s youth”. But as a science, its method is man and his place in the society. Since the new society can only emerge on the ruins of the old world, that is, conflict of opposites, it is only the most advanced class that is interested in creating a scientific philosophical theory of society. Therefore, Marxism a genuinely scientific philosophy combines the possibility of a correct explanation of the past and a prognostication of the future, at the same time expresses the interests of the advanced, progressive social strata, those of the working class above all.
Marxism does not try to conceal its class nature, but includes partisanship, so to speak, and enjoins the direct and open adoption of the stand-point of a definite social group in any assessment of events. The proletariat sees philosophy as its theoretical weapon. Philosophy becomes a theoretical foundation of society’s transformation.
Dialectical and historical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, is precisely this type of philosophy. Marx science-cum-philosophy; Lenin writes in Materialism and Empiriocriticism “is a consummate philosophical materialism which has provided mankind, and especially the working class, with powerful instrument of knowledge (1985:220). The Edenic knowledge from where the first man Adam discovered his nakedness the knowledge of self cognition in a changing world.
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List of Contributors
Obu, Joseph A. M.Sc; an academic
staff in the Department of Physics,
Oku, Ene E. (Mrs) Ph.D is a senior academic staff in
the Department of Zoology, University of Calabar.
Nkang, Ani
Ph.D, is an Associate Professor in the Department of Botany, University
of Calabar.
John, Mildred E., B.Sc. (Nursing
(Ph.D) F.W.A.C.N is an Associate Professor in the Department of Nursing
Science, University of Calabar.
Obianwu, Victor, Ph.D, LL.B is a lecturer in the
Department of Physics, University of Calabar.
Alozie, Princewill I. Ph.D (Philosophy); LL.M; is an
Associate Professor and Acting Head, Department of Religious Studies and
Philosophy, as well as the Editor of this work.
Asira, E. Asira Ph.D; is a senior academic staff in
the Department of philosophy, University of Calabar.
Inyang, John O; M.A; is an academic staff in the
Department of Philosophy.
Akpan, Chris O; M.A, is a lecturer in the Department
of Philosophy.
Kanu, Macaulay A. Ph.D (Philosophy) LL.B; is a senior
academic staff in the Department of philosophy, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.
Eyo, Emmanuel B. Ph.D; (Philosophy); LL.B; is a senior
academic staff in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar.
Uduigwomen, Andrew F., Ph.D; is an Associate Professor
in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar.
Ozumba, G.O. Ph.D is an Associate Professor in the
Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar.
Ogan, Tamunosike V; Ph.D is a senior academic staff in
the Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt.
Anele, Douglas I. O; Ph.D; is a senor academic staff
in the Department of Philosophy, University of Lagos.